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Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

Lectures
LAW AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA
William E. Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of England’s North American empire, the restoration of
Charles II to the nation’s throne in 1660 quickly led to a sharp break in
the continuity of the legal system. In New England, the crown began to
interfere with local legal ordering in ways unprecedented since
Plymouth had been founded in 1620. In the Middle Atlantic, the
Restoration led to a new imperialism that replaced Dutch rule and Dutch
law with English rule and English common law. In the Carolinas,
Charles II’s new policies led to the founding of two new colonies.
Such was not the case in Virginia. With the restoration of Charles II
to the English throne, the king also restored Sir William Berkeley, a
former royal governor, to his post in Virginia, and the law continued to
develop largely in directions it had already been moving. A potentially
transforming event occurred a decade and a half later, when Nathaniel
Bacon, a newcomer from England who had settled on the Virginia
frontier, led a rebellion that resulted in a civil war that nearly toppled the
colonial regime. Ultimately Bacon’s Rebellion was suppressed, and its
suppression resulted not in change, but in reinforcement of legal
developments that were already occurring.
This Article proceeds in four main parts. Part II focuses on the
decade and a half between the Restoration and Bacon’s Rebellion and
examines Virginia’s unstable and somewhat weak legal order in the
1660s and early 1670s.1 Rapid immigration by whites lay at the root of
the instability; Virginia’s planters needed laborers—mainly in the form
of young, mostly male, indentured servants—for the economy to grow
and prosper. However, the colony proved unable to absorb those
newcomers into the governing elite after they completed their period of
servitude. Instead, the freed laborers grew into a landless, sullen, and
Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law and Professor of History, New York University. A
condensed version of this article was delivered as the Martin Luther King Lecture at
Valparaiso University School of Law on January 23, 2014. The author is indebted to the
Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York University
School of Law for research support and to the members of the Legal History Colloquium at
New York University for their comments and criticisms.
1
See infra Part II (examining the weak nature of Post-Restoration law in Virginia).
*
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unruly lot that eventually turned to open rebellion. As noted above,
however, their rebellion failed.
In the aftermath of rebellion, Virginia’s governing elite solidified its
power. In the short term, rebels were punished, compelled to give peace
bonds promising obedience, or otherwise coerced into quiescence. In the
longer run, except in connection with the somewhat later settlement of
the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia became increasingly unwelcoming to
white immigrants, at least in comparison with other colonies like
Pennsylvania that had been founded in the Post-Restoration era. After
the 1670s, whites tended to immigrate to those other colonies, and
Virginia was forced to replace its white, indentured servants with black
African slaves, who became victims of severe forms of repression that
never could have been imposed on voluntary immigrants from Europe.
As a result, elites had an easier task of governance in the eighteenth
century than they had had in the seventeenth—they only had to control a
smaller, stable class of whites positioned midway between themselves
and their slaves rather than a growing underclass of whites striving for
upward mobility.
Part III will examine how the structure and
procedures of the legal system enabled elites to exert that control.2
Meanwhile, Virginia’s substantive law continued to develop in the
directions it had taken since the 1620s. In an effort to attract settlers and
capital, Virginia continued to champion private property and facilitate
the collection of debts. The law also strove to encourage immigration
from Europe by improving the well-being of indentured servants, in part
by conferring real rights on those servants but also by distinguishing
white servants from black slaves through degradation of the latter.
Taken together, the degradation of Africans and their descendants and
the replacement of white with black labor, together with the protection
of creditors and property owners, set in motion chains of causation that
would result in the inhumanity and injustice of nineteenth-century
slavery. Part IV will examine these developments.3
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Virginia’s provincial elites
together with crown officials could look with some satisfaction on the
legal order they had created. They governed the colony effectively, with
no outward signs of resistance to the powers in authority. Virginians
were among the most docile and supportive subjects in Great Britain’s
colonial American empire. Nonetheless, some fragility remained. In
analyzing developments in Virginia law after 1750, Part V will examine

2
See infra Part III (explaining how Virginia elites strengthened their legal power
throughout the 1600s).
3
See infra Part IV (examining various substantive law areas in colonial Virginia).
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how that fragility was gradually exposed. Ultimately its exposure led to
the collapse of Virginia’s colonial legal order in 1776.4
In addition to providing the first general history of colonial Virginia
law, this Article seeks to intervene in two respects in ongoing scholarly
debates. First, in respect to the subject of slavery. For almost threequarters of a century, historians have rightly assumed that colonial
Virginia slavery was thoroughly unjust and inhumane, but few have
inquired in a systematic fashion about what made it so. This Article
urges that historians have used the concept of slavery to describe a wide
variety of vastly different socio-economic systems of subordination and
also urges that various conditions and circumstances on the ground have
made those different systems more and less evil. The Article then offers
a specific theory, together with some tentative but by no means full
evidentiary support, to suggest what made Virginia slavery more
inhumane and unjust than most other systems of servitude.
Second, in respect to the subject of the causes of the American
Revolution. For the past half century, most historians have searched for
causation in the realm of political and legal ideology. This Article finds
that search misguided in Virginia’s case. Although Virginia lawyers
undoubtedly employed familiar political, constitutional, and legal ideas
in challenging Parliamentary policies, this Article suggests that economic
considerations combined with ideological and constitutional ones to
motivate Virginia planters as they ceased being some of the most docile
and supportive of Britain’s colonials and instead became almost
unanimous defenders of American rights and ultimately of American
independence.
II. THE WEAKNESS OF POST-RESTORATION LAW
Historians generally agree that in the 1660s and 1670s the legal
system of Virginia—consisting of a colony-wide General Court and local
county courts—suffered from instability and weakness despite the broad
civil, criminal, equitable, and regulatory jurisdiction that both the
General Court and the county courts possessed. The root problem lay in
the large number of landless, difficult-to-govern, former indentured
servants whom the colony’s small governing class lacked sufficient
power to coerce. The system had to govern by consent since it was too
weak to do otherwise.5
See infra Part V (examining the weakening of the Virginia legal order throughout the
1700s).
5
See JOHN RUSTON PAGAN, ANNE ORTHWOOD’S BASTARD: SEX AND LAW IN EARLY VIRGINIA
51 (2003) (providing the most recent monograph on the legal system of seventeenth century
Virginia). The jurisdiction of the courts is outlined in more detail below. See infra Part III.E.1.
4
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A good deal of evidence of the weakness of post-1660 legal
institutions exists. A persistent sign was the difficulty of obtaining the
attendance of witnesses,6 jurors,7 and even justices in court.8 There was
also “the long & tedious”9 nature of sometimes “frivolous”10 litigation
that parties could pursue until they were either satisfied with the result
or totally exhausted. If a litigant did not approve of a result in a county
court, he could appeal to the General Court,11 even from a second
decision in “a vexatious turbulent cause already judged,”12 and from the

See, e.g., R v. Goodrich (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND
GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 1622−1632, 1670−1676 WITH NOTES AND EXCERPTS FROM
ORIGINAL COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT RECORDS, INTO 1683, NOW LOST 376 (H.R. McIlwaine
ed., 1924) [hereinafter MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL] (noting that a witness failed to appear); R v.
Walker (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY VIRIGINA DEEDS, ORDERS WILLS & C.
1657–1662, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) [hereinafter 3 YORK 1657–
1662]; see also R v. Dangerfield (Va. Gen. Ct., Nov. 20, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra,
at 397 (explaining that a fine was remitted since the witness “was made incapable by
sickness”).
7
See, e.g., R v. Bryan (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 4, 1674/1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 403 (stating the government fined Charles Bryan for failing to appear as a juror); R v.
Davis (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 25, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 379 (fining
jurors for failing to appear); see also R v. Lang (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 24, 1668), in 9
NORTHAMPTON RECORD BOOK, 1664−1674, at 176, 178 (Howard Mackey & Marlene A. Groves
eds., 2003) [hereinafter 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674] (requiring jurors show why they failed to
appear).
8
See, e.g., R v. Wright (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1662), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1661−1665, at 26 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665] (fining justices
499 lb. of tobacco for missing court); cf Order That Court Be Adjourned (Northumberland Cnty.
Ct., May 20, 1661), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOKS NORTHUMBERLAND
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1657–1661, at 101 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter
VIRGINIA 1657–1661] (cancelling a court session since only two justices attended).
9
Gilbert v. Smith (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1675), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical
Soc’y of Utah); accord Bu[s]hrod v. Dixon (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 4, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 314; see also Bridger v. Pitt (Va. Gen. Ct., May 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF
THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 336–37 (describing the proceeding as a “long dispute”).
10
R v. Spencer & Goodale (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1664), in 3 VIRGINIA COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS 303–04 (Beverley Fleet ed., 1988) [hereinafter 3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS].
11
See, e.g., Madeson v. Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1667), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1665–1669, at 49
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–1669] (stating
that Bennet Madeson appealed the decision); Williams v. Christmas (Northumberland Cnty.
Ct., Sept. 6, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 85–86 (granting Thomas
Williams’ request for appeal to the General Court); Hubard v. Wheeler (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26,
1657), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical
Soc’y of Utah).
12
Salter v. Stinson (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1658), in 3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS,
supra note 10, at 199.
6
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General Court to the House of Burgesses13 or the Privy Council.14 Courts
also reversed their own judgments without appeals when parties
brought new matters to their attention.15 It seems that judges were
unwilling or unable to enforce their judgments as final, but were instead
engaged in a negotiating process in which the court and the litigants
responded to each other’s contentions, slowly narrowed their
differences, and ultimately came to a result with which all could live.
Like many other
The case of John Gibson is illustrative.16
seventeenth-century Virginians, he decided one day to use someone
else’s boat, for which he was convicted of theft of the boat. The court
levied a stiff fine of 6000 lbs. of tobacco. However, as the court
undoubtedly knew, collecting a fine was quite different from imposing
one. John Gibson, in fact, did not pay his 6000 lb. fine, and soon the
court offered a bargain: it agreed to remit half the fine if Gibson would
agree to pay the other half—that is, 3000 lbs. tobacco—within the next
two years.17 He agreed, although it is unclear how much, if anything, he
ultimately paid.

13
See, e.g., Carter v. Hatcher (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 383 (referring the decision to the Assembly); West v. Wilson (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 28,
1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 382 (allowing Wilson to appeal the decision
to the Assembly); West v. White (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 375–76 (referring the entire cause of action to the Assembly); Lawrence v. Lloyd
(Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 25, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 295, 297 (stating that
the case would next move to the Assembly).
14
See, e.g., Ludwell v. Bland (Va. Gen. Ct., Nov. 21, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 398−99 (moving the case from the Assembly to the Council).
15
See, e.g., Wyatt v. Ford (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 16, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 441−43 (voiding its own previous proceedings because a mistake was made);
Taberer v. Hunt (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 277
(reversing its previous disposition); R v. Anderson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1670), in MINUTES OF
THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 238–39 (reversing the jury decision); Page v. Estate of Dixon
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1661/1662), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1656−1661, at 100 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993)
[hereinafter LANCASTER 1656−1661] (reversing its previous order issued against the estate of
Miles Dixon); R v. Thomas (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 24, 1669), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1665−1669, supra note 11, at 93–94 (remitting the amount the court original decreed William
Thomas to pay). Compare Madeson v. Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1667),
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 46 (allowing the case be presented again to the
jury because the original information presented to the jury was imperfect), with Madeson v.
Flowers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1667), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note
11, at 49 (granting the request to review the court’s previous decision regarding which party
owned the servant).
16
See Remission of Gibson’s Fine (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1668), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 67 (bargaining with John Gibson to reduce his
fine if he paid what else he owed within the next two years).
17
Id.
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A series of matters involving Richard Cole, a justice of the
Northumberland County Court in the late 1650s, provides another
example of the legal system’s weakness. Cole’s difficulties began when
his colleagues filed a petition in February 1658/1659 with the governor
requesting that Cole “for his misdemeanor . . . be expelled” from the
court.18 His expulsion, however, marked only the beginning. Thereafter,
Cole was a frequent litigant in,19 among other cases, one in which a
female servant accused him of “abus[ing] her by very unlawful &
careless beatings.”20 At one point, the court put him under a bond for
good behavior, from which it released him in October 1662, “he
promising conformity for the future in all things touching his civil
comportment.”21 Of course, he did not keep his bargain; and in
December 1663, another female servant accused him of beating her
cruelly.22 The court, however, either would not or could not coerce Cole
into good behavior; all it did was require him to give another bond, from
which it released him in March 1663/1664 on his promise “to comport &
demean himself civilly toward all people.”23 At its next session, the
court directed the sheriff to impanel a jury to inquire into the death of a
woman servant belonging to Cole,24 but it did not indict him. Another
case highlighted the court’s impotence six months later when a fourth
female servant complained of Cole’s cruelty, Cole failed to appear in
response to her complaint, and thus the court adjudged her to have
“ma[d]e good her complaint.”25 As a result of her success, the man with
whom she lived while her suit against Cole was pending received a
judgment of 100 lb. of tobacco compensation from Cole; apparently he
Petition to Governor (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 24, 1658/1659), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1657−1661, supra note 8, at 39.
19
E.g., Cole v. Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 25.
20
Earle v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 21, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665,
supra note 8, at 28–29.
21
Application of Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 34−36.
22
Newman v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1663), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 64–65.
23
Application of Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1663/1664), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 78; see also Lewis v. Rothram (Northumberland
Cnty. Ct., July 20, 1670), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1669−1673, at 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669−1673] (releasing the defendant from punishment on an identical
promise).
24
Order to Impanel Jury (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 80–81.
25
Knight v. Cole (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 20, 1664), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661−1665, supra note 8, at 91.
18
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also received the right to bargain with Cole to purchase her future
service.26 However Cole, who was a man of some wealth, could not be
coerced.
Ludwell v. Scarborough27 can be understood as yet more of the same.
This October 1670 case between Thomas Ludwell, the secretary of the
colony who was representing a deceased London merchant, and
Edmund Scarborough, the wealthiest man on the eastern shore, arose out
of Scarborough’s bond for £1500.28 Scarborough “in his defense having
exhibited a bill in equity laying down sundry reasons wherefore the said
bond and interest thereupon should not be adjudged against him”
offered to pay £743 and 13 shillings immediately and £130 and 13
shillings in two years, and the court did “unanimously adjudge nemine
contra dicente that it [was] a satisfactory payment.”29 Ludwell promptly
appealed to the next session of the House of Burgesses, but then in the
afternoon withdrew his appeal and interposed a new motion in the form
of a demurrer to Scarborough’s defense.30 The court then ruled that the
“demurrer to the bill exhibited by the said Scarborough is undeniable in
regard that many things in the said bill cannot be answered but by” the
deceased London merchant himself.31
With the case now in an uncertain posture, Ludwell offered to settle
for £840, to be paid in two equal installments on March 1, 1671, and
March 1, 1672.32 The next morning, Scarborough counteroffered with a
proposal to pay £300 immediately, £300 on March 31, 1672, and £240 on
March 31, 1673; on this basis, the suit was settled.33
The legal system also behaved less harshly toward crime in the PostRestoration Era than it had in the past or would again in the future,
thereby implying its weakness. Not surprisingly the criminal law
continued to punish murder with death,34 and theft—especially hog
Id.
(Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 239−41.
28
Id. at 239.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 239–40.
31
Id. at 240.
32
Id.at 240–41.
33
See Ludwell v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 27, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 241 (dropping the appeal once they reached an agreement).
34
See, e.g., Indian Condemned (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 25, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 379–80 (ordering death for murder by stabbing); Sentence of Death (Va. Gen.
Ct., Oct. 24, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 352–53 (ordering death by
hanging); Sentence of Death (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 15, 1672/1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 329 (mentioning Thomas was sentenced to death for murdering Morrice); Shaw
Arraignment (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 7, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 252
(reporting that the governor consented to Shaw’s death penalty sentence for murder); see also
Judgment for Murder (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 23, 1669), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
26
27
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stealing—with whippings and heavy fines.35 Perjury was another
serious offense for which a convict might be whipped as well as barred
from giving any future testimony.36 Other noteworthy cases included
prosecutions for sexual assault,37 forgery,38 piracy,39 witchcraft,40
drunkenness,41 unlawful sale of liquor,42 not tending corn,43 “making
unreasonable hogsheads,”44 and trading with servants.45
513 (failing to state the penalty for murder); Judgment of Death for Stabbing (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct.
29, 1666), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 510 (failing to state the penalty for
murder); Indictment Against a Man and Woman for Murdering Child (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 17,
1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509 (describing an indictment for the
murder of a child where the penalty was unclear); R v. Woollford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan.
29, 1661/1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES 1657−1664,
at 215 [hereinafter 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664] (discussing an infanticide defendant held for
trial). However, death setences could still be commuted before the King carried out the capital
punishment. See, e.g., Shaw to Be Free (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 26, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 297–98 (showing Shaw’s pardon for a death sentence from the King).
35
See, e.g., R v. Phillis (Va. Gen. Ct., June 22, 1670), in MINUTES OF GENERAL COURT, supra
note 6, at 223–24 (describing the penalty for felony larceny, benefit of clergy, was to burn it in
the criminal’s hand); R v. Richards (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1665/1666), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1662−1666, at 94 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1662−1666] (describing the penalty
for killing a hog as a fine of 2000 lb. of tobacco); R v. Hayes (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 31,
1664/1665), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 370−73 (punishing petty larceny
with thirty-nine lashes); see also R v. Droigt (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1662), in LANCASTER
1662−1666, supra, at 5 (explaining that breaking into a house and stealing corn is an offense
properly held before the General Court).
36
See, e.g., R v. Stansby (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
37
E.g., R v. Wiltshire (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 207−09. The defendant sat at a door “showing in a beastly manner
his members . . . [a]nd Sarah Gilbert seeing his members flung water out of a porringer at them
saying hide your Arse you nasty rogue” and ran into the woods. Id. at 208–09. Wiltshire
followed her, “took up her coats, & in a most barbarous manner plucked off a tuft of her hair
presupposed of her privities.” Id. at 209. He received a penalty of thirty-nine lashes. Id.
38
See, e.g., R v. Burrell (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20, 1671), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 46 (convicting Burrell of forging a deed of sale); R v. Michaelson
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674, supra note 7, at 227
(convicting Michaelson for using another's name).
39
See, e.g., Case of Piracy (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 19, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 509 (sending the pirate to England for trial and setting his ship’s captives free).
40
See, e.g., Commwealth v. Stephens (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 16, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509 (reporting the witch accusation against Stephens).
41
See, e.g., R v. Betts (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664,
supra note 34, at 310 (fining the defendant for drunkenness).
42
E.g., R v. Allen (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1661/1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 216, 219.
43
E.g., R v. Robins (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1665), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674,
supra note 7, at 63.
44
Complaint of Wraxall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1669/1670), in 9 NORTHAMPTON
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 224.
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Three other broad categories of offenses—violation of sexual norms,
contempt of authority, and sins against the religious establishment—
require more extended discussion. The most common offense against
sexual morality was bastardy.
Prosecutions against parents of
illegitimate children, however, were not about morality but rather about
the costs of raising the children,46 and hence courts dismissed such cases
if it became clear that no parish would be chargeable with support of the
bastard child.47 Almost uniformly, those prosecuted were servant girls
whose penalty—in addition to twenty lashes48 or payment of a fine49—
was to serve extra time to compensate their masters for the
inconvenience of their pregnancy.50 These young female servants, of
See, e.g., R v. Ashwign (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1673), in 3 VA. COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 353 (forcing Ashwign to pay back the value of the coat plus
fourfold its value); R v. Naylor (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1668/1669), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1666−1669, at 69 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1666−1669] (forcing a trader to pay back
fourfold the value of traded tobacco plus costs); Kirton v. Richardson (Northumberland Cnty.
Ct., Dec. 18, 1672), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669−1673, supra note 23, at 76 (stating that bartering
with servants is illegal); Meriweather v. Sorsby (Surry Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1672), microformed on
1000469889 (Library of Va.).
46
But see, e.g., R v. Watson (Northampton Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1669), in 9 NORTHAMPTON
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 203–04 (discussing a possible exception where a couple was
prosecuted for premarital intercourse). Since the marriage of a couple made the father liable
for support of their children, the usual economic basis for prosecution—the potential liability of
the public to support a child—disappeared. However, another economic basis—the loss by
masters of their servants’ labor—may have existed and may have motivated prosecutions like
that in the Watson case. In any event, however, cases such as Watson were overruled by R v.
Blackston. (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1671), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of
Utah) (holding that a couple could not be prosecuted for premarital intercourse if they married
before return of an indictment).
47
See, e.g., R v. Hughes (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
48
See, e.g., R v. Tyer (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664,
supra note 34, at 305–06, 308 (sentencing a servant to a fine and twenty lashes); R v. Emery
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1668), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at
67 (requiring the woman receive twenty lashes until blood comes out); R v. Jones
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1667), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at
47 (ordering that young servant woman receive twenty lashes for delivering the “bastard
child”); R v. Miles (York Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1661/1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). On very rare occasions, men
were also whipped. See, e.g., R v. Maynard (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 26, 1670), microformed on
1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
49
See, e.g., R v. Poore (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 8, 1665), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra note
35, at 88 (fining the master 500 lb. of tobacco); R v. Connor (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1675)
microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.); R v. Driggs (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1663), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 320 (requiring the master to pay 500 lb. of tobacco).
50
See, e.g., R v. Poore (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 8, 1665), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra note
35, at 88 (extending the servant woman’s service time by two and a half years); R v. Bell (York
Cnty. Ct., May 25, 1674), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). Another form
45
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course, had no capacity to resist, but in contrast their boyfriends did.
Thus, if their boyfriends were prosecuted at all, they would merely have
to pay a fine51 and/or give a bond to compensate the parish for childrearing costs.52 They would suffer no penalty at all if they could prove
that they did not have intercourse with the child’s mother.53 The father
of compensation was to bind the bastard to the master’s service until the age of twenty-one.
See, e.g., R v. Ameny (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 20, 1669), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 4–5 (ordering the servant’s child serve the master until the child
turns twenty-one); Petition of Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1661), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 7–8 (forcing the servant’s child be the master’s
apprentice until the child turns twenty-one). A pregnant female servant was simply worth less
than a female without child. See Waters v. Bishopp (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1664), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 348–49 (allowing for recission of a contract for sale
of a female servant when the servant turned out to be pregnant). For a book about the servant
in question in Waters v. Bishopp and her child, see generally PAGAN, supra note 5.
51
See, e.g., R v. Osborne (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9, 1663), in LANCASTER 1662−1666, supra
note 35, at 25 (fining the man 500 lb. of tobacco for the fornication); R v. Powell (Norfolk Cnty.
Ct., Aug. 17, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.); R v. Wills (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct.
29, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 317, 320 (fining the man 500 lb. of
tobacco for the fornication).
52
See, e.g., R v. Mongon (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 310–11 (fining the man 500 lb. of tobacco and keeping him in
custody until he creates a bond arrangement to pay for child care); R v. Jones (Northumberland
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 20, 1666), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 30–31 (forcing the
child’s father to post a bond to pay for the parish’s child-rearing). Note that a bond would be
cancelled if the bastard died. See, e.g., R v. Bryan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1674), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1674−1677, at 15 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND
1674−1677] (returning the bond to the deceased child’s father less costs). Occasionally, a
woman also might be asked to give a support bond. See, e.g., R v. Rane (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.,
Mar. 11, 1673/1674), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1670−1674, at 93 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER
1670−1674] (requiring a woman give 500 lb. of tobacco to the parish as a security for her child’s
care).
53
See, e.g., R v. Baker (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1666), in 9 NORTHAMPTON
1664−1674, supra note 7, at 90, 95, 98 (requiring the sheriff forbear collecting a fine from an
alleged father who plead “mistake of some of the Jurors by calling common fame certain
knowledge”); R v. Kendall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 353−54 (stating that the court found John Kendall innocent upon
the computation of time and regarding his “future reputation,” the court put its “calculation
upon record”); R v. James (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1661/1662), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1661−1665, supra note 8, at 17 (aquitting an alleged father who was out of
the county nine months before birth); R v. Dicker (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 20, 1670/1671),
microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (holding that a man cannot be held a
father if he is not accused by a woman during labor); R v. Heyricke (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26,
1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical
Soc’y of Utah) (finding that the charge against Heyricke was not supported “by any good
evidence”). At least one court adjudged a man the father on conflicting evidence by a divided
court. See Pinkethman v. Reason (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 25, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662,
supra note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
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of a bastard child also had the choice of keeping the child and putting it
to work,54 even if the father’s female servant was the child’s mother.55 A
master who impregnated his female servant would nonetheless still be
fined,56 and the servant also would be found guilty of fornication,57
unless she could prove that intercourse had occurred against her will.58
Further evidence of the law’s inability to act with vigor to protect
Virginians’ sexual morality lay in its treatment of adultery. Thus, when
Susan Powell delivered a bastard child after having “for a long time
entertained in her house one John Powell[,] her . . . husband’s brother,”
she received, not the usual twenty lashes, but only a 500 lb. tobacco fine
plus a warning that she would receive a further fine if she continued to
entertain her brother-in-law.59 When June Beadle was accused of
adultery, her case was postponed,60 it “not appearing to the Court by
positive proof . . . that she has a husband that lay claim to her.”61 Even
when adultery became scandalous, the law did little about it. The
Northumberland County Court did punish as libelous a bogus document
See, e.g., Reader v. Whittaker (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 21, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 265 (requiring the father keep the child and pay only those costs already
disbursed); R v. Arnold (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1670), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1669−1673, supra note 23, at 15 (ordering the father keep and take care of the child). The court
also could order the child be apprenticed. See, e.g., R v. Parker (Northumberland Cnty. Ct.,
Nov. 18, 1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52, at 41–42 (requiring the child
serve the mother’s master until the child reaches age eighteen).
55
See Muirhall v. Clarke (York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 24, 1662), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra
note 6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (discussing a master
impregnanting his servant). For a discussion regarding the issue of masters impregnating their
servants and legislative efforts to prevent such issues, see PAGAN, supra note 5, at 84−85.
56
Compare Donnell v. Green (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1690), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1689−1692, at 15–16
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692] (requiring
that Green appear before the court for fathering a bastard child), with R v. Green
(Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra, at 23 (fining
Green 500 lb. of tobacco for the fornication).
57
See Commwealth v. Bennett (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24, 1658), in LANCASTER 1656−1661,
supra note 15, at 40 (issuing corporal punishment for the servant mother for her fornication).
58
See, e.g., Langworth v. Calloway (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1660), in 3 VA. COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 232 (finding a servant not liable for fornication against her will
while failing to charge the master with any crime). Of course, another option was to deny
pregnancy. If this were done, midwives were assembled to inspect the woman. See, e.g.,
Petition of Banton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 8, 1671), in LANCASTER 1670–1674, supra note 52, at
41 (mandating two skillful and honest citizens search the accused woman).
59
R v. Powell (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.).
60
See R v. Beadle (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664,
supra note 34, at 319–21 (discussing how the defendant was given two months to prove that she
had no husband or she would be forced to leave the county).
61
R v. Beadle (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra
note 34, at 293–94.
54
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in the form of a false “contract of marriage . . . between Charles Ashton
and the wife of David Lindsay,”62 a local minister, and did respond to
complaints that Lindsay’s wife was poisoning him63 and that he had
“clandestinely (unknown to the clerk) tak[en] away a petition” he had
filed, perhaps in connection with his marital difficulties.64 However,
when, in the end, the court concluded there had “been unlawful
familiarity & meetings between” Ashton and Mrs. Lindsay, it only
required Ashton give bond to remain away from his lady love.65 The
court found him, like other adulterers, guilty only of the offense of
“disorderly walking.”66
The legal order displayed even greater weakness in addressing
contempts against authority. On occasion, the General Court strove to
be effective, as in a prosecution for “opprobrious words” against “the
Queen;”67 the records fail to indicate, however, whether the case went to
judgment. In another case, the court ordered a man whipped for
“irreverent and undecent words” about the king.68 Courts also were
effective against their own officials, as when Edmund Scarborough was
suspended from all offices after being convicted of misdemeanors
“touching the complaint of the Indians,”69 or when the sheriff of James

R v. Thompson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1665), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–
1669, supra note 11, at 2.
63
See id. (referring to the appointment of a committee to investigate the poisoning claim).
64
R v. Lindsay (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1665), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1665–1669,
supra note 11, at 3.
65
Id. at 4–5.
66
See, e.g., Hare v. Kindrod (Surry Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000469889
(Library of Va.) (discussing the bond required of a man “not to come into” a woman’s
“company, unless at . . . church or some other meeting”). Some men’s sentences were
eliminated if they promised to not keep company with the women. See, e.g., R v. Stott
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1661), in LANCASTER 1656–1661, supra note 15, at 87–88 (ordering
the sheriff to take security of Stott “for the good behaviours [sic] and promises not to keep
company with the said woman”); Genesis v. Lewis (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 20, 1670),
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 20–21 (allowing the man to be freed on bond
if he avoided the woman’s company and behaved civilly in the future); Complaint of
Thompson (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1674) microformed on 1000469889 (Library of Va.). Compare
Groton v. Henricks (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664,
supra note 34, at 361–62 (releasing Hendricks on bond with the condition he shun the company
of Groton’s wife), with Groton v. Groton (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1664), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 361–62 (ordering Groton’s wife receive fifteen
lashes because she refused to return to her husband and stated “she would be hanged before
she would live with him”).
67
(Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 19, 1661), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 507.
68
R v. Mill (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1662), in 8 NORTHAMPON 1657–1664, supra note
34, at 221, 223.
69
R v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
238.
62
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City County was fined for arresting a member of the General Court.70
Moreover, they tried to protect their officials, as when one entered a
“severe judgment for taking a prisoner out of [a] sheriff's custody.”71
Courts also succeeded in enforcing Parliament’s Navigation Acts.72
Judges were far less effective, though, in the ordinary run of
contempt cases, where they could not compel the general population to
show them respect and, where, when disrespect occurred, they could not
impose severe penalties but could only ask defendants to acknowledge
their wrongdoing and humbly seek forgiveness. The records are filled
with entries about Virginians who were guilty of “uncivil language &
deportment to judges”73 and other officials.74 Elizabeth Fielding, for one,
(Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 30, 1664), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 508.
(Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1665), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 509; cf. (Va. Gen.
Ct., Nov. 25, 1668), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513 (discussing a party who
broke away from prison and was banished to Barbados); R v. Mill (Northampton Cnty. Ct.,
April 28, 1662), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 221, 223 (discussing the
abusing of a constable); R v. Allford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1661), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 203 (referring to the striking of a sheriff); R v.
Napier (York Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1668), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah)
(retaking property attached by an undersheriff).
72
See, e.g., Bland v. Hansford (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 448–49 (discussing the punishment for failure to pay thirty-five
hoggheads of tobacco to the King for the transport); Condemnation of Ship Phoenix (Va. Gen.
Ct., Mar. 17, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 443–45 (requiring
forfeiture of all goods on ship for violating the act of Parliament); Order Against New England
Vessels (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 10, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 434–35
(holding the ship until payment of sufficient security); Condemnation of Ship St. George of
Galloway (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 16, 1669/1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 242–
43 (condemning the ship for failure to follow the act of Parliament).
73
R v. Hale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1668/1669), in LANCASTER 1666–1669, supra note 45,
at 69; accord R v. Roads (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Sept. 15, 1662) microformed on 30144006669329
(Library of Va.); R v. Shappell (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 8, 1671), in LANCASTER 1670–1674,
supra note 52, at 41 (referring to a man sitting in a pew in the church reserved for justices “to the
dishonour [sic] of God Almighty [and] the contempt of his Majesty's justices”); Commonwealth
v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34,
at 110, 114 (discussing Warren’s misbehavior before the court when it pronounced its
judgment); R v. Moulton (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 8, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1661–1665, supra note 8, at 31 (discussing Moulton’s failure to appear before the court);
Commonwealth v. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1660), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1657–1661, supra note 8, at 68 (committing Warren to the sherriff’s custody for uncivil and
unbefitting language before the court); R v. Lee (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1674), microformed on
1000469889 (Library of Va.) (discharging Lee from the sherriff’s custody for acknowledging his
offense).
74
See R v. Bushrod (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1661), in 3 YORK 1657–1662, supra note 6,
microformed on 1000445991 (Library of Va.); cf. Order Regarding Sheriff (Northampton Cnty. Ct.,
Dec. 13, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 16571664, supra note 34, at 143 (discussing the authorization
for arrest of persons who “disturbed the Sheriff in [the execution] of his office”). Compare R v.
Allford (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Nov. 29, 1661), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34,
at 203 (discussing a couple who refused to obey a sherriff’s arrest), with R v. Allford
70
71
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“openly did declare that she would not yield obedience to their [the
judges’] order,”75 while William Hatton committed a “contempt . . . of
dangerous consequence,” when, on receiving a summons for his
appearance, he announced that “he was not then at leisure but when he
was at leisure he would come.”76 Philip Mongom, a “Negro,” when
accused of stealing hogs, threw “hogs’ ears on the . . . court table.”77 A
year later Thomas Cheney was accused of “speaking dangerous and
unlawful words of the King’s Most Excellent Majesty and his
Government” and of refusing to take the oaths of allegiance and
supremacy. The court did not punish Cheney because it found him
“disturbed in his brain talking wildly and distractedly of such things as
are put to him.”78
In most other contempt cases, the court merely imposed a slap on the
wrist—it threatened severe punishment but then remitted that
punishment as long as the defendant acknowledged his wrongdoing and
humbly submitted to the court’s authority.79 Robert Warren, for
example, while drunk, “came into the faces of the Court . . . rudely
intruding & . . . interrupting & upbraiding the Commissioners in their
Pronouncing of Judgment.”80 He was left at “liberty in hopes he would
better his behavior,” but he nonetheless confronted one of the
Commissioners “in the open yard & hearing of many persons, there
affronting & upbraiding him concerning Justice[,] telling him he cared
not for him, nor the Court with other words of defiance.”81 The court
then committed him to the sheriff82 and fined him 350 lb. tobacco at the
next sitting court.83

(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 30, 1661), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 208–09
(discussing the couple’s “dangerous assa[u]lt” on the sherriff).
75
R v. Fielding (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1671), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673,
supra note 23, at 43–44; see also Beale v. Wardley (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 23, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 267 (discussing Wardly’s refusal to obey the court judgment).
76
R v. Hatton (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 26, 1660/1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note
6, microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
77
Commonwealth v. Mongom, (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 110, 113.
78
R v. Cheney (York Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note 6,
microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
79
See, e.g., Price v. Ball (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 26, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note
6, at 299 (discussing the form of punishment used in contempt cases).
80
Commonwealth v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 114.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Commonwealth v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1660), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657–1664, supra note 34, at 115–17.
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The courts were equally powerless in dealing with offenses against
religion. The most common such offense was missing church or
otherwise profaning the Sabbath, which could be prosecuted with some
success because punishments were mild.84 Sometimes the judiciary also
was able to prosecute individuals who defamed clergymen and church
leaders.
Thomas Bushrod, for one, used “slanderous, rude,
contemptible, and mutinous language against the Reverend Clergy” and
was held for the General Court; because “the charge against him [was] of
so high & dangerous a nature & concernment,” the court found him “no
way bailable.”85 Another man received thirty lashes “for swearing and
using profane words in the pulpit of [the] parish church.”86 Similarly, a
court fined John Williams for his contempt of “the solemnity of the true
orthodox established religion of the Church of England” and his efforts
to “stir . . . up the hearts & minds of the people to a hatred & dislike of
God’s word preached by the pious & learned ministers of the Gospel” as
he sought to convert them “to the . . . proud, vain, formal hypocrisy of
the Quaker.”87
However, most challenges to religious authority received the same
weak response courts gave to contempt against civil power. Thus, when
John Stockly, “in a turbulent manner disturbed and abused” a vestry by
calling it “an illegal vestry,” the court required only that he “make his
public recantation in the church” and give a good behavior bond.88

See, e.g., R v. Wolmsey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 25, 1663), in 3 VA. COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 276 (presenting Wolmsey before the grand jury for failing to
attend church for nine months); R v. London (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 29, 1663/1664), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 335–37 (fining London for not baptizing his
children or coming to church); R v. Marriott (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1672), microformed on
1000469889 (Library of Va.); R v. Wade (York Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1666/1667), microformed on
1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (“using uncivil language” on the Sabbath); R v. Tailor
(York Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1665), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (coming
to divine service drunk).
85
R v. Bushrod (York Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26–27, 1661), in 3 YORK COUNTY 1657–1662, supra note
6, microformed on 000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
86
R v. Stanford (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1673), microformed on 1000457503
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
87
King v. Williams (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1694), in 3 COLONIAL FAMILIES OF SURRY
AND ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES, VIRGINIA: THE COURT ORDERS OF ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY,
VIRGINIA OCTOBER 1693–MAY 1695, at 42–43 (John Anderson Brayton ed., 1999) [hereinafter 3
SURRY & ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695]; see also King v. Williams (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct.,
Dec. 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra, at 44 (fining Williams for his
contempt).
88
R v. Stockly (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra
note 34, at 295.
84
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Another court likewise ordered that a man merely give a good behavior
bond for his “blasphemous words.”89
Another offense connected with religion occurred when a minister,
without a license, married two servants.90 Perhaps because punishment
was severe, few prosecutions were brought. Another lone prosecution,
for which the punishment was a severe fine of 1000 lb. of tobacco, was
brought against a father for failing to baptize his children.91 Perhaps the
father did not believe in infant baptism, but if so he was not alone, and
there is no evidence that co-religionists were prosecuted.
Individual contempts against either lay or religious authority were
only a small part of the problem, however; crowds were much more
dangerous. On one occasion, “threatening words . . . in contempt of this
Court,” uttered by an assemblage of people, led to “so great a confusion”
that the “Court thought it not safe to sit any longer, being . . . forced to
adjourn.”92 On another occasion, three men committed an assault in
open court,93 while yet another county court had to deal with an
unlawful assembly of malcontents.94 Even women created problems:
the wives of George Spencer and David Goodale engaged in “scurrilous
brawls” and provoked their husbands to file “reciprocal, frivolous[,]

R v. Rice (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19, 1674), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677,
supra note 52, at 7–8.
90
See, e.g., (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 24, 1668), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513
(issuing a judgment against the minister for marrying a servant). Compare Lee v. Lindsay
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1661/1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661–1665, supra note 8,
at 13 (fining a minister 10,000 lb. tobacco for “his transgression”), with R v. Lindsay
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1662), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1661–1665, supra note 8, at 38
(remitting the fine since the minister “did not act the same in contempt against the law and
being ignorant what the laws provided”). For a suit against a minister who charged an
excessive fee for officiating at a marriage, see Woodson v. Marye (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Jan.
1734[1735]), in 3 GOOCHLAND COUNTY VIRGINIA COURT ORDER BOOK 1731–1735, at 385 (Ann K.
Blomquist ed., 2006) [hereinafter 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735] (discussing an action against
Marye for marrying two individuals for a certain fee).
91
On remand, the Norfolk County Court upheld the fine. Edwards v. Biggs (Va. Gen. Ct.,
June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 410, on remand, (Norfolk Cnty. Ct.,
Aug. 18, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of Va.).
92
R v. East (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., March 14, 1665/1666), in LANCASTER 1662–1666, supra note
35, at 95.
93
See R v. Wheeler (Charles City Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1673), in 13 VIRGINIA COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS CHARLES CITY COUNTY COURT ORDERS 1664–1665 FRAGMENTS 1650–1696, at 87
(Beverly Fleet ed., 1961) [hereinafter 13 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS] (discussing a ringleader who
was fined 1000 lb. of tobacco; a second man upon his humble submission who was required to
give bond; and a third man acquitted since he “only endeavored to part the affrayers”).
94
See R v. Swann (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1673/1674), microformed on 1000469889 (Library of
Va.), aff'd., (Va. Gen. Ct., April 6, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 366–67
(affirming the Surry Court order that the ringleader be fined 2000 lb. of tobacco).
89
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litigious suits.”95 Ultimately, these disorders culminated in Bacon’s
Rebellion and in colony-wide civil strife.96
In sum, the resulting weakness of the legal order forced those who
administered it to select carefully targets for serious prosecution. The
law could harshly punish the powerless—female servants who became
pregnant, for example—by whipping them and compelling them to
serve extra time to compensate their masters. It could also impose severe
punishments on heinous criminals, such as murderers and even thieves,
whom no one else in society would defend. Perhaps there is a similar
explanation for the few harsh penalties meted out for challenges to
religious authority. However, the many offenses committed by free
men—contempt of authority, religious dissent, bastardy, adultery—met
with a feeble judicial response.
This weak legal system had to deal with a colony whose inhabitants
during the 1660s and early 1670s, in large part, failed to prosper. By the
1660s most of the best land had already fallen into the hands of great
landowners and speculators, with the result that, as servants completed
their terms of labor, they found themselves landless or exiled to small
tracts on the colony’s margins. Taxes were high, and discontent was rife.
People began to confederate in “seditious” meetings declaring “they
would not pay their public taxes,”97 and only a spark was needed to set
the colony ablaze.98
Accordingly, when a handful of Native Americans commenced
random raids along the frontier, it was easy for a wealthy newcomer
from England, Nathaniel Bacon, to assume leadership of discontented
frontiersmen eager to take revenge on the Indians. In the spring of 1676,
Bacon sought the blessing of Governor Sir William Berkeley, but
Berkeley, after promising to give Bacon a commission to lead an
expedition against the Indians, refused to honor his promise. When
Bacon showed up in Jamestown in June at the head of his army of
malcontents, Berkeley fled to the eastern shore and Bacon’s men began
plundering the plantations of Berkeley’s supporters. Open rebellion had
King v. Spencer & Goodale (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1664), in 13 VA. COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 1–2.
96
See infra notes 393–451 (discussing the status of criminal proceedings following Bacon’s
Rebellion).
97
Decision of Law (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1673/1674), in SURRY COUNTY RECORDS SURRY
COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1652–1684, at 87 (Eliza Timberlake Davis ed., 1980) [hereinafter SURRY 1652–
1684]; see King v. Chissett (Surry Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1673/1674), in SURREY 1652–1684, supra, at 88
(summoning fourteen individuals to account for their “riotous assembling” regarding
unreasonable taxes).
98
See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 215–49 (1975) (discussing the political climate of colonial Virginia
during this time).
95
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begun, but it petered out when Bacon died suddenly at the end of
October, probably from some form of dysentery.99
Once Berkeley recovered power, he began to exact revenge and tried
to insure against future rebellions. A few rebel leaders were executed100
and a few who fled had their property forfeited,101 although most were
pardoned after they paid the money that Berkeley charged for a
pardon.102 Many rebels, like Dominick Rice, were required to give bond
in the amount of £100 sterling and, on their knees, to “humbly and
heartily penitently confess and acknowledge [their] horrid villainious
[sic] rebellious and unreasonable practice” and their “horrid treasons
and rebellion” and “absolutely resolve . . . never more to commit
perpetrate contemptuously or by any . . . means to be assisting or
adhering to the like.”103 Many cases also were brought to recover
properties that had been plundered during the rebellion.104 Finally,
courts made it procedurally easier for magistrates to discipline anyone
speaking contemptuous words against them.105
Order, however, was not easily restored. Six years after Bacon’s
Rebellion, malcontents seeking to raise the price of tobacco by reducing
its supply began moving around the colony from plantation to
plantation and cutting down tobacco plants growing in planters’ fields.
A newly arrived governor had to put down this minor rebellion.106

For an in-depth discussion of Bacon’s Rebellion, see id. at 250–70.
Id. at 273.
101
E.g., King v. Lawrence (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1685/1686), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOKS (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1685–1687, at 35
(Lydia Bontempo & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687].
102
MORGAN, supra note 98, at 272–73.
103
Comm’rs v. Rice (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 18, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–
1677, supra note 52, at 89–90; accord King v. Thompson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19,
1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 95–96.
104
See, e.g., Lewis v. Bentley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1677/1678), in VIRIGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1673–1678, at 89–90 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1673–1678] (bringing an action
after the destruction of Lewis’s hogs and sheep); Codd v. Browne (Northumberland Cnty. Ct.,
July 18, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 88 (bringing an action for the
recovery of a horse).
105
See Stith v. Reeve (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1690), in CHARLES CITY COUNTY,
VIRGINIA COURT ORDERS 1687–1695 WITH A FRAGMENT OF A COURT ORDER BOOK FOR THE YEAR
1680, at 76–77 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III ed., 1980) [hereinafter CHARLES CITY 1687–1695]
(referring to a defendant who was not allowed “customary liberty” in a slander case since the
plaintiff was a magistrate).
106
See, MORGAN, supra note 98, at 286–87 (explaining Governor Chichely’s attempts at
extinguishing the rebellion); see also infra Part III (discussing how Virginia elites later
strengthened the colony’s legal order).
99

100
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III. STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL ORDER
Order ultimately was restored only as a consequence of more longterm changes in Virginia law that are about to be examined. These
changes—some of which had begun before and all of which continued
over the course of decades in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion—
transformed Virginia, by the mid-eighteenth century, into the most
stable of Britain’s North American colonies as well as the colony most
willing to serve imperial interests.
No royal or other official intentionally orchestrated the changes.
They simply occurred for widely disparate reasons unrelated to each
other or to any clear goal of strengthening the legal powers of the
regime. Collectively, however, they had that effect.
First, this section discusses the change in Virginia from a
predominately white labor force to African slavery.107 Second, the
section explains the role of patronage in controlling lower classes in
colonial Virginia.108 Third, it examines the relationship between law and
religion.109 Fourth, it explains the roles and relationships of both judges
and jurors in the legal landscape of Virginia.110 Finally, it discusses the
relation of the colony’s central government to local county elites.111
A. The Switch from White to Black Labor
If Bacon and his followers had prevailed in their rebellion against
Governor Berkeley, perhaps Virginia’s land distribution policies would
have changed. Maybe land would have been distributed to recently
freed indentured servants rather than to established elites that already
owned most of the good land. Bacon, however, lost, and existing
policies of distributing new land to already established landholders
continued and even broadened.112 The result was that colonies other
than Virginia, where land was available to indentured servants who
completed their term of servitude, became more attractive destinations
107
See infra Part III.A (examining how the move to black slave labor strengthened the
power of Virginia’s elites).
108
See infra Part III.B (discussing the duties the poor owed the wealthy and the generosity
the wealthy owed the poor).
109
See infra Part III.C (examining the role played by religion in Virginia’s legal system).
110
See infra Part III.D (discussing the powers of judges compared to juries in Virginia’s
legal system).
111
See infra Part III.E (examining various facets of Virginia law that added to the strength
of the controlling elites).
112
See generally WARREN M. BILLINGS ET AL., COLONIAL VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 134, 139, 147,
160–161, 171–72, 209–11 (1986) (explaining political tensions surrounding the Virginia
plantation elite following Bacon’s Rebellion).
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than Virginia for young people emigrating from England to America.
This slowed the pace of white immigration to Virginia.
Virginia’s planters nonetheless needed workers. They took two
steps to obtain them. One was to import black slaves to replace white
immigrants they could not obtain. Another was to make additional
efforts, apart from offering land to freed servants, to make Virginia
attractive to white immigrants.
Slavery was economically and culturally unimportant in Virginia
before the late seventeenth century. Existing scholarship agrees that
Africans and descendants of Africans constituted only some three
percent of the population in 1660—fewer than 1000 blacks out of a total
population of at least 25,000.113 Indentured servants, who were mainly
young men and teenage boys from the British Isles, performed most
drudge work. Although the few blacks present in the mid-seventeenth
century on average served longer terms of servitude than whites,
including terms for life, many blacks ultimately did become free, and no
clear distinctions separated black servants from white ones during the
periods of time during which they served. African servants lived with
European servants, performed the same work as Europeans, and were
subject to the same disciplinary rules and punishments as Europeans.
Finally, if they became free, Africans and their descendants could buy
and own land, indentured servants, and slaves just as Europeans
could.114
Slavery developed as a clear legal category in the decades following
1660. The key to its development was a series of statutes during the
1660s that first differentiated slaves from non-slaves along racial lines.
The first, in March 1660/1661, recognized that runaway “Negroes” who
already served for life were “incapable of making satisfaction by
addition of time” and accordingly required white servants who ran away
with them to serve their time.115 Several years later the recognition also
led to another act allowing masters to inflict “moderate corporal
See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 154, 404 tbl.1; KENNETH MORGAN, SLAVERY AND SERVITUDE
A SHORT HISTORY 30 tbl.2.1 (2000).
114
See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 154–57 (explaining the property rights of freed African
slaves); T.H. Breen, A Changing Labor Force and Race Relations in Virginia, 1660–1710, 7 J. SOC.
HIST. 6, 7(1973) (referring to the status of black men in the mid-seventeenth century). See
generally James H. Brewer, Negro Property Owners in Seventeenth Century Virginia, 12 WM. &
MARY Q. 575 (1955) (discussing freed African slave property owners in seventeenth-century
Virginia). But see Russell R. Menard, From Servants to Slaves: The Transformation of the Chesapeake
Labor System, 16 S. STUDS. 355 (1977) (explaining the rise in black slavery in the Chesapeake
colonies during the 1700s).
115
2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 26 (Univ.
Press of Va. 1969) (1823).
113
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punishment,” on runaways.116 A year earlier, when doubts had arisen
whether baptism made a person now described as a “slave” free, the
legislature responded by declaring “the blessed sacrament” did “not
alter the condition of [a] person as to his bondage or freedom.”117 The
decline into slavery continued in 1669 when a statute provided that a
master would not be guilty of murder if a “slave [who] resist[ed] his
master . . . by the extremity of the correction should chance to die,” since
it could “not be presumed” that anyone would “destroy his own
estate.”118 The next year Virginia barred free blacks from “purchasing
Christian servants,”119 and a decade later the first “act for preventing
Negroes’ insurrections” prohibited blacks from carrying guns or other
weapons and from meeting in “considerable numbers . . . under pretence
of feasts and burials.”120
Even by the 1680s, however, slavery had not replaced indentured
servitude as the principal form of plantation labor; planters continued to
rely mainly on indentured servants. Only after 1690, for reasons much
debated among historians, did Africans and their descendants become
the primary providers of plantation labor in the colony of Virginia,
although even then it was not clear that all black servants were slaves.121
Further, as late as the 1740s, a runaway black was dealt with as a servant
when he was required to serve extra time for running away—a penalty
that made no sense if he was a slave already required to serve for life.122
The evidence is ambiguous and conflicting, but the view of Russell
Menard and others seems correct—that until the end of the seventeenth

Id. at 266.
Id. at 260.
118
Id. at 270.
119
Id. at 280.
120
Id. at 481. For scholarly analysis of the statutory recognition of enslavement, see
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–
1812, at 71–82 (1968); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 38–
45 (1996); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the Southern Labor System, 7 WM. &
MARY Q. 199 (1955)
121
See MORGAN, supra note 98, at 306 (discussing the importation of slavery in the later half
of the seventeenth century); MORGAN, supra note 113, at 26 (explaining how indentured
servants and slaves provided most of the labor in the seventeenth century); Menard, supra note
114, at 360 (“Probate inventories and tax lists indicate that black slaves came to predominate
about 1690.”).
122
See Motion of Edwards (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1742), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1740–1742, at 63 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1740–1742] (punishing a runaway black
servant by extending his service time); Corbin v. Dolphin (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1738),
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1738–
1740, at 26 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740]
(requiring a runaway black servant serve his master for an extra five months and two days).
116
117
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century Virginia planters preferred to import white, English-speaking
indentured servants as their main labor force rather than African slaves
Only when the availability of
who spoke strange languages.123
indentured servants declined—as newly founded colonies like
Pennsylvania became more welcoming to immigrants than Virginia—
and whites, as a result, could no longer satisfy the colony’s labor needs,
did the planters switch to a slave labor force.124
Meanwhile, the colony’s leaders strove to make Virginia more
attractive to potential white immigrants. As a first step, it was essential
to draw a sharp distinction between black slavery and white indentured
servitude and thereby reassure whites that they would not be treated as
badly as blacks. Thus, one court held that a white man could not enter
into an agreement to serve a master for life.125 In addition, courts took
other steps that led, at least marginally, to the uplifting of whites.
Virginia’s law of servitude had long combined rule-of-law features
contrived to induce Europeans to immigrate with harsh mechanisms of
coercion intended to insure that, once present in Virginia, indentured
servants would work. Over the course of the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, however, the law became less harsh.
Of course, much of the old harshness remained. Thus, minors,
typically orphans who were unable to support themselves, continued to
be bound into servitude,126 and judges routinely determined the age of
servants and thus the length of time they were required to serve.127
ALLAN KULIKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CULTURES
1680–1800, at 40 (1986).
124
See Menard, supra note 114, at 362 (explaining evidence shows that as supply of servants
decreased the price of indentured labor and supply of slaves increased).
125
See Groton v. Stringer (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 29, 1678), in 10 NORTHAMPTON
COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK DEEDS, WILLS & C 1674–1678, at 297–98 (Howard Mackey &
Candy McMahan Perry eds., 2003) [hereinafter 10 NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678] (invalidating an
agreement to serve the master for life).
126
See, e.g., Binding of Martin (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1725–1728, at 74 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1725–1728] (ordering a child serve until
he reaches the age of majority); Binding of Bruce (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1729), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1729–1732, at 1
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1729–1732] (forcing the child
remain a servant until he reaches age twenty-one).
127
See, e.g., Matter of Gallion (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1665), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1664–1668, 1689–1690, at 13 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1987) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690] (adjudging a servant
to be fifteen years of age); see also Matter of Dianah (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730
(PART III, at 105–06 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III)] (determining the age of a “Negro girl . . . towards payment of levys”); cf.
Certificate of Boyd (King George Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1721/1722), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
123
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Courts also imposed punishment on runaway servants,128 with the
standard penalty being extension of the period of service by twice the
amount of time that a runaway had been absent.129 Another disability
imposed on servants prohibited them from engaging in trade without
their masters’ approval, although enforcement fell mainly on those who
bought goods from or sold goods to servants rather than on the servants
themselves.130
RECORDS ORDER BOOK KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1721–1723, at 30 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1721–1723] (referring to the certificate of a ship
captain specifying the amount of time some twenty-one English convicts were required to
serve).
128
See e.g., Williams v. Pooly (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Nov. 15, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 6 (ordering a runaway servant to serve extra time); see also Gill v. Willis
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1700–1702, at 18, 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds.,
1996) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1700–1702] (upholding, pursuant to a statute, a servant’s
agreement made in open court to serve the master for additional time); cf. Order re Parsons
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 15, 1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note
52, at 57–58 (ordering thirty lashes for runaways from Maryland plus return to provincial
secretary of Maryland); Order re Wilson (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1729), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDERS 1727–1729, at 105 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1727–1729] (ordering placement of
an iron collar on the neck of a persistent runaway); Order re Moore (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct.,
Aug. 27, 1713), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1712–1714, at 66 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter
WESTMORELAND 1712–1714] (ordering return of a runaway servant to his master). Anyone
entertaining a servant without the owner's consent was liable for statutory penalties. See, e.g.,
Rice v. Adams (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1686/1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687,
supra note 101, at 68–69 (referring to a lawsuit by a servant owner against a man who
entertained the servant without the owner’s consent).
129
See, e.g., Clarke v. Wright (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000457503
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (convicting a servant of running away and extending his service
time as punishment); Order re Dew (Surry Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1675), microformed on 1000469889
(Library of Va.) (extending a servant’s servive by 132 days for his sixty-six day absence); Order
re George (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1672), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y of
Utah) (fining a runaway 5 lb. of tobacco and extending his service time). But see Bridges v.
Barnes (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 27, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 274 (holding
that a servant who returns voluntarily must serve only the time he was absent).
130
See 3 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 451–
52 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1823) (requiring anyone who trades with a slave be thrown in jail
for one month and remain there until that person posts sufficient bond); see also Hobson v.
Watkins (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1700–1702, at 14, 18–19 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702] (imposing fourfold
penalty on a person who bought corn from a servant); Vaughan v. Chisnall (Westmoreland
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1709), VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1709, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709] (imposing one month imprisonment and fourfold damages on a
person who sold a hat to a servant); cf. In re. Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in
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Judges were especially harsh on servants who spread “scandalous[,]
false[,] and abusive language against [their] master[s].”131 The General
Court ordered one such servant to receive thirty-nine lashes and
apologize in open court.132 Likewise, servants who behaved violently
toward their masters faced a broad range of penalties, including
whipping and extra years of service,133 as did servants who, after
claiming that their masters abused them, failed to prove their claims.134
For example, two female servants who accused their master of rape had
to serve extra time when a grand jury refused to indict him.135 The same
was true when parents sued on behalf of an indentured daughter; after
they failed to prove their claim, the court would not permit them even to
visit with their child.136 This was also true for at least some servants who
claimed freedom but failed to establish it. For example, the court
required Christopher Charlton to make up time for his absence from his
master during the course of his unsuccessful suit for freedom.137 People
assisting servants in bringing wrongful complaints also might be

MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 53 (holding attempt of a servant to assign the right of
executorship void).
131
Wormely v. Morris (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 17, 1672/1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 330.
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., Ballard v. Servants (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 4, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 245 (ordering thirty-nine lashes to one servant and twenty to the another plus extra
service for assaulting overseer and running away); In re. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct.,
Nov. 11, 1670), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 25 (requiring extra service for
striking a master); In re. Sanders (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 9, 1670), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 16 (ordering twenty lashes plus one year extra
service for rude demeanor); cf. Lewis v. Morris (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 21, 1679/1680),
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1677–1679, at 95–96 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND
1677–1679] (providing that the servant was liable at end of term for injuries to a third party);
Dodman v. Duke (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 12, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra
note 127, at 5 (ordering two extra years of service for killing the horse of a third person). But see
Lucy v. Stamp (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1673), microformed on 1000457503 (Genealogical
Soc’y of Utah) (holding punishment remitted at request of master).
134
See, e.g., Cumberford v. Whitaker (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1677–1680, at 94–95 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1677–1680] (ordering the servant
whipped for failing to prove his claim against his master).
135
Smith v. Servants (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 21, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6,
at 212.
136
Medley v. Douglas (York Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1668/1669), microformed on 1000445991
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). But see Complaint Against Stevens (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug.
29, 1664), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657−1664, supra note 34, at 351 (holding a child restored to the
parent who proved “harsh usage” by master).
137
Pate v. Charlton (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
351–52.
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summoned to appear in court to answer questions concerning their
role.138
On the other hand, the courts did deal fairly with servants who
proved their claims. In some cases they recognized the freedom of
servants who were manumitted by will,139 who obtained freedom by
marrying the widow of their master,140 or who entered into agreements
with their masters to work as wage laborers rather than as servants141 or
to shorten their terms if they did not run away.142 In other cases courts
freed apprentices, the death of whose masters prevented their learning
the trade for which they had been apprenticed.143 More often courts
awarded freedom to servants when judges concluded that the servants
had completed their term of service.144 In one case, for example, a
See, e.g., R v. Jones (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1716), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–1716, at 96–97 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1714–1716] (holding those who
petitioned in slaves’ honor must appear in court on the slaves’ behalf).
139
See, e.g., Hunt v. Monger (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 240 (holding servant set free by the owner’s will); see also Agreement of Eskridge
(King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 28
(providing that the master agreed to free the servant from a six-year term if the servant
faithfully served him for three years).
140
E.g., Clark v. Ashburne (Va. Gen. Ct., April 7, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 253.
141
E.g., In re. Beverley (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 105–06.
142
E.g., Agreement of Home & Patterson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1736), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1735–1738, at 39 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738]. Legislation
required agreements between masters and servants be made in open court. 6 WILLIAM
WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 358 (Univ. Press of
Va. 1969) (1819).
143
E.g., Order re: Venna (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1674–1677, supra note 52, at 75.
144
See, e.g., Rayner v. Benford (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 22, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 349 (freeing a servant by court order); Mozingo v. Stone (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 5, 1672), in
MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 315–16 (giving an African-American his freedom
after his twenty-eight years of service); see also Flynt v. Towers (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug.
17, 1682), microformed on 00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (holding a master, who
sells a servant for a longer term than the servant was required to serve, was liable in damages
to buyer when the servant was freed before the time for which the buyer paid for him); cf.
Roades v. Heale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1678–1681, at 64 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1678–1681] (reporting a jury verdict that set a servant free).
But see Latham v. Shumate (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 25, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1761–1762, at 65–66 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1761–1762] (holding a seller not liable if he or
she warned a buyer at the time of sale of disputes regarding title to a servant or slave). Of
course, there were also numerous suits for fraudulent sales of physically unsound slaves. See,
138
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mother had bound her son to servitude until he was twenty-four years
old.145 The son, when he attained the age of twenty-one, successfully
appealed to the court that parents had no control over their children
beyond age twenty-one and thereby obtained his freedom.146 Other
courts freed servants who had been unlawfully bound.147 In one such
case,148 the court explained its reasoning, noting that, even though a
woman named Williams was on a list of indentured servants, “there
appear[ed] no manner of consideration whatsoever” for her being
there.149 It continued that “the said Williams or any other poor person
might be forced into the list . . . by hard usage, good words, or the like
dealings, for prevention of which . . . like wrongdoing for the future, this
Court does declare the said Williams to be free from the said
indenture.”150 In all, courts freed numerous indentured servants held
unlawfully,151 and in some cases even ordered the payment of wages for
e.g., Waddill v. Chamberlayne (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1735), in 2 JOHN RANDOLPH & EDWARD
BARRADALL, VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS: THE REPORTS OF DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL
COURT OF VIRGINIA 1728–1741, at B45–46 (R.T. Barton ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1909)
(ruling for plaintiff when defendant sold a slave with an incurable disease); Hill v. Young
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 11, 1698/1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1695–1699, at 85 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998)
[hereinafter LANCASTER 1695–1699] (proclaiming it fraudulent to sell a servant who is not of
sound body); Beverley v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702,
supra note 128, at 18, 20 (discussing a suit brought against the seller of a slave claimed to be
perfect when the slave was “full of pain”). Suits for breaches of warranties in the sale of
servants could be brought before the end of the period of servitude. Compare Davis v. Carlyle
(Loudoun Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762–1763, at 71–72 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997)
[hereinafter LOUDOUN 1762–1763] (awarding a special verdict of £15 for damages before the
end of the servitude period), with Davis v. Carlyle (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Apr. 11, 1764), in
LOUDOUN 1763–1764, supra, at 100 (enforcing the previous special verdict).
145
In re. Bengee (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., May 2, 1688), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1687–1689, at 26 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689].
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., Gowen v. Lucas (Va. Gen. Ct., June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 409, 411 (ordering the servant free from unlawful service); Letherbury v. Carter (Va.
Gen. Ct., Oct. 4, 1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 313–14 (freeing the child of
a servant when the owner had unlawful ownership); cf. Chavis v. Barber (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 3,
1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 312 (mandating that a boy unlawfully
bound as an apprentice be returned to his mother).
148
Williams v. Nash (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1663), microformed on 1000549062 (Library
of Va.).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., In re. Letty (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1728), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK 1727–1729, at 50 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds.,
2002) [hereinafter ESSEX 1727–1729] (reporting jury verdict that a Native American was “a free
woman”); Roades v. Heale (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1680), in LANCASTER 1678–1681, supra
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time worked following the end of the period of servitude.152 On
occasion, the judiciary also had to protect servants who were bringing
suits for freedom from intimidation and threats.153
In other cases, judges required masters to treat servants properly
during the course of their servitude. Thus, in one case the General Court
freed an apprentice when his master failed to perform his part of the
agreement,154 while in another an apprentice was freed when his master
assigned him to tasks other than those for which he had been
apprenticed.155 The courts also strove to prevent masters from unduly
disciplining servants,156 treating them “barbarously,” or “neglect[ing]”
note 144, at 64 (reporting jury verdict that the servant was free); Indian Nan v. Holt (Louisa
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1771), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1770–1772, at 42–43 (Lydia Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter LOUISA 1770–
1772] (reporting jury verdict freeing plaintiff); Cross v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3,
1739), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1738–
1740, at 23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1738–1740]
(ordering the plaintiff be declared free after she was unlawfully detained as a servant); In re.
Whickers (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127,
at 56 (holding an indentured servant released from service); cf. In re. Brown (Richmond Cnty.
Ct., Aug. 6, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1718–1719, at 76–77 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter
RICHMOND 1718–1719] (ordering a ship captain return a captive and his family to their home).
But see In re. Bess (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1694), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1694–1697, at 12 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1694–1697] (requring a Native American captured in late
war be a servant until age thirty).
152
See, e.g., Moore v. Light (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 27, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 353–54 (holding a servant be paid corn, clothes, and 400 lb. tobacco for extra time
worked after the end of the period of servitude); Marshall v. Baker (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr, 22, 1670),
in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 213–14 (holding an owner to pay the servant corn,
clothes, and tobacco for his extra time served).
153
See, e.g., Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1768), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1767–1768, at 81 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1767–1768] (ordering the servant freed even after
she initially disclaimed suit for freedom out of fear for herself and her children).
154
Hicelde v. Reade (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 31, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
358.
155
Rawlins v. Cassinett (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 6, 1674/1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 406–07; see Sancebury v. Bayly (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1689), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 76–77 (holding the servant be freed after working
on tasks not assigned throughout the length of service). But see In re. Molton (Northumberland
Cnty. Ct., Feb. 21, 1671/1672), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 56–57 (reading
the indenture of a sailor and ruling that “when his master has no employment for him at that
said trade, he [may] set him to work in any lawful & necessary work he thinks fit to employ
him about”).
156
See, e.g., Duggins v. Ward (Goochland Cnty. Ct., July 1732), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735,
supra note 90, at 103–04 (requiring the master pay the servant forty shillings for beating him); In
re. Thomas (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 13, 1677/1678), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1674–1678, at 90 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
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their “education and trade.”157 One court, for example, ordered a man
who had married a child’s mother to free the child from “very hard
labor” and to permit him to choose a new guardian.158
Judges also came to the aid of servants whose masters failed to
provide adequate food or medical assistance.159 Servants such as these
usually would not be freed, but their masters might be placed under
court orders in regard to their treatment or they might be sold to new
masters, who hopefully would treat them better.160 Finally, masters were
required to give former servants their freedom dues upon the expiration

eds., 1993) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1674–1678] (requiring bond not to correct servants except in
presence of neighbors).
157
Read v. James, (Prince William County. Ct., Sept. 7, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762, at 57–58 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1762].
158
In re. Price (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1692/1693), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1692–1693, at 75 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1988) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1692–1693].
159
See, e.g., Grimes v. Wright (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1685), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK (OLD) RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1683–1685, at 92–93
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685] (requiring
the master to allow his servants sufficient food in the amount typically given servants in the
colony); Evins v. Morgan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1723), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1722–1724, at 35 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1722–1724] (ordering the master to provide the
servant with medical assistance).
160
See, e.g., In re. Heap (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 8, 1708), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1708, at 80 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1707–1708] (holding “barbarous usage” of a
servant resulted in the servant being sold at an outcry); In re. Welch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
Mar. 6, 1743/1744), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1742–1744, at 54–55 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter
SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744] (ordering a servant abused by the owner to receive a good diet and
clothing and not be disciplined without court order); Spencer v. Thorn (Westmoreland Cnty.
Ct., Nov. 25, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 23 (directing sale of a
servant), rev’g Thorn v. Spencer (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24, 1714), in WESTMORELAND
1714–1716, supra note 138, at 22–23 (ordering freedom for the servant). The servant in Thorn,
however, also received money damages from her master who had stripped her naked before
beating her. Thorn v. Spencer, (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1714), in WESTMORELAND
1714–1716, supra note 138, at 23–24, rev’g Spencer v. Thorn (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 24,
1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 22–23. But see In re. Flowers (Fauquier
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 23, 1765), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1764–1766, at 43 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter FAUQUIER
1764–1766] (ordering an apprentice bound to another master after complaining “of ill-usage”);
In re. Byrn (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1733), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER
BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1734, at 96–97 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734] (freeing a servant who received insufficient
lodging and clothing) .

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

785

of their terms.161 Other judges ordered masters to abide by the terms of
the agreements by which they had obtained servants.162
The legal system dealt even more generously with wage laborers.
Unlike runaway servants, for example, wage laborers who did not work
during part of the period of their contract lost wages only for the time
they had missed without any additional penalty.163 Similarly, sailors
were able to obtain special writs from the governor directing county
courts to adjudicate their wage claims against their vessels.164 Wage
laborers who failed to perform in accordance with the terms of their
contracts might find their wages judicially reduced, however.165
Efforts to uplift white servants and workers did not inopportunely
have the desired effect of increasing white immigration. After the 1670s,
European immigrants continued to migrate mainly to destinations other
than Virginia, with the result by the early eighteenth century that
Virginia’s plantation labor force consisted mainly of Africans and their
descendants rather than white indentured servants.166
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dromond (Va. Gen. Ct. Mar. 9, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 432 (requiring the owner pay his servant corn and clothing upon
release); Hoskins v. Spratt (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of
Va.) (order apparently not entered in local records until after affirmance by the General Court),
aff'd (Va. Gen. Ct., June 17, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 411–12 (ordering
the owner to pay his freed servant 500 lb. of tobacco and barrel).
162
See e.g., In re. Read (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1762, supra
note 157, at 57–58 (placing the servant with a new master in light of mistreatment by existing
one); Bankes v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 64 (ordering the master to teach his servant to read and write). Courts
almost invariably decided issues of servant status without the aid of juries, but occasionally
juries were used. See, e.g., Talbort v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 15, 1692), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1690–1694, at 65 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1690–1694] (confirming jury
verdict that the servant be freed); cf. Webb v. Hughlett (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 19,
1680), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1680–1683, at 4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683] (addressing an issue of status that arose collaterally in a suit
between non-servants).
163
See, e.g., Turner v. Ashby (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1692/1693), in MIDDLESEX 1690–
1694, supra note 162, at 57 (holding a wage laborer lost his wages for work missed during part
of his contract period); Banister v. Fielding's Estate (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20,
1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 55 (granting pervious years’
wages at the master’s death minus wages for one month of absence).
164
See, e.g., Barrett v. Barque Mary of Carolina (Northumberland County Ct., Feb. 19,
1679/1680), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1677–1679, supra note 133, at 98 (requiring payment of £20
and 13 shillings).
165
See, e.g., Grame v. Peirsey (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730 (PART
II), at 60–61 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART II)] (reducing servant’s wages for failing to perform in accordance with the contract).
166
KULIKOFF, supra note 123, at 38–41.
161
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The change in the demographics of the labor force did, however,
make Virginia easier to govern. The first generation of Virginia slaves
came from widely divergent African cultures and spoke different
languages;167 and their diversity likely impeded their ability to organize
resistance to planters’ impositions.168 In addition, planters could deal
with black slaves more harshly than with white servants, who might
report cruelty back to England and thereby discourage others from
following in their footsteps.169 Thus, it was easier to govern blacks
repressively than it had been to govern whites.
The switch to black labor also changed the nature of the remaining
white community. Most significantly, the poor white community that
elites had to govern was smaller, and therefore easier to control, than it
would have been if indentured servants had continued to provide most
of Virginia’s labor. Over time the young, rowdy men who had followed
Nathaniel Bacon into rebellion grew older, obtained families, and
became more accepting of their position in life—and less willing to turn
to violence and rebellion to better it. Finally, the potential for black
resistance arguably threatened poor whites as well as elite ones and
thereby gave elites an argument for uniting the white underclass with
them in their practices of repressing blacks.170
B. Patronage and Noblesse Oblige
Elites, however, needed more than a threat of black rebellion to
persuade lower class whites to accept their leadership as part of a
coherent, peaceful community. They had to adopt the gentlemanly code

See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 205 (describing the incoming African slaves as an
“array of tribal customs” with a “babel of langauges”).
168
See WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA xvi (1999) (attributing the Virginia gentry’s success to
slavery).
169
See, e.g., In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Oct. 5, 1736), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1735–1737, at 82 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2002) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1735–1737] (giving a master leave
to castrate a runaway slave); Robinson v. Duncum (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 8, 1707), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1707–1708, at
23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1707–1708] (ordering
“a Negro slave” be castrated for “running away, lying out and destroying people's stocks”);
King v. Sawney (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1718–1721, at 19–20 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1718–1721] (allowing a master to cut off a
runaway’s “two great toes”).
170
For a brief discussion of the dynamics of the white community in Virginia in the late
1600s, see MORGAN, supra note 98, at 343–44 (explaining how there were fewer poorer whites
and those who remained feared an insurrection).
167
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of noblesse oblige and recognize their duty to care economically for whites
who were poorer or otherwise less fortunate than themselves. In
particular, leading planters had to use their economic power to reward
people beneath them who became upstanding, constructive contributors
to their communities.171
Individual planters, as owners of vast land estates, wielded
considerable power over the lives and economic opportunities of
everyone except the few other great planters with whom they typically
sat in consensus on the county bench. Small landowners needed the
assistance of great planters in marketing tobacco and obtaining credit.
Those who did not own land had to turn to great landowners to find
land they could rent. Others who did not own land might just want
employment as overseers or field hands, or in service occupations such
as blacksmiths, coopers, etc.; but again, wealthy landowners would
prove key to providing those jobs.172
In short, as a result of a continued policy of granting new land
mainly to great planters, nearly everyone else became dependent on
those planters. In a world where behavior was publicly known and
could not be hidden in the anonymity of large cities, planters became
responsible for improving the well-being of their dependents; and
dependents, in return, had little choice but to improve their lives and
behave, whether as jurors, minor officials, or ordinary members of the
community, as their betters expected them to behave.173 They could no
See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 101 (discussing large planters’ accommodations for
small planters to avoid rebellion).
172
See RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740–1790, at 133, 136–37 (1982)
(discussing the relationship between wealthy landowners and the poorer classes). Isaac notes,
however, that the mid-eighteenth century of Glasgow merchant houses in tobacco marketing
undermined the economic power of Virginia elites. Id. at 137. The most recent analysis of the
Scottish merchants’ role is consistent with that of Isaac. See ALBERT H. TILLSON, JR.,
VIRGINIA’S NORTHERN NECK IN AN ERA OF
ACCOMMODATING REVOLUTIONS:
TRANSFORMATIONS, 1760–1810, at 154–55, 166–67 (2010).
173
As Virginia developed toward the west, beyond the tobacco-producing Piedmont and
into the Shenandoah Valley, patterns of governance changed only slightly. ALBERT H. TILLSON,
JR., GENTRY AND COMMON FOLK: POLITICAL CULTURE ON A VIRGINIA FRONTIER 1740–1789, at 20
(1991). The Shenandoah was not settled by English stock from the east, as all of Virginia up to
the Piedmont had been; instead, settlers came mainly from Pennsylvania or from Scottish
sections of North Britain or Northern Ireland. Id. at 8. Thus, the population of the Shenandoah
tended to be Presbyterian rather than Anglican, and leaders and other residents typically did
not have kinship ties with Virginians from the east. Id. at 20. However, they did have close ties
with each other and important political and economic ties with colonial leaders in
Williamsburg. Id at 20–22. Those ties enabled a small group of leaders to dominate
landholding and, hence, the economy. For example, in the early years of settlement of Augusta
County, which initially covered most of the Shenandoah Valley, thirteen men patented 86.6%
of all patented land; and as late as 1769, a total of forty-one men still owned 52.1% of all
freehold acreage under private control. Turk McCleskey, Rich Land, Poor Prospects: Real Estate
171
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longer remain the rowdy, independent, potential rebels they once had
been. Only those who owned significant quantities of land could be
independent, precisely because they could be relied upon to behave as
gentlemen in a civilized community.174
C. Law and Religion
Many late seventeenth-century Virginians found Christianity an
important force in creating a civilized community. A main argument for
enslaving blacks, especially in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century, was that whites were Christian and thus civilized, whereas
almost all blacks before the Great Awakening were not and thus, it was
said, had to be controlled by force.175
In fact, many whites in the seventeenth century had not been
practicing Christians. Virginia then had only half the number of clergy it
needed to fill its pulpits, and living conditions in many parishes were so
bad that the ministers who served them were unsuitable.176 Before
Bacon’s Rebellion, as shown above, religious norms were irregularly
enforced.177 Transforming Virginians into true Christians thus required
both that church institutions be created for them and that, once brought
into churches, parishioners abide by the norms of those churches.
Reverend James Blair, who arrived in Virginia in 1685 and was
named the commissary or personal representative of the bishop of
London in 1689, set about the task of reforming the church and thereby
strengthening the legal order of the colony by persuading the Governor’s

and the Formation of a Social Elite in Augusta County, Virginia, 1738–1770, 98 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 449, 466 (1990). As in the east, the great landowners used their economic power to
control local government. As county courts were established, governors in Williamsburg
appointed wealthy men to the bench, and those men then became a self-perpetuating oligarchy
that recommended their own reappointment and nominated others to fill vacancies. See
TILLSON, supra, at 17, 22–23 (providing examples of specific positions filled by the wealthy).
That oligarchy, in turn, used its control over the economic prospects of its underlings to secure
their obedience. See McCleskey, supra, at 459–60, 477–86 (explaining this concept and also
providing examples). The most recent book on the Shenandoah uses McCleskey’s and Tillson’s
findings in its larger project of describing the Shenandoah Valley's early history. See generally,
WARREN R. HOFSTRA, THE PLANTING OF NEW VIRGINIA: SETTLEMENT AND LANDSCAPE IN THE
SHENANDOAH VALLEY (2004).
174
See McCleskey, supra note 173, at 460 (describing how limited land ownership reduced
democracy).
175
See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 206 (describing the white interpretation of religion
among slaves). For legislation defining non-Christians brought into Virginia as slaves, see 3
HENING, supra note 130, at 447–48.
176
BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 140.
177
See id. (explaining the religious setup in late seventeenth century England and how
some hoped this religious experience would spread to Virginia).
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Council in July 1690 to call for stricter enforcement of religious laws.178
He remained a significant force in Virginia government into the 1730s,
when he was still a member of the Council.179 By then, Blair’s efforts had
led to the formation of a close alliance between local courts and local
churches, with the same gentry families who controlled the county bench
also controlling local vestries—vestries that possessed substantial
governmental powers and typically levied the highest taxes that
eighteenth-century Virginians paid.180
Throughout the eighteenth century, church and state remained
closely intertwined. Thus, the General Court asserted its jurisdiction
over religion, when, for example, it disciplined a minister “of evil fame
and profligate manners . . . much addicted to drunkenness . . . [who]
officiated in ridiculous apparel unbecoming a priest[,] . . . exposed his
private parts to view in public companies, and solicited negro and other
women to fornication and adultery with him.”181 Likewise at the county
level, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century witnessed a
revival of prosecutions for morals offenses, which had largely
disappeared from court dockets in the post-1660 era. Indeed, by the
early eighteenth century, grand juries had developed the habit of
presenting and having prosecuted as criminal virtually any conduct on
which local elites frowned.
Thus, Virginia courts again began routinely to punish what one
court described as “the several sins and offenses of swearing,182 cursing
by profaning God’s Holy Name,183 Sabbath abusing,184 drunkenness,185
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141, 234.
180
JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRINGS OF LIBERTY: HOW VIRGINIA’S RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS
HELPED WIN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND SECURED RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 16–17, 37 (2010).
181
Godwin v. Lunan (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1771), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730, TO 1740; AND FROM 1768, TO 1772,
at 96 (Charlottesville, F. Carr and Co. 1829).
182
See, e.g., King v. Clifton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1665), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 9 (ordering Clifton pay a fine for “proclaiming [the] name of God”).
183
Cf., e.g., King v. Dickins (Goochland Cnty. Ct., July 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND COUNTY
VIRGINIA COURT ORDER BOOKS 1728–1731, at 358–59 (Ann K. Blomquist ed., 2007) [hereinafter 1
& 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731] (presenting to the court a man who taught his slave “to profane
the Lord’s Prayer”). But see King v. Dickins (Goochland Cnty. Ct. July 1731), in 1 & 2
GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra, at 392–93 (dismissing the complaint against Dickins).
184
The most basic Sabbath violation was not attending church on Sunday. See, e.g., King v.
Gooding (Henrico Cnty. Ct., May 2, 1758), microformed on 00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y
of Utah) (issuing criminal charges against someone “for not going to [c]hurch”); King v.
Falkner (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1718), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1719, at 79–80 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999)
[hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1716–1719] (fining a woman for missing church for three years).
Everyone, except those whose status as dissenters had been officially recognized, was deemed
to be a member of the Church of England and required to attend services at least once every
178
179
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fornication and adultery.”186 Other morals offenses, which had been
largely ignored in the middle of the seventeenth century, included
baptizing a child without authority,187 blasphemy,188 buggery,189 “living a
four weeks. ISAAC, supra note 172, at 58. Other offenses included disturbing church services,
e.g., King v. Thornbury (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1692), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1692–1694, at 34 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1692–1694]; “rude and disorderly behavior” in
church, e.g, King v. Davis (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1724), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDERS 1724–1725, at 6–7 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1724–1725]; leaving church during service, see, e.g.,
Churchwardens v. Wooden (Lancaster County Ct., May 10, 1732), in LANCASTER 1729–1732,
supra note 126, at 87–88 (fining a man five shillings or 50 lb. of tobacco for leaving church early);
working on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Rowland (Stafford County Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK STAFFORD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1691–1692, at 96
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1987) [hereinafter STAFFORD 1691–1692] (fining a man for
cutting tobacco on Sunday); travelling on the Sabbath, e.g., King v. Crosswell (Richmond Cnty.
Ct., Dec. 6, 1704), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1704–1705, at 13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter RICHMOND
1704–1705]; driving a wagon on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Lewis (Augusta County Ct., June
22, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (fining a man five
shillings); hunting on the Sabbath, e.g., King v. Blackly (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1725), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1724–1730 (PART I), at 78 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART I)]; or putting slaves to work on the Sabbath, see, e.g., King v. Gibson
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note 151, at 81 (summoning
a man before a grand jury for forcing his slaves to work in the field on the Sabbath). Cf.
Beverley v. Beach (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1681), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1680–1686, at 12–13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1680–1686] (voiding an attachment signed on a Sunday).
185
See, e.g., Taverner v. Jacobus (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–
1697, supra note 151, at 31 (listing “drunkenness” as one of the “several sins and offences”).
186
See, e.g., id. (ordering a fine of 2000 lb. of tobacco for fornicating on Sunday). For examples
of adultery prosecutions, see King v. Barras (Henrico Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1757), microformed on
00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); King v. Davis (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1687),
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1687–1691, at
21 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1687–1691]. The nature
of the crime of adultery is made somewhat unclear by the case of King v. Philips, in which a
couple accused of “living in adultery” was found not guilty because they had recently
married—an impossibility if one or both of them had been married already. (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1730), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), at 73–74 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990)
[hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV)]. Thus, living in adultery might have consisted
of nothing more than a couple’s living together and engaging in sexual intercourse.
187
See, e.g., King v. Thackston (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678,
supra note 104, at 74–75 (ordering the arrest of Richard Thackston for illegally performing a
baptism).
188
See, e.g., King v. Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), microformed on
00303775162116 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (reporting that Graham was the subject of a grand
jury hearing regarding allegations of blasphemy); see also King v. Giles (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.,
Oct. 13, 1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra note 144, at 51 (ordering punishment of three
days in pillory and twenty-five lashes for calling Christ “a Son of a Whore”); cf. King v. Furrill
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lewd and vicious loose life,”190 allowing “unmarried persons to bed
together,”191 “cohabiting with a Negro,”192 and selling liquor without a
license.193
Changes in prosecutions for fornication best revealed the emerging
concern in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion with prosecuting offenses
against morality. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the concern
with fornication had been economic rather than moral—almost no
prosecutions were brought for sexual activity unless it resulted in the
birth of an illegitimate child with whose support the public might be
charged. By the early eighteenth century, in contrast, couples were
presented for “living in that notorious sin of fornication”194 or “for being
reputed to live in fornication,”195 even when no evidence was brought
forward of birth of an illegitimate child. However, charges of fornication
still would be dismissed if a couple married, even if they married after
the charges had been presented,196 thereby suggesting that the
(Middlesex County Ct., Oct. 1, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 79 (ordering
punishment for “condemning . . . the holy institutions & ceremonies of the Church of
England”).
189
See, e.g., King v. Blaney (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–
1687, supra note 101, at 91–92 (ordering a fine upon conviction for buggering a cow).
190
King v. Fletcher (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184,
at 31; accord King v. Vanlandegham (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 17, 1700), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1700, at
104, 106 (Lydia Bontempo ed., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1699–1700] (reporting
Vanlandegham was ordered to remain in sherriff’s custody for keeping another man’s wife in
his custody).
191
King v. Bell (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Sept. 26, 1763), microformed on 00303765162115
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
192
King v. Moore (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 22, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
193
See, e.g., King v. Wood (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra
note 151, at 81 (ordering Wood answer for selling liquor without a license); cf. King v. Spiering
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3, 1695/1696), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1694–1697, at 59–60 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995)
[hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1694–1697] (fining a man 1000 lb. tobacco for maintaining an
unlicensed tipling house). The usual penalty for liquor offenses was a fine, but one defendant
who was jailed because he was unable to pay requested corporal punishment instead. In re.
Matthews (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1773), microformed on 00303785162117 (Genealogical
Soc’y of Utah). The court obliged with twenty-one lashes. Id.
194
Washington Parish v. Buss (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 24, 1713), in WESTMORELAND
1712–1714, supra note 128, at 58.
195
King v. Dye (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1728), in RICHMOND 1727–1729, supra note 128, at
51.
196
See, e.g., King v. Gressam (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 26 (dismissing a presentment for “living together in fornication”
because the couple later married). But see King v. Boy (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1740), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 93–94 (punishing a woman for having an
illegitmate child even though she had since married).
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immorality of a couple’s premarital sex still may not have been the law’s
primary concern.
The increase in prosecutions for immorality also can be observed
statistically in two counties—Lancaster and Middlesex—for which court
records are readily available throughout the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century. In both counties, prosecutions for religious offenses
such as missing church, profaning the Sabbath, swearing, and
contemptuous behavior toward clergy rose significantly in the
eighteenth century. Between 1671 and 1675, there was one such
prosecution in Lancaster County, while there were two in Middlesex
between 1674 and 1678, both occurring after the suppression of Bacon’s
Rebellion. Lancaster witnessed four such prosecutions between 1701
and 1705 and forty between 1731 and 1735. There were twelve
prosecutions in Middlesex between 1703 and 1707 and fifteen between
1733 and 1737.197 Similarly, as Peter Hoffer has shown, prosecutions for
sexual immorality peaked in Richmond County in the 1720s, while
prosecutions for regulatory and other morals offenses in general were at
their height in the 1710s, 1720s, and 1730s.198
In other ways as well, the justices of the county courts became
dedicated to maintaining the hegemony of the established Church of
England. According to the most recent scholar of religion in preRevolutionary Virginia, “no British colony was more protective of its
established church, nor more abusive of its religious dissenters, than
Virginia.”199 As late as the 1740s, a main threat to that hegemony came
from Roman Catholics rather than dissenting Protestants,200 and the
defense of Anglicanism began with the oath taken by the justices, who
swore their belief “that there is not any transubstantiation in the
Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper or in the elements of bread and wine”
and that “adoration of the Virgin Mary or any other saint and the
sacrifice of the mass as . . . used in the Church of Rome are superstitious
and idolatrous.”201 Catholics faced other forms of discrimination as well.
All figures referenced in this section were derived from court records from Lancaster and
Middlesex counties published by the Antient Press.
198
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA: [RECORDS OF] FINES, EXAMINATION OF
CRIMINALS, TRIALS OF SLAVES, ETC., FROM MARCH 1710 [1711] TO [1754] [RICHMOND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA] xxviii fig.1, lvi tbl.5 (Peter Charles Hoffer &William B. Scott eds., 1984) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA].
199
RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 3.
200
See e.g., King v. Matthews (Frederick Cnty. Ct., Nov. 10 1744), FREDERICK COUNTY
VIRGINIA MINUTES OF COURT RECORDS 1743–1745, at 110–11 (John David Davis ed., 2001)
[hereinafter FREDERICK 1743–1745] (charging Matthews with “propagating the Romish
Doctrine”).
201
Oath of Spicer (King George Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra
note 127, at 1.
197
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In one case, for example, the Stafford County Court ordered a Roman
Catholic who was caring for several orphans to deliver the children to
specified Protestants to be bound as apprentices.202 Although the same
court would not dismiss cases brought by a lawyer thought to be a
Roman Catholic203—and thereby deny a litigant the right to be
represented by a lawyer of his choice—the court, over the dissent of
three justices, did order the lawyer to take oaths mandated by
Parliament that were inconsistent with his Catholic beliefs, from which
order he appealed to the General Court.204 Further, as late as 1756,
legislation was enacted to disarm Catholics.205
When it came to dissenting Protestants, the courts were required to
dismiss charges of not attending church on Sunday if a defendant
showed that he or she was a member of a dissenting Protestant
communion.206 They were also under a duty to protect dissenting
congregations from insult and abuse,207 although dissenters, in fact,
frequently faced discrimination and even physical violence.208
In any event, the courts did not make it easy for Protestant dissenters
to establish separate congregations. Dissenting congregations were not
permitted to build places of worship without prior judicial authorization,

202
In re. Barton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra
note 127, at 54–55.
203
Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158,
at 89–90; cf. Churchhill v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1702), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 3 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1702–1704] (permitting a lawyer to plead even
though he had not taken the oaths mandated by Parliament). But see Brent v. Edmunds
(Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 11, 1667), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 50
(preventing an attorney from practicing before the court for failure to take the requisite oaths).
204
Gibson v. Brent (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 18, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158,
at 95–97.
205
See 7 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at
35–39 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1820) (reporting an “[a]ct for disarming [p]apists, and
reputed [p]apists, refusing to take the oaths to the government”).
206
E.g., King v. Reading (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 25. Charges also would be dismissed for defendants who attended
Anglican services in a parish other than their own. E.g., Regina v. Williams (Westmoreland
Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1710), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1709–1712, at 23–24 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter
WESTMORELAND 1709–1712].
207
See, e.g., King v. Moyer (Orange Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1735), in ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA
ORDER BOOK ONE 1734–1739 PART ONE 1734–1736, at 38 (Barbara Vines Little ed., 1990)
[hereinafter ORANGE 1734–1736] (presenting a man who “insulted and abused” an assembly of
worshipers).
208
See RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 28–36 (discussing the fate of religious dissenters in the
eighteenth century just before the Revolutionary War).
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which even at the end of the colonial period was not readily granted.209
In addition, dissenting preachers could not preach without licenses,210
which were difficult to obtain,211 and would be prosecuted if they did.212
It appears, indeed, that no dissenting clergymen were licensed until the
1730s and 1740s.213 Another obstacle to dissent was the requirement that
county courts report to the governor on meetings of dissenters within
their jurisdiction.214 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Middlesex
County Court reported in 1703 that no dissenting congregations existed
in the county.215
At the same time that the courts created obstacles to dissenting
congregations, they set up rules to further the effective functioning of
Anglican parishes. County officials under judicial supervision paid the
salaries of the Anglican clergy.216 Judges specified the locations where

See, e.g., In re. Faulkner (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1771), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1771–1772, at 39 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1771–1772] (rejecting a petition to build a house for
worship because “the court are of opinion they have not jurisdiction of the matter”); cf. In re:
Holt (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1734), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1734–1735, at 51–52 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds.,
1991) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735] (granting petition for certificate of governor
concerning raising money in Germany to build a church).
210
See, e.g., Swearing of Dalgleish (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1729), in RICHMOND 1727–
1729, supra note 128, at 85 (swearing in a Presbyterian minister required to take oaths in open
court); cf. Orders of Council (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 21, 1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1701, at 20–21 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1699–1701] (requiring licensing of
schoolmasters).
211
See, e.g., In re. Magil (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–
1721, supra note 169, at 67, 69 (rejecting a petition for license “to preach the Gospel” pursuant to
acts of Parliament because it did “not properly l[i]e before” the court).
212
See, e.g., R v. Organ (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1717), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1718, at 59 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1716–1718] (convicting defendants for
“concerning themselves under the pretense of religious worship”); see also RAGOSTA, supra note
180, at 18–19, 23 (discussing impediments to dissenting preachers).
213
See RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 40–41 (discussing examples of such licensure).
214
See Orders of Council (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 21, 1699), in LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra
note 210, at 21 (requiring county courts to report on meetings of religious dissenters in their
counties).
215
Return of Court (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note
203, at 41. For a fuller description of the discrimination and other obstacles faced by dissenters
in colonial Virginia, see RAGOSTA, supra note 180, at 15–42.
216
See, e.g., Farnefold v. Mottrom (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1680), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 14 (reporting a minister’s complaint for two
years salary not paid by the sheriff).
209

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

795

Anglican clergy were required to preach217 and supervised vestry
elections to insure that the clergy had adequate lay support.218 In case
such encouragement did not suffice, the courts prosecuted parishes that
did not provide a minister or reader or failed to keep their church in
repair.219
In sum, by the early decades of the eighteenth century, Virginia's
county courts were in the business of insuring that their people—lower
as well as upper class—lived in moral communities, as judges intrusively
regulated sexuality, religious belief, and ecclesiastical government and
structure. The most important matter of morality they regulated,
however, was family life.
Thus, the courts acted intrusively in protecting innocent wives from
errant husbands. For example, in one important case the Governor and
Council directed a county court to hear the case of an eleven-year-old
girl who claimed that she had been married at the age of nine without
her consent.220 The court ordered the girl to state, on her twelfth
birthday, whether she wished to affirm or disaffirm the marriage.221
When she disaffirmed the marriage, the court declared it null and
void.222 County courts also had power to grant wives separate
maintenance when husbands did not adequately provide for them,223
whereas courts required men who beat their wives to enter into peace
bonds as well as to provide separate maintenance.224 Occasional cases
even authorized spouses to live separately, with the husband providing
for the wife according to his “estate, condition and quality.”225 One
See, e.g., Order re Location of Preaching (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1667), in STAFFORD
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 43 (ordering a minister to preach in three particular
places until further order).
218
See, e.g., Vestry of North Farnham (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1684), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 53 (ordering that half of the lay persons for
election be chosen from the upper parts of the parish and the other half from the lower part).
219
E.g., King v. Parish of Sittenburne (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan., 7, 1690/1691), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra note 56, at 43–44.
220
In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note
184, at 62–63.
221
Id. at 63.
222
In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184,
at 68–69.
223
See, e.g, In re. Hanslip (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 73 (ordering all of the husband’s estate as alimony towards the
wife’s future support and maintenance). But see James v. James (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 6,
1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 13 (denying separate maintenance and
granting a peace bond in lieu thereof).
224
E.g., In re. Harwood (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–
1689, supra note 145, at 68–69.
225
E.g., In re. Martin (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note
186, at 41; accord In re. Grey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1665), in 13 VA. COLONIAL
217
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court, in addition, ordered a husband not to cohabit with a specified
woman who was not his wife.226
The courts also supervised parental upbringing of children.
Although courts recognized the right of parents to custody, even of
illegitimate children,227 they were more concerned with issues of proper
moral training and support. Thus, James and Elizabeth Lee were
summoned to appear in court to respond to accusations that they
brought up their children to pilfer and steal,228 while another court
required Adam Hubbard to show why he “[did] not . . . keep his children
as he ought . . . or suffer them to be christened or brought to church.”229
When Hubbard failed to appear, the court ordered the churchwardens to
bind out his two eldest children.230 Other children were similarly bound
out when courts found their parents too poor to support and educate
them in a proper Christian manner.231 In a final case, the court granted a
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 42, 45 (allowing the wife to live separate from her abusive husband
and ordering the husband to pay the wife’s accomodations); see also In re. Wardens of Hungers
Parish (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 18, 1712/1713 & Mar. 17, 1712/1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON
COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES & C, 1710–1717, at 86, 90–91 (Howard Mackey &
Marlene Groves eds., 2003) [hereinafter 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717] (releasing the husband
from the sheriff’s custody for fulfilling a prior bond to indemnify the church for any charges
incurred for maintaining his wife); Wharton v. Wharton (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1,
1705), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK WESTMORELAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1705–1707, at 4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1988) [hereinafter WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707] (ordering equal division of the husband’s estate upon willingness to separate from his
wife). However, a wife who left her husband could not take any of her property without an
order from the court. See, e.g., Turner v. Thompson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 98 (requiring a wife who left her husband
without a court order return all property taken from the house).
226
King v. Grant (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 6, 1725), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
KING GEORGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1723–1725, at 87–88 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1992) [hereinafter KING GEORGE 1723–1725]. A defendant accused of
breaching a peace bond was entitled to a jury trial to determine whether a breach had, in fact,
occurred. E.g., King v. Monteith (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–
1725, supra, at 96–97.
227
See In re. Hanks (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692,
supra note 56, at 38 (granting a mother’s request for custody of her natural son); see also Kirtley
v. Hartley (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra
note 225, at 12–13 (recognizing a father's right to custody of his legitimate children following
his wife's death).
228
King v. Lee (King George Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note
126, at 19–20.
229
Summons of Hubbard (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738,
supra note 142, at 6.
230
Summons of Hubbard (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738,
supra note 142, at 9.
231
See, e.g., In re. Jackson (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1771), microformed on 00307225162119
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (reporting a complaint made against a father for “not educating
his children in a Christian like manner”); In re. Rose (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1675),
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mother’s second husband control of the children's estates following her
death upon his promise to care for them until adulthood.232
Both the power of county courts over families, and the limits on that
power, emerged most clearly in a proceeding brought by a widow,
Hanna Grey Jacob.233 When several of her slaves became infected with
smallpox, she petitioned the county court to have her family inoculated
against the disease.234 The court granted her petition but refused to
allow inoculation of the county at large—something it deemed too
dangerous.235 Accordingly, the court exercised its power to prohibit
other inoculations, although it did declare that other families that
wanted inoculations could seek permission to receive them.236
In sum, the mid-eighteenth-century legal order of Virginia was
substantially stronger than the legal system that Bacon’s Rebellion had
challenged. The mid-eighteenth-century labor force of African and
African-American slaves was under far more repressive control than the
older force of white indentured servants had been. Meanwhile, the
white underclass was no longer composed mainly of rowdy, single
young men but of families. Those families, in turn, had developed ties of
dependency and deference to elites and, whether by coercion or
conviction, had become part of well-regulated Christian communities
adhering to high standards of morality. The communities of mideighteenth-century Virginia had been compelled to accept traditional
norms and thus were far easier to govern than their seventeenth-century
predecessors had been.
D. Judge and Jury
A further window through which to envision the relationship
between elites and the middling and even lower classes is the jury
system. Juries, the most important institution of the common law, were
central to the functioning of Virginia’s legal system in the seventeenth
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 42 (ordering an indigent’s child work under
an apprentice until the age of eighteen); In re. Pickett (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1686), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 51 (ordering a neglected child to be placed in the
care and custody of the petitioner); see also 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 32 (authorizing the
binding out of such children).
232
In re. Lyser (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1685), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1683–1686, at 79 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686].
233
In re. Jacob (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1774), microformed on 00327485162124
(Library of Va).
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
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and eighteenth centuries. Litigants had a right to trial by jury if they
demanded it, and thousands of jury trials occurred in the decades after
1660.237 Even after default judgments, juries of enquiry were used to
determine damages not fixed by law.238 However, juries were not
always used. Courts, for example, typically tried actions to balance
accounts,239 as well as suits commenced by petition rather than by writ240
and suits in which one party demanded that the other prove his or her
case by oath.241 Occasionally, other cases, even those involving rights in
land,242 for no apparent reason were tried to the court as well.243 Of
course, if both parties agreed, they could waive jury trial and submit a
case for decision by the court244 or referees,245 especially in cases where

237
E.g., Walker v. Blaxly (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1665), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690,
supra note 127, at 10. Compare Gubton v. McDannell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1706), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1705–1706, at
53–54 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1705–1706] (reporting
defendant’s motion to overturn his conviction due to lack of jury trial), with Gubton v.
McDannell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra, at 64 (reversing
the judgment against the defendant).
238
E.g., Carter v. Hedgman (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1705), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1703–1706, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1703–1706]. In Robinson v. Humphrys, a writ of
enquiry was used in an action of debt. (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 40–41. However, the need for a jury of enquiry was
obviated when the plaintiff produced the defendant’s obligation. Robinson v. Humphrys
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at
74–75; see also Ovi v. Ramsay (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1754), microformed on 00303755162114
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (summoning a jury of enquiry in a writ of debt to calculate the
value of Virginia money into a certain sum of Pennsylvania money).
239
E.g., Pratt v. Brock (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 10–11.
240
See, e.g., Beven v. McCarty (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1705/1706), in
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 12 (refusing to allow the parties to admit the
petition to a jury).
241
See, e.g., Grymes v. Wadding (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702,
supra note 128, at 18, 24 (granting judgment for the plaintiff upon his oath); cf. Thompson v.
Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 21, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note
162, at 29–30 (granting judgment for the plaintiff on contract unless the defendant takes an oath
that he never promised to pay).
242
See, e.g., Gwin v. Ridley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697,
supra note 151, at 24–25 (trying an action in which the plaintiff accused the defendant of
trespassing and removing timber from land).
243
See, e.g., Bankes v. Myers (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1701), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 66–67 (rendering a verdict regarding a dispute
over cattle).
244
E.g., Maning v. Carroll (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 2, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 97–98; Collier v. Fabian (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 29, 1702), microformed
on 00327505162126 (Library of Va.) (reporting an action in which a defendant refused his right
to a jury trial and consented to leave the issue to the judgment of the court).
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factual issues were “long & tedious”246 or in cases where the parties had
submitted an agreed statement of facts.247
See Davis v. Skrine (King George Cnty. Ct., Dec. 8, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra
note 127, at 57 (referring an action to referees to audit, state, and settle all accounts between the
plaintiff and the defendant). Reports of referees were subject to challenge in a county court,
however, and to appeal to the General Court. See Taliaferro v. Grymes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct.,
July 7, 1707), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra note 169, at 17 (reviewing referees’ decision and
acknowledging the defendant’s appeal from the court’s judgment). Compare Barbour v. Sandys
(Orange Cnty. Ct., June 27 , 1755), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE
COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1755–1756, at 54 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter
ORANGE 1755–1756] (awarding damages to both the plaintiff and defendant upon accounting
by referees), with Barbour v. Sandys (Orange Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756,
supra, at 82 (finding wholly for defendant after reviewing the final verdict).
246
George v. Churchhill (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra
note 184, at 32.
247
E.g., Mitchell v. Lockart (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Feb. 22, 1762) microformed on 00303765162115
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah). In cases tried to the court, there were numerous rules about
burden of proof, such as a rule that “one evidence [was] not sufficient to prove [an] assumpsit.”
Beck v. Triplett (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra
note 101, at 14; cf. Miller v. Kelly (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13, 1702/1703), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1701–1703, at 62–63 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1701–1703] (dismissing the
information for killing a sow since proof was “by Commissioners only”). Normally a litigant
could not testify on his or her own behalf. Compare Champe v. Russell (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar.
24, 1749/1750), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1749–1752, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORANGE 1749–1752]
(refusing to allow defendant to take an oath because “better proof” was available), with
Champe v. Russell (Orange Cnty. Ct., June 28, 1750), in ORANGE 1749–1752, supra, at 19
(rendering judgment for the plaintiff in light of the defendant’s plea being overruled). But see
Ward v. Bingley (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1735), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra note 90,
at 466 (finding for the defendant based only on his motion); Hill v. Wilke (Lancaster Cnty. Ct.,
July 14, 1686), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1682–1687, at 87 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER
1682–1687] (allowing the plaintiff who lost a bill to recover on his oath that no part of it was
paid); Shropshire v. Pratt (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–
1712, supra note 206, at 18–19 (allowing a minister who preached a sermon at a funeral to
recover on his oath that the defendant had agreed to pay him). See generally Coats v. Rayburne
(Botetourt Cnty. Ct., July 14, 1773), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah)
(permitting probate upon a witness’s oath); Revet v. Sertain (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12,
1691/1692), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 92 (allowing the plaintiff to recover on an
account when two witnesses gave proof of the debt). Compare Rostis and Watson v. Hopkins
(Henrico County Ct., Feb. 7, 1757), microformed on 00317735162121 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah)
(admitting an account book into evidence), with Rostis and Watson v. Hopkins (Henrico Cnty.
Ct., Mar. 7, 1757), microformed on 00317735162121 (holding the account book was properly
admitted in evidence). On the other hand, actions against estates could be proved by the
plaintiff's oath to a debt if the debt was less than one year old and no other evidence was
available. E.g., Hill v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 11, 1700), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRIGINIA 1699–1702, at 53 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSEX 1699–1702]; Belote v. Marshall (Northampton Cnty. Ct.,
Oct. 14, 1735), microformed on 0032751562127 (Library of Va.); Waters v. Wilton (Rappahannock
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 57–58; cf. McNeil v.
245
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In cases tried to a jury, the plaintiff had the burden of proof. Thus,
when one jury returned a verdict that it could “find no matter of fact for
want of evidence,” a suit was dismissed.248 Likewise, a plaintiff would
lose if he or she did not present enough evidence.249 One piece of
evidence was always key; in a suit on an obligation, the written
obligation had to be put into evidence.250
When litigants chose to try a case by jury, the court and the jury
typically functioned harmoniously. But on rare occasions conflict
between court and jury emerged. One early case of conflict was Saffin v.
Watson,251 a 1668 matter in which a “verdict . . . appear[ed] to th[e] court
to be grounded upon the insufficiency of the evidence,” and another
evidence being produced to the court,252 it was the opinion of the court

Churchill's Executors (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1766–1767, at 39–40 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1995) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1766–1767] (holding the plaintiff’s oath was sufficient to
authenticate even accounts older than one year). But see Ball v. Ball (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov.
10, 1698), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra note 144, at 77 (requiring one witness in addition to
the plaintiff to prove an account against decedent’s estate); cf. Ellis v. Edmondson (Essex Cnty.
Ct., June 11, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra, at 119–20 (holding certification on account of Lord
Mayor of London was sufficient proof of account without further evidence). More generally, a
court would decide in favor of a party who gave evidence under oath when the opposing party
offered “nothing material in bar.” Almond v. Macarty (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5,
1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689–1692, supra note 56, at 57; accord Martin v. Woodson
(Goochland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1729/1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 185–
86 (rendering judgment for the plaintiff upon his oath and where the defendant failed to
appear). But in another case, in which a plaintiff had been permitted to swear that no suit had
been brought previously upon his claim, judgment went against him when pleadings from
such a suit were produced in court. Gibson v. Peale (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 13, 1693), in
STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 114–15.
248
Lee v. Jenkins (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1685), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–
1686, supra note 232, at 66. For another example of an early, irregular jury verdict, compare
Potter v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184,
at 24 (reporting jury verdict that could “not find any such tract of land” ever possessed by the
plaintiff), with Potter v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1681/1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–
1686, supra note 184, at 28 (reporting a third person’s claim to title and appeal to the General
Court).
249
See, e.g., Thacker v. Devolve (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1709), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1708–1710, at 21 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1708–1710] (finding one piece of evidence not
enough).
250
See, e.g., In re Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20, 1727), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1725–1729 (PART I), at 100 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I)] (rejecting the petition because the
written obligation was not presented); Powell v. Doniphan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1692),
in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 38 (dismissing a suit when the plaintiff did not
produce the written agreement).
251
(Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1668), in LANCASTER 1666–1669, supra note 45, at 47.
252
Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

801

“that that jury should yet again to enquire further of the . . . said
evidence[,] whereupon” six named members “of the said jury did
dissent, for which their contempt the court . . . impose[d] a fine of 400 lb.
of tobacco to be paid by each of the said dissenters.”253 When three of
the jurors then appealed, the General Court confronted essentially the
same issue of jury law-finding power that the Court of Common Pleas in
England would face two years later in Bushell’s Case.254
Unfortunately, we do not know what the General Court decided,
and the issue of the power of juries to determine law does not appear to
have arisen again before the end of the century. Accordingly, the issue
needs to be regarded as unresolved. In the years following the turn of
the century, however, judges developed several mechanisms by which to
control the power of juries.
One mechanism was to direct juries to return special verdicts, which
they did with some frequency.255 Once a jury had been “directed by the
court to find the special facts proved and leave the law to the court,” a
general verdict could be set aside and a retrial granted if the jurors did
not obey.256 Another device was the grant of a new trial when a judge
concluded that a jury had returned a general verdict contrary to the
evidence; such grants occurred with some frequency.257 On at least one

Id.
See generally (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.), in VAUGHAN’S REPORTS 135 (1669)
(discussing the court’s powers where a jury acts contrary to the court’s direction).
255
E.g., Stepto v. Hattaway (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 10, 1734), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1736, at 62–63 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1732–1736].
256
Holt v. Custis (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1730), microformed on 00327515162127
(Library of Va.); see also Holt v. Custis (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1730/1731), microformed
on 00327515162127 (Library of Va.) (setting aside the jury verdict where jurors disobeyed the
court’s direction).
257
E.g., Darnall v. Morgan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26, 1764), in FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra
note 160, at 6; Batson v. Batson, (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 11, 1732), microformed on
00327515162127 (Library of Va.); Stubblefield v. Moore (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1740), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 104; cf. Drummon v. Hauxford (Richmond Cnty.
Ct., June 2, 1709), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1708–1709, at 58 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND
1708–1709] (granting the defendant leave to appeal based on a claim that the jury verdict was
against the evidence). But compare Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1759–1761, at 93
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1759–1761] (reporting
defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground that the jury rendered a verdict for the wrong
party), with Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra
note 144, at 19–20 (denying defendant’s motion for new trial). Even when a jury found
contrary to evidence, a court had discretion to accept its verdict. See Henslee v. Tutt
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1742/1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 3–4
(reserving ruling on grant of a new trial upon jury finding against the evidence). In Henslee v.
253
254
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occasion, a court penetrated beyond the rubric that a verdict was
contrary to the evidence, which often meant not that a jury had
misconstrued the evidence but that it had rejected the judges’ view of the
law, and explicitly set aside a verdict as contrary to law.258 In that case,
the jury had returned a verdict for the defendant, but the court,
“conceiving the matter as confessed both of fact and law,” directed the
defendant to make a further plea, and when the defendant refused, it
entered judgment for the plaintiff.259 Courts also set aside verdicts when
juries found incorrect issues, as in a case of trespass, where the jury
mistakenly found the defendant committed waste.260
Finally, jury verdicts were set aside when they were improper as to
form or otherwise insufficient as a basis for judgment.261 Judges also
Tutt, the court ultimately did, in fact, grant a new trial. (Spotsylvania County Ct., Apr. 5, 1743),
in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 7–8.
258
Bertrand v. Fox (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 8–9, 1703), in LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note
247, at 92–93.
259
Id. at 93.
260
Hobson v. Occany (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 27, 1715), in WESTMORELAND 1714–
1716, supra note 138, at 37–38; accord Warren v. Warren (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct., 9, 1745),
microformed on 00327525162128 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (finding the verdict “so
contradictory and imperfect that the court [could] not render their judgment thereupon”). But
see Watts v. Field (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra
note 127, at 34–35 (rendering judgment for the plaintiff even though the jury failed to identify
who should pay).
261
See, e.g., Doe v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1743/1744), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ABSTRACTS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1740–1745, at 93–94
(Lydia Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2002) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1740–1745] (setting aside a verdict
for insufficiency). Compare Weekes v. Clarke (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1711), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1710–1712, at 35–36 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1710–1712] (finding by the jury, at
the initial trial, £5 damages for the plaintiff if “the law be with him”), with Weekes v. Clarke
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1711), in MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra, at 40 (considering parties’
motion for new trial based on an imperfect jury verdict), and Weekes v. Clarke (Middlesex
Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1711/1712), supra, at 58 (granting motion for new trial because the former
verdict was imperfectly found); compare Houison v. Elly (Orange Cnty. Ct., Sept. 29, 1749), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1748–1749, at 93–
94 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter ORANGE 1748–1749] (reporting the
plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to law), with Houison v. Elly (Orange
Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1750), in ORANGE 1749–1752, supra note 247, at 9–10 (ordering a new trial
based on an imperfect verdict); compare Clay v. Alloway (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1709), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1709–1710, at 8–
9 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1709–1710] (reporting the
initial verdict in an action relating to property ownership), and Clay v. Alloway (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1, 1709/1710), in RICHMOND 1709–1710, supra, at 21 (finding the previous verdict
to be insufficient), with Clay v. Alloway (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1710), in RICHMOND 1709–
1710, supra, at 73–75 (reporting the second impanelled jury verdict upon reconsideration of the
action). If imperfections in the verdict were intentional, jurors might also be fined. See, e.g.,
Pope v. Miller (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1704), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER
BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 128 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds.,
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tightly policed the processes of jury selection262 and deliberation.263 A
jury verdict would be set aside, for example, if some of the jurors
“appear[ed] to be in drink, and not fully agreed in their verdict.”264
Cases of hung juries that could not agree on a verdict were exceedingly
rare, however.265
An even more effective form of jury control than the motion for a
new trial, and one used more frequently in the early eighteenth century,
was a chancery decree enjoining execution of judgment on a jury
verdict.266 It is noteworthy that a litigant could turn to chancery for
injunctive relief even after denial of a post-verdict motion, although a
county court sitting in chancery would not grant an injunction when it
did “not see[] any cause therefor.”267

1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1702–1704] (fining jurors for contempt when they failed to return
a perfect verdict upon court order).
262
See, e.g., Coleman v. Hawly (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 37–38 (setting aside the verdict because jurors
were not all freeholders); Jones v. Samford (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1710/1711), in
MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra note 261, at 2 (rejecting several veniremen who were unable to
read and write for jury service).
263
See, e.g., Flower v. Blanch (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1695), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1691–1695, at 102 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1691–1695] (ordering the jury to be kept “together
without meat, drink or candle until they have agreed on their verdict,” which is to be returned
to a specified justice); Day v. Wilton (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 2, 1711), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1710–1711, at 79 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1710–1711] (separating the jury before giving
its verdict); Chilton v. Redman (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1707), in WESTMORELAND
1707–1709, supra note 130, at 7–8 (finding a verdict signed only by foreman rather than the
entire jury erroneous). Compare Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 34 (summoning the jury to court to deliver
their verdict the following day due to absence of two jurors), and Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 42 (staying the
judgment because of errors), with Pigg v. Pain (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1725), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 54 (finding that the entire jury must appear
in court to present a verdict). But see Dalton v. Lynch (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5, 1706/1707),
in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 90 (holding the verdict will not be invalidated when
a juror is called as a witness if a timely objection is made and the juror does not testify).
264
Spotswood v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 106–07.
265
For an example of such a rare case, see Smyth v. Richardson (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 4,
1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 91.
266
See, e.g., Baker v. Minton (King George Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 37 (relieving the defendant from judgment rendered against him).
267
Whitton v. Burgoyne (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 10, 1696), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1695–1699, at 21–22 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSEX 1695–1699]; accord Macon v. Wharton, (Goochland Cnty.
Ct., July 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 378 (enjoining the verdict).
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In addition to setting jury verdicts aside, judges controlled the
evidence they permitted juries to hear. On many occasions, they
concluded that proffered evidence did not support parties’ legal
contentions and accordingly declined to admit it.268 The procedure
available to a party against whom evidence was offered was to make and
preserve an objection by a demurrer to the evidence and a bill of
exceptions.269 Objections also could be interposed to the competence or
interest of witnesses as well as to the substance or weight of what they
had to say.270
Despite all these available tools, courts nonetheless at times stayed
their hand and declined to interfere intrusively in the trial process. Thus
in one case, in which the defendant relied on a 1663 statute concerning
entertainment of strangers, the court ruled that the statute was no longer
in force, but the jury nonetheless returned a verdict for the defendant,
and the court upheld the verdict.271 In another case, in which the court
had directed the jury to find a special rather than general verdict, the
court, after a debate in which one justice changed his vote, accepted the
See, e.g., Corbin v. Beverich (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 7, 1709/1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–
1710, supra note 249, at 66–67 (permitting the plaintiff to swear to tobacco weights rather than
admit a list of weights into evidence). On other occasions, of course, they admitted material
into evidence. See, e.g, Meaver v. Hewitt (York Cnty. Ct., Jan. 20, 1734), in YORK COUNTY,
VIRGINIA WILLS, INVENTORIES AND COURT ORDERS 1732–1737, at 93, 95 (Mary Marshall Brewer
ed., 2005) [hereinafter YORK 1732–1737] (admitting an account book into evidence).
269
See, e.g., Stretton v. Martin, (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra
note 144, at B52, B55–56 (admitting a certificate into evidence to which the plaintiff tendered a
bill of exceptions and appealed); Jameson v. Vawter, (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH
& BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B51–52 (reversing the judgment where the defendant
demurred to the plaintiff’s evidence but the court did not force plaintiff to join); Campball v.
Sayers (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Feb. 18, 1763), microformed on 00303765162115 (Genealogical Soc’y of
Utah) (admitting the plaintiff’s evidence, to which the defendant demurred); Jett v. Barrow
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1706/1707), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 94–95
(admitting a will entered by the plaintiff, to which the defendant demurred). Of course, if the
demurrer was sustained, the challenged evidence would not be given to the jury. For an early
example of an apparent bill of exceptions, see Spotswood v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 20,
1721), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1723
(PART III), at 118 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART
III)].
270
See, e.g., Morris v. Chamberlayne (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1735), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL,
supra note 144, at B50–51 (refusing to admit an interested witness). A claim of interest or lack of
competence would require a witness to undergo a voir dire. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Robinson
(Essex Cnty. Ct., June 19, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729, supra note 151, at 32–33 (refusing to allow a
witness to testify because the witness refused to undergo a voir dire). For an example of a voir
dire, see Samford v. Suggitt (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1719), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1719–1721, at 3–4 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1719–1721].
271
Churchhill v. Lomax (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1707), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra
note 169, at 5–6.
268
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general verdict that the jury returned.272 Of course, there were many
cases in which a losing party sought relief from a jury verdict and the
court, without giving reasons, simply denied the request.273
The declining power of juries confirms, in short, what other facts
suggest—that the legal system of Virginia and especially the judges
thereof gained effective power to enforce their commands in the seventyfive years following Bacon’s Rebellion. Whereas a rowdy lower class
guided by a few elite leaders had come close in the 1670s to
overthrowing the colony’s government and driving established elites
from power, those elites had more than recovered their power by the
mid-eighteenth century. By the mid-eighteenth century, Virginia’s legal
system, and in particular its judiciary, clearly possessed sufficient power
to govern the colony effectively.
E. Center and Periphery
But how was that power divided among the judges? Could the
General Court, sitting first in Jamestown and later in Williamsburg,
control the work of county courts? How much power did the General
Court’s appellate jurisdiction,274 its exclusive jurisdiction over felony
trials, and its concurrent jurisdiction over major civil litigation give it?
The evidence suggests that the General Court’s power was somewhat
limited and that predominant power in colonial Virginia rested in the
hands of county courts, which had jurisdiction over civil and most
criminal cases, a wide variety of regulatory matters, and even chancery
litigation.
This section first explicates the jurisdiction of Virginia’s county
courts.275 Second, it describes the structure of the colony’s political
power.276 Third, it details the structure of the legal knowledge in
Virginia.277 Finally, it explains county court independence.278
Weekes v. Mountague (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–1710, supra
note 249, at 73–74.
273
Compare Bruce v. Dowdy (Orange Cnty. Ct. May 19, 1736), in ORANGE 1734–1736, supra
note 207, at 77 (reporting a jury verdict against the defendant, to which the defendant filed
errors), with Bruce v. Dowdy (Orange Cnty. Ct., July 21, 1736), in ORANGE 1734–1736, supra note
207, at 94–95 (upholding the verdict against the defendant).
274
Before the 1680s, appeals also were taken on occasion to the General Assembly, but after
the 1680s the Assembly's appellate jurisdiction disappeared. Warren M. Billings, Temple v.
Gerard, 1667–1668: An Example of Appellate Practices in Colonial Virginia, 94 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 88, 89 (1986); Warren M. Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves in SeventeenthCentury Virginia, 99 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 56 n.37 (1991).
275
See infra Part III.E.1 (examining what matters came before county courts).
276
See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing political power in colonial Virginia).
277
See infra Part III.E.3 (examining the sources and extent of legal knowledge in colonial
Virginia).
272
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The Jurisdiction of County Courts

In the decades following Bacon’s Rebellion, Virginians, in the words
of one grand jury, continued to consider themselves entitled to “the
benefit of the laws of England,”279 and courts frequently proclaimed their
adherence to English law. They ruled, for example, that criminal
prosecutions could be instituted only “according to the laws of England
and this country;”280 that “the law of England require[d] two witnesses”
for resolving any dispute in court;281 that guardians had to be appointed
for minors “by the law of England;”282 and that a sheriff could not retain
fees “exacted . . . contrary to equity & law.”283
They also turned continually to the procedures and vocabulary of
the common law. Young people, for example, were apprenticed
“according to custom in England.”284 Other common-law words of art
similarly appeared, such as “bills of exchange,”285 “escheat,”286 “fee
tail,”287 “curtesy of England,”288 “quietas est,”289 “in trust,”290 “joint

278
See infra Part III.E.4 (examining the lower courts’ independence from the General
Court).
279
Information Against Robins (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1687), microformed on
00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
280
Order Against Quakers (Va. Gen. Ct., June 16, 1675), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 409–10.
281
In re. Gale (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1676), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y
of Utah).
282
In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6,
at 450.
283
In re. Page (York Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1671), microformed on 1000445991 (Genealogical Soc’y
of Utah).
284
In re. Executors of Flynt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1670/71), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 31–32.
285
Foxcraft v. Newell (Va. Gen. Ct., May 24, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6,
at 338. Bills of exchange were widely used from an early date. E.g., Spencer v. Austen
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 17, 1674/5), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52,
at 25–26. Suit did not lie on a bill of exchange that had not been the subject of a legal protest.
See Whitticer v. Atkins (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Apr. 11, 1683), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra note
247, at 16 (dismissing an action based on a bill of exchange where no legal protest was made).
Further, the drawer of a bill of exchange was not liable thereon once the bill was accepted by
the drawee. E.g., Whetstone v. Laight (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1678), in Middlesex 1677–
1680, supra note 134, at 25; Bayley & Co. v. Gwin (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 8, 1699/1700), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1699–1701, at 10
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1699–1701].
286
Bridger v. Pitt (Va. Gen. Ct., May 23, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
337; accord In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 450; Starkey v. Vauson (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 372.
287
Dunkan v. Remy (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 30, 1714), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716,
supra note 138, at 19.
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tenancy,”291 “consideration,”292 “demurrer,”293 “dedimus potem,”294
“dower,”295 “executor,”296 “administrator,”297 “adm. cum testamento
annexo,”298 and “non est inventus.”299 Finally, judges and the lawyers
appearing before the courts routinely cited both English statutes adopted
before the settlement of Virginia and other English authorities as bases
for decision.300
Doctrines that are recognizably common-law rules of law also were
adopted in Virginia, although they did not always have the same social
Smith v. Cheesman (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 25, 1673), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6,
at 353; accord In re. Bowler (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 21, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 448, 450 (following the “curtesy of Virginia”).
289
Reeves v. Reeves (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
371–72.
290
West v. Wilson (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 9, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
371–72.
291
Beverly v. Pate (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
385–86.
292
Waggaman v. Anderson (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 22, 1675/1676), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL,
supra note 6, at 451–52.
293
Ludwell v. Scarborough (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 26, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 239–40.
294
Chicheley v. Potter (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 6, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6,
at 250–51.
295
Hansford v. Seawell (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 22, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note
6, at 266. A widow was entitled to dower even in land in which her husband’s fee simple failed
if he died without heirs. See, e.g., Sheares v. Courtnall (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18,
1682), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 76 (granting the widow one third of
her deceased husband’s estate).
296
Bacon v. Swan (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
276–77; accord In re Executors of Flynt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 25, 1670/1671), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1669–1673, supra note 23, at 31–32 (reporting a motion brought by
“executors” of Flynt’s estate).
297
Estate of Vassall (Va. Gen. Ct., April 19, 1670), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
207–08; accord In re. Langley (Norfolk Cnty. Ct, Oct. 16, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of
Va.). In the absence of a close relative, the “greatest creditor” of the estate would be appointed
administrator.
Estate of Ralph (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1669), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1665−1669, supra note 11, at 99–100.
298
Estate of Gregory (York Cnty. Ct., Feb. 24, 1669/1670), microformed on 1000445991
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
299
Abrahall v. Payne (Va. Gen. Ct., Mar. 22, 1671/1672), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 293–94; accord Lee v. Elmey (Charles City Cnty. Ct., 1672/1673), in 13 VA. COLONIAL
ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 78.
300
See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Dade (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 106–08 (citing a statute of King Henry VI); Brent v. Dunne (Stafford
Cnty. Ct,. Apr. 7, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 84 (citing a statute
of Queen Elizabeth). Virginia courts held, however, that statutes enacted subsequent to the
colony’s settlement that did not expressly state they were applicable, such as the 1677 Statute of
Frauds, were not of force in Virginia. See, e.g., Hayberd v. Hawksford (Richmond Cnty. Ct.,
Mar. 6, 1700/1701), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 55–56 (holding a statute of King
Charles II inapplicable).
288
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and economic effects that they had in England. For example, Virginia
courts held that a tenant in less than fee simple could “have the use of
the land not committing any waste thereupon and not to dispose of the
same.”301 Lawyers also knew how to engage in a “privy examination of
a feme covert” to convey real property without subjecting it to dower.302
Above all, the county courts continued to exercise plenary commonlaw jurisdiction grounded in the use of the common-law forms of action.
Among the common-law writs filed were account,303 audita querela,304
case,305 covenant,306 debt,307 deceit,308 detinue,309 elegit,310 replevin,311 scire
facias,312 trespass,313 and trover.314 Two suits—one grounded on a statute
Appleton v. Waugh (Va. Gen. Ct., Sept. 29, 1674), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note
6, at 384. A lessee who failed to maintain land as required by the lease would be subject to
liability but could set off improvements he had made to the land against any damages. See, e.g.,
Towers v. Bryan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3, 1674/1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1674−1677, supra note 52, at 17–18 (taking into account work done on the land when
determining damages).
302
(Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 28, 1669), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 513; e.g.,
Examination of Micham (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1702), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra
note 128, at 86–87. As Linda Sturtz has shown, however, the adoption of common law rules of
coverture did not subordinate women to men in Virginia as much as they did in England. See
LINDA L. STURTZ, WITHIN HER POWER: PROPERTIED WOMEN IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 20–21
(2002) (discussing successful and powerful women in Virginia).
303
E.g., Callahan v. Phillips (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 13, 1703), in LANCASTER 1701–1703,
supra note 247, at 97; Estate of Traverse (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1672/1673), in LANCASTER
1670–1674, supra note 52, at 76; Solo v. Pinton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1672/1673),
microformed on 1000549064 (Library of Va.).
304
E.g., Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 100.
305
E.g., Mingo v. Poole (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1673), microformed on 1000457503
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Foxhall v. Jones (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1721), in KING
GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 7–8.
306
E.g., Brent v. Dunne (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690,
supra note 127, at 106.
307
E.g., Lewis v. Henley (Norfolk Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18, 1675), microformed on R-53 (Library of
Va.); Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Mar. 10, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 63.
308
E.g., Digges v. Lilly (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 JOHN RANDOLPH & EDWARD
BARRADALL, VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS: THE REPORTS OF DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL
COURT OF VIRGINIA 1728–1741, at R1, R7 (R.T. Barton ed., 2005) (1909).
309
E.g., Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668,
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 77.
310
See, e.g., Taylor & Co. v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–
1704, supra note 203, at 77.
311
E.g., Whitty v. Aldridge (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 17, 1671), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 252–53.
312
E.g., Parker v. Genesis (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1674/1675), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1674–1677, supra note 52, at 22–23. It was decided early that courts
processing writs of scire facias would not entertain defenses available in the original, underlying
suit and not therein raised. See Briscoe v. Tignor (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1689), in
301
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of Henry VIII providing that tenants in common were entitled to
partition their land,315 and the other on a suit for “negligence” in letting a
horse lent by one person to another die316—made the growing breadth of
jurisdiction clear.
Along with the growth of common-law jurisdiction came an
increasing use of common-law defenses. Defendants learned, for
example, how to interpose proper pleas of the general issue to different
writs, such as pleading not guilty to a writ of trespass,317 and pleading
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1686–1690, at
85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1686–1690]
(confirming the judgment against the defendant where he failed to raise an available defense in
the original suit).
313
E.g., Page v. Marshall (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1724), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 53–54; Bayley v. Pritchett (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1668), in LANCASTER
1666–1669, supra note 45, at 50.
314
E.g., Poole v. Huxford (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1677), in Middlesex 1673–1678, supra
note 104, at 60–61. By the end of the seventeenth century, plaintiffs were pleading in proper
formulary words: in one assault case, for example, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant “by
force and arms . . . did beat bruise and batter and evilly entreate” the defendant “so that of his
life he did despair.” Maupin v. Winder (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 25, 1699), in
Northumberland 1699–1700, supra note 190, at 69, 71. Failure to use proper words could result
in abatement of a suit. E.g., Clarke v. Hipkings (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1699), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1697–1700, at 73–74 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1697–1700]. Similarly, failure to
recite “the action . . . in the [d]eclaration” could have the same affect. E.g., Willis v. Thilman
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra, at 52–53. Courts also had
begun to specify what writs could be used for what purposes. They ruled, for example, that
case would lie on a promise to pay rent, e.g., Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct.
7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 128, at 26–27; for recovery of a legacy, e.g.,
Covington v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at
94–95; or for recovery of a statutory penalty, e.g., Swanson v. Burton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr.
7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note 128, at 47, 49–50. However, case would not lie for
a trespass committed on a freehold. E.g., Pley v. Maguyer (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in
ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 11. Debt also would lie for rent. E.g., Fitzhugh v. Williams
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 32–33. There
remained, however, clear instances in which plaintiffs used and recovered judgment on
improper writs, as with a writ of debt on what was described as a “[n]ote,” but was in fact a bill
of exchange. Parrott v. Morgan (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 7, 1705/1706), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1705–1707, at 25–26 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1705–1707]. Similarly, another
plaintiff improperly used and recovered on a writ of case for an assault. Cobb v. Eaton
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1730), microformed on 00327515162127 (Library of Va.). For
information on the common law forms of action in Virginia, see PAGAN, supra note 5, at 68–
70.
315
Brent v. Thompson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690,
supra note 127, at 97–98.
316
Hall v. Stribling (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1692/1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note
158, at 65.
317
E.g., Taylor v. Willis (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1696/1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699,
supra note 144, at 31.
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owes nothing to a writ of debt.318 Defendants also knew how to
interpose other pleas, such as performance—either total319 or partial320—
duress,321 illegality,322 self-defense,323 statute of limitations,324 res
judicata,325 settlement,326 discount or set-off,327 want of consideration,328

E.g., Wormely v. Fluker (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 16, 1699), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1699–1700, supra note 190, at 83, 86. However, an incorrect plea would be rejected. E.g., Smith
v. Gray (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 78.
319
E.g, Brent v. Darnell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 13, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668,
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 69–70.
320
E.g., Gibson v. Battalia (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 58; cf., e.g., Butler v. Hammersley (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 96 (holding an executor who paid a debt up
to the limit of estate funds in his possession was free from further liability).
321
E.g., Somervill v. Settle (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra
note 160, at 41.
322
See, e.g., Russell v. Mathews (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1735–1736, at 77–78 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1735–1736] (barring suit on an
account because the plaintiff, an ordinary keeper, had extended more credit to the defendant
than allowed by statute); cf., e.g., Arnold v. Bramham (Orange Cnty. Ct., May 30, 1752), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1752–1753, at 26–
27 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORANGE 1752–1753] (allowing the
plaintiff to testify to accounts for liquor sales since he was within proviso of law allowing
merchants to sell liquor for consumption off the premises).
323
E.g., Norris v. Thomas (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1700), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1700–1702, supra note 130, at 1–2. A defendant was not entitled to use force against a plaintiff
who merely threatened him with force. See Hubbard v. Lynn (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 2,
1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1746–1748, at 27–28 (Sam Sparacio & Ruth Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA
1746–1748] (granting judgment against the defendant for assault and battery where the plaintiff
only verbally threatened the defendant).
324
E.g., Booth v. Dudley (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note
308, at R9–11; Ellis v. Garton (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 8, 1739), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740,
supra note 122, at 67–68; see Clay v. Day (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 25, 1712), in
WESTMORELAND 1712–1714, supra note 128, at 6–7 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on the amount of time he occupied the land). Special rules existed for suits against a
decedent's estate; suits could be brought for any debts “authentically proved.” Ellis v. Tomlin
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1695/1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 75–76.
Suits could also be brought for debts contracted within one year before the decedent’s death
and proved by the oath of the creditor and one other person. E.g., Haslewood v. Tomlin
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1695/96), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 74; see
Campbell v. Callaway (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT
COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 33 (barring a suit for being “out of date”); see also Cole v.
Godwin (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1699), microfilmed on 00327505162126 (Library of Va.)
(barring a suit even though the debt was acknowledged within one year prior to the decedent’s
death).
325
E.g., Abbot v. Abbot (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note
308, at R21; Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster County Ct., Apr. 13, 1693), in LANCASTER 1691–1695,
supra note 263, at 50. In Hill v. Whitfield, the court ruled that a final judgment for the plaintiff in
a suit for stealing hogs did not preclude a subsequent suit for a statutory penalty for stealing
318

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

811

and, in a slander case, that words were not actionable.329 Defendants
could also plead that persons who did not control their own legal affairs,
such as wives,330 minors,331 and servants,332 could not bring suit or enter
the same hogs. (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1693), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES
1693–1695, supra note 87, at 1–2.
326
E.g., Sharp v. Marshall (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1705), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra
note 238, at 69. Compare Canterbury v. Sclater (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2 1733), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1732–1734, at 52 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1732–1734] (reporting the jury’s
recognition of settlement between the parties), with Canterbury v. Sclater (Richmond Cnty. Ct.,
Aug. 6, 1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734, supra, at 65–66 (holding the settlement found by special
verdict as binding). But see Drummond v. White (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1717), in 16
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY VIRGINIA RECORD BOOK COURT CASES & C 1717–1719, at 31–32
(Howard Mackey & Marlene A. Groves eds., 2003) [hereinafter 16 NORTHAMPTON 1717–1719]
(holding that an oral agreement may not be pleaded in bar to suit on specialty).
327
E.g., Carter v. Trent (Richmond County Ct., Mar. 6, 1700/1701), in RICHMOND 1699–1701,
supra note 285, at 57.
328
E.g., Chapman v. Bevan (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 32. The court rejected the defense in Chapman v.
Bevan, which involved suit on a specialty. Id.; cf. Green v. Ward (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Dec.
1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 45 (stating prior
agreements “cut off & excluded by a specialty”); Drummond v. White (Northampton County
Ct., Sept. 17, 1717), in 16 NORTHAMPTON 1717–1719, supra note 326, at 32 (holding a parole
agreement not binding against specialty). But see New v. Morriss (Goochland Cnty. Ct., May
1729), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 88–89 (holding lack of consideration
was a valid defense to suit on a bond).
329
E.g., Batson v. Fitchet (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1730), microformed on
00327515162127 (Library of Va.); Gibson v. Richee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1690), in
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 95. In some cases, courts rejected such a
plea. E.g., Mutlow v. Ballard (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note
308, at R9–10. Compare Scott v. White (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 20, 1700/1701), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 54 (considering the defendant’s plea that the
plaintiff failed to allege that the words “were spoken falsely and maliciously”), with Scott v.
White (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1701), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note
130, at 63–64 (overruling the defendant’s plea). Slanders, of course, generated considerable
litigation. See, e.g., Bryant v. Cammell (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 18, 1681/1682), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 53 (reporting a case in which the defendant
called plaintiff's wife a “whore”). Much of said litigation was ended by a public apology by the
defendant. E.g., Neavil v. Arnold (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1766), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767,
supra note 247, at 38; Swan v. Hedgman (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1706), in LANCASTER
1703–1706, supra note 238, at 99–100; cf. Hamelin v. Jarmin (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5,
1693/1694), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 170–71 (finding words “not
actionable” but “contrary to good manners” and reducing damages given by the jury to costs
only). People who repeated slanders initiated by others were not liable. E.g., Rallings v.
Fraquair (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1738), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at
26. In one case, a county justice sitting on the bench accused the presiding justice of being
drunk. In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1704/1705), in Middlesex 1702–1704, supra
note 203, at 96–97. The court determined that the presiding justice was not drunk. Id. at 97.
330
See, e.g., Jones v. Courtney (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 22, 1681), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 51 (voiding a contract because a wife entered
into it without her husband); see also Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 13,
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into contracts, or that one joint owner of an obligation could not sue
thereon without joining co-owners.333 Indeed, by the end of the
seventeenth century, special pleading had begun to emerge in Virginia's
county courts.334 Pleas, it should be noted, were required to be in writing
“for the better regulating and keeping the records and transferring the
pre[ce]dents to posterity.”335
1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695, supra note 263, at 9–10 (holding property of a wife before
marriage becomes that of the husband upon marriage); cf. Jones v. Smith (Isle of Wight Cnty.
Ct., Mar. 9, 1693/1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 18
(upholding suit against a widow and her new husband for bed claimed by the widow as
inheritance from her deceased husband); Graves v. Barker (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9,
1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1762, supra note 157, at 68 (holding suit abated by plaintiff’s
marriage). But see In re. Payne (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note
267, at 14–15 (granting the wife of an absent husband power to sue for debts); Millner v.
Hightower (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 8, 1736), in RICHMOND 1735–1736, supra note 322, at 48
(upholding a deed executed by a woman prior to marriage); Payne v. Mathews (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1701/1702), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 102 (upholding a note
signed by a wife on behalf of her “lame” husband).
331
See Velden v. Chelton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1730), in LANCASTER 1729–1732, supra
note 126, at 30 (holding a minor may not appear in court except by guardian); Glascock v. Goad
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1705/1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 11–12
(stating in dictum that “no minor . . . [is] permitted to sue in any [c]ourt”); see also Johnston v.
Johnston (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Oct. 15, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773–1774, at 37 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994)
[hereinafter CAROLINE 1773–1774] (reporting a case where a minor entered a plea that he was
not bound by his contract). But see In re. Terret (King George Cnty. Ct., Jan. 5, 1722/1723), in
KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 66 (binding an underage youth who agreed to
indenture even though his parents never agreed to it).
332
See, e.g., Lennox & Co. v. Donaldson (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Aug. 10, 1768), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1768–1769, at 53 (Lydia
Sparacio Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter LOUISA 1768–1769] (reporting the defendant’s plea
that he was a servant at the time of the sale); Peyton v. Marston (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 19,
1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 82–83 (voiding a bill of sale entered into by a
servant); McCarty v. Philpott (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694,
supra note 184, at 64 (dismissing suit where bill was passed during the time of servitude). A
statutory penalty could also be imposed for unlawfully trading with a servant. See Carey v.
Barefoote (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 15–16
(ordering the defendant pay four times the value of the contract as a penalty); cf. In re.
Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 53
(holding a servant may not assign the right of executorship).
333
E.g., Dudley v. Beverley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Feb. 5, 1682/1683), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686,
supra note 184, at 42.
334
See, e.g., Robinson v. Skipwith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1697), in MIDDLESEX 1697–
1700, supra note 314, at 12–13 (reporting the defendant’s plea of lawful seizure of the plaintiff’s
property). Compare Carter v. Scholfield (Lancaster County Ct., Dec. 11, 1701), in LANCASTER
1701–1703, supra note 247, at 14 (reporting the defendant’s plea that the “Negroes” at issue in
the suit lawfully belonged to him), with Carter v. Scholfield (Lancaster County Ct., Feb. 11,
1701/1702), in LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note 247, at 17 (rejecting the defendant’s plea).
335
Fitzhugh v. Dade (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690,
supra note 127, at 90. Contra Carter v. Beale (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 26, 1711), in
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Defendants also learned how to interpose procedural pleas in
addition to substantive pleas in bar. By the early eighteenth century, for
example, demurrers were in regular use.336 Suits would be dismissed if a
plaintiff “brought the wrong action”337 or brought an action on a statute
that had been repealed;338 if either the plaintiff339 or the defendant340
died; if a defendant did not reside in the county where suit was
brought341 or the matter at issue had occurred in another county;342 if a
WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, at 43; see Order re Records (Charles City Cnty. Ct.,
Aug. 10, 1689), in CHARLES CITY 1687−1695, supra note 105, at 59 (directing the clerk to keep
records at the courthouse rather than his own house).
336
E.g., Arnold v. Sharp (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 6, 1726), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART II), supra note 165, at 18.
337
Robinson v. Whitaker (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1692/1693), in MIDDLESEX 1690–1694,
supra note 162, at 61. Thus, courts decided that case would lie on a promise to pay rent. E.g.,
Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note
128, at 26–27. Debt also would lie for rent. E.g., Fitzhugh v. Williams (Richmond Cnty. Ct.,
June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 32–33. Case also would lie for
recovery of a legacy. E.g., Gouldman v. Ransone (Essex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1700/1701), in ESSEX
1699–1702, supra note 247, at 74; accord Covington v. Meriwether (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12,
1701), in Essex 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 94. Likewise, case would lie for recovery of a
statutory penalty. E.g., Swanson v. Burton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX
1700–1702, supra note 128, at 47, 49–50. However, case would not lie for a trespass committed
on a freehold. E.g., Pley v. Maguyer (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra
note 267, at 10. Similarly, debt would not lie on an account. E.g., Stringer v. Robins
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1712), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 63.
Further, trespass would not lie for committing waste by cutting down trees. E.g., West v.
Robyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note
225, at 91, 93.
338
See Francis v. Cock (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at
117 (holding a defense based on legislation that has been repealed void). Compare Johnson v.
Henderson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1734/1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note
209, at 81–82 (reporting the defendant’s assignment of errors in the judgment against him), with
Johnson v. Henderson (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra
note 209, at 94–95 (dismissing the suit where the action was based on legislation that had been
repealed).
339
E.g., Walker v. Row (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1721), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1719–1721, at 71 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1719–1721].
340
E.g., Draper v. Clayton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1701), in LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra
note 210, at 87–88.
341
E.g., Grymes v. Harrison (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697,
supra note 193, at 89. But see Stepto v. Jones (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1704), in LANCASTER
1703–1706, supra note 238, at 44 (overruling a plea that the plaintiff and defendant were nonresidents of the county since the plaintiff was a freeholder of the county); Neale v. Barrow
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 27, 1707), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 77
(holding the defendant may be sued in any county where he or she owns property even where
the underlying offense is not local). A nonresident plaintiff would be required to give security
to pay costs before suit could proceed. See Chamberlaine v. Marchbanks (Goochland Cnty. Ct.,
Nov. 1728), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 35 (dismissing an action where
the nonresident plaintiff failed to give security); Carstarphan v. Lewis (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
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writ was “not . . . executed in due time”343 or a declaration was
“untimely” filed;344 if a declaration was uncertain345 or “not full or
sufficient,”346 in that it did not, for example, indicate the time at which
pleaded events occurred or were to occur347 or whether money became
due by “bill bond or account;”348 if a variance existed between a writ and
a declaration;349 if a party submitted an unsigned plea350 or a double
plea;351 if a suit against an estate sought judgment against an executor
personally rather than against goods of the estate in the executor’s
hands;352 or if a suit for a statutory penalty was brought in the name of
the informer only, rather than the informer and the crown.353
July 1, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 108−09 (dismissing an action where
the nonresident plaintiff failed to give security).
342
E.g., Barrow v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar 2, 1709/1710), in RICHMOND 1709–1710,
supra note 261, at 41.
343
Johnson v. Hay (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART
I), supra note 184, at 79.
344
Hawkins v. Moseley (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at
11.
345
E.g., Gray v. Grymes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, supra
note 193, at 74; Peale v. French (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 2, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 71–72.
346
Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695,
supra note 263, at 14–15.
347
E.g., Pafford v. Jennings (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704,
supra note 203, at 86–87; see Gibson v. Brent (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–
1693, supra note 158, at 90 (showing a plea lacking a certain time). But see Davis v. Tayler
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 31–32
(permitting a declaration that lacked the time at which the trespass was committed); Gerrard v.
Allerton (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra
note 225, at 19−20 (overruling the defendant’s motion for dismissal based on several
uncertainties).
348
Herford v. Clarke (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 6, 1698/1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700,
supra note 314, at 66. Contra Haines v. Pinkard (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 15, 1702), in
LANCASTER 1701–1703, supra note 247, at 50–51.
349
E.g., Mann v. Bertrand (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 10, 1697), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra
note 144, at 55; Baker v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1708), in MIDDLESEX 1707–1708,
supra note 169, at 88. But cf. Garlington v. Berratt (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 19, 1700), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 4–6 (denying a motion to abate for variance
between the writ and declaration).
350
E.g., Plunkett v. Mercer (King George Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725,
supra note 226, at 104−05.
351
E.g., Pope v. Long, Richmond Cnty. Ct. Mar. 1, 1703/1704, in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra
note 261, at 94–96.
352
E.g., Russell v. Downing (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1703), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1702–1704, at 73–74
(Lydia Bontempo & Ruth Sparacio eds., 2003) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704]; cf.
Robinson v. Skipwith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1699), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note
314, at 72–73 (dismissing a suit where executors were not properly appointed); Garner v.
Straughan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 17, 1703/1704), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704,
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There were limits, however, to the willingness of courts to rely on
common-law technicalities.354 On one occasion, for example, a defendant
interposed a technically insufficient plea that he “kn[e]w nothing of the
matter,” issue was joined, and the case nonetheless proceeded to a
plaintiff's verdict.355 Parties at times also joined issue on other erroneous
pleas, such as not guilty to a writ of debt,356 “nil debet” to an action of
case,357 and not his deed to case.358 An especially interesting plea was
interposed in Thompson v. Frezer,359 a suit by a county clerk for his fee for
marrying the defendant. The defendant responded that the amount
sought was “too large” and “exhorbitant” and in excess of the sum
provided by the legislature.360 The defendant won.361 Yet another
defendant won when a jury returned a verdict in an action for breach of
contract that neither “the words or treatment between the parties nor the

supra, at 95–96 (dismissing a suit brought against the defendant personally rather than as
administrator of the decedent).
353
E.g., French v. Hawksford (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1700), in RICHMOND 1699–1701,
supra note 285, at 14–15; Quidley v. Bledsoe (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1725), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 58–59. But see Lyell v. Russell (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1739/1740), in RICHMOND 1738–1740, supra note 151, at 85–86 (holding joinder
of an officer was not required in a suit against a creditor for unlawful arrest); see also Thornbury
v. Coward (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 46–47
(holding that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be brought until plaintiff who brings
the action is acquitted of charges in the initial prosecution).
354
See Bag v. Cooke (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at
R42–43 (arguing whether a plea in abatement could be interposed after special imparlance
without known result).
355
Harvey v. Shelton (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 17, 1702), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1702–1704, supra note 352, at 1, 4–5; accord Smitton v. Jones (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 17,
1702), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1702–1704, supra note 352, at 18–20 (overruling the defendant's
plea that he never sold any cow to the plaintiff and granting judgment for the plaintiff).
356
E.g., Tunney v. Conner (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART I), supra note 184, at 6. At a later term of court, however, the suit was dismissed on the
ground of unspecified errors. Tunney v. Conner (Spotsylvania County Ct., June 1, 1725), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 49.
357
Chew v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 35–36. But see Harrall v. Williams (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug.
6, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 111–12 (holding nil debet was
not a proper plea to an action of case).
358
E.g., Mackey v. Stone (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra
note 237, at 40−41.
359
(Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1689/1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note
127, at 79–80.
360
Id.
361
Id. at 79–80. However, in another case, in which a defendant tore in pieces a plea to which
the plaintiff had objected, the court “[took] the said plea to be insufficient.” Hipkings v. Gray
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1697), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 14–15.
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evidence at bar doth amount so high as to make a contract nor
consummate a bargain.”362
Nor would cases be dismissed simply because a plaintiff failed to
plead words not material thereto.363 Thus, a court did not dismiss an
action for an apparent assault for want of the words “contra pacem” or
“vie et armis” in the declaration.364 A court would not dismiss a suit
involving title to land for the plaintiff’s failure to plead that his
predecessor in interest was seised in fee simple as long as the
predecessor was, in fact, so seised.365 Nor would a court dismiss a suit
because the plaintiff’s name had been misspelled.366 Courts also rejected
other technical claims, such as one that a defendant was improperly
arrested on a court day when he happened to be in court on other
business,367 and one that a defendant had improperly joined a plea in bar
to a plea in abatement.368 Finally, the courts enforced agreements among

Gundry v. Bennet (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 11, 1692), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note
158, at 1–2. In Gibson v. Bowrne, the parties accused each other of detaining goods. (Stafford
Cnty. Ct. Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 87–88. In a subsequent suit
between the parties over the same matter, the court was met by pleas such as one that the
defendant did not “in his heart think scorn to keep or detain any thing of the plaintiff.”
Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at
92–93. After highly irregular pleading, the court decided the first case in favor of Gibson where
he was the plaintiff. Gibson v. Bowrne (Stafford Cnty. Ct. Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693,
supra note 158, at 87–88. A jury decided the second case in his favor where he was the
defendant. Bowrne v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra
note 158, at 92–93.
363
E.g., Scholfield v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697,
supra note 193, at 84–85.
364
Barloe v. Mitchell (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 11, 1699), LANCASTER 1699–1701, supra note
210, at 24. But see Jones v. Mackey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1699), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1697–1699, at 128 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1991) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1697–1699] (dismissing a slander action for
failure to allege that words were spoken “falsely and maliciously”).
365
E.g., Payne v. Shipway (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 8, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 47–48; Pope v. Pitman (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1698/1699), in
RICHMOND 1697–1699, supra note 364, at 74–75.
366
E.g., Willcocks v. Cammell (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1702/1703), in RICHMOND 1702–
1704, supra note 261, at 42. But see Paris v. Stool (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 15, 1711/1712), in
15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 36, 38 (dismissing suit where the plaintiff
misspelled the defendant’s name); cf. Lynch v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1703), in
RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 78–79 (dismissing suit for misnomer in plaintiff’s
replication).
367
Evans v. Jones (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1683), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note
184, at 58.
368
Briscoe v. Dunkington (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1700), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra
note 128, at 26–27.
362
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attorneys not to take advantage of technical errors369 and permitted
parties to cure other technical defects by amending their pleadings.370
Judges also tolerated other sorts of deficient behavior on the part of
attorneys. Illness of an attorney was reason for postponement of a
matter,371 as was death.372 In addition, courts permitted defendants,
whose attorneys had defaulted, to reopen cases on the date set for
judgment and to plead to issue immediately.373 Another court permitted
a litigant, whose attorney had “runaway,” to substitute a plea of the
general issue in lieu of a possibly invalid double plea previously entered
by the runaway attorney.374 A court would not grant an attorney a
postponement, however, even of “a cause of great weight,” for the
purpose of drafting a plea in bar after the defendant’s plea in abatement
had been overruled.375 Similarly, a court would grant judgment against
and charge costs to a litigant who personally and through counsel
“unfairly left his action.”376
As the common-law jurisdiction of the county courts was maturing,
an extensive jurisdiction in chancery was also emerging in those courts.
Chancery, for example, performed key functions relating to the
distribution of estates,377 such as setting off dower,378 distributing
369
E.g., Thurman v. Bowdoin (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 13, 1731), microformed on
00327515162127 (Library of Va.).
370
E.g., Bell v. Hord (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 23, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note
247, at 75; Skinker v. Robinson (King George Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1727), in KING GEORGE 1725–
1728, supra note 126, at 54; cf. Fantleroy v. Smith (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1708), in
RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra note 160, at 77 (permitting the clerk to amend the record to correct
an error in transcription).
371
E.g., Corbin v. Beverich (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1709/1710), in MIDDLESEX 1708–1710,
supra note 249, at 53–54; cf. Barrow v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1711), in RICHMOND
1710–1711, supra note 263, at 70 (postponing the case when the defendant’s attorney was absent
“by reason of some other extraordinary business”).
372
E.g., In re. Morgan (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 15, 1680), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–
1683, supra note 162, at 17.
373
Compare Ireson v. Stevens (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1703/1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–
1704, supra note 203, at 45–46 (granting the defendant’s plea to hold over until next court
session), with Ireson v. Stevens (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704,
supra note 203, at 58–59 (finding the defendant’s ultimate plea insufficient and ruling for the
plaintiff).
374
Pley v. Beckham (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1702), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at
127.
375
Scholfeild v. Willis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. Feb. 3, 1695/1696), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697,
supra note 193, at 59–60; cf. Jackson v. Weekes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 1, 1699/1700), in
MIDDLESEX 1697–1700, supra note 314, at 91–92 (refusing postponement for the defendant to
bring in discount when the case already had been placed on the calendar twice).
376
Willis v. Scholfeild (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 10, 1697/1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700,
supra note 314, at 37–38.
377
See, e.g., Dunn v. Wythe (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra
note 144, at B80–82 (deciding whether beneficiaries inherit as a next of kin or through the
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legacies,379 and directing the execution of deeds.380 In one case, chancery
went beyond these functions when an administrator of an estate sued a
man who purchased hogs from the decedent’s widow, but when the
purchaser responded that he had no knowledge whether the hogs
belonged to the decedent or the widow personally, the court dismissed
the suit.381 Chancery also played a key role in determining rights of
creditors.382 In one case, for example, chancery enjoined a common-law
judgment on a debt when it concluded that the debtor had paid it in
full,383 while in another, chancery stayed a common-law suit on a bill
allegedly obtained by fraud.384 It was the jurisdiction of chancery, of
course, to foreclose mortgages.385
More generally, a litigant could seek “relief in th[e] equitable Court
of Chancery according to the merits of his case” whenever he or she was
express devise); Waddy v. Sturman (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL,
supra note 308, at R61–63 (deciding an action of trespass arising out of the distribution of an
estate); Griffin v. Long (Caroline Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1768), in CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note
153, at 59–60 (concluding that specified slaves were not part of the decedent’s estate); Stone v.
Stone (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 21–22
(commanding an executrix to show cause for failing to probate a will when children brought
suit to compel probate).
378
Compare Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in LANCASTER 1691–
1695, supra note 263, at 4 (referring an action for failure to assign a dower correctly until the next
court), with Wormeley v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in LANCASTER 1691–1695,
supra note 263, at 8–9 (dismissing the action where the sherrif incorrectly arrested the
defendant).
379
E.g., Taylor v. Pratt (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725,
supra note 226, at 96.
380
E.g., Orchard v. Gowre (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1693), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra
note 184, at 58.
381
Alliman v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1701), in MIDDLESEX 1700–1702, supra note
128, at 73–75.
382
See, e.g., Pendleton v. Harrison (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 13, 1765), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1765, at 58–59 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1765] (upholding a marital trust preventing a
creditor from reaching a wife’s assets); Hickey v. Sumers (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3,
1706/1707), in MIDDLESEX 1705–1707, supra note 314, at 96 (voiding a previous judgment for a
creditor and requiring the creditor to reimburse the plaintiff).
383
Field v. Bronaugh (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1730), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1730–1732, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732].
384
Brown v. Ingo (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1718), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note
151, at 4–6; cf. Irby v. Portis (Isle of Wight Cnty. Ct., Feb. 9, 1693/1694), in 3 SURRY & ISLE OF
WRIGHT COUNTIES 1693–1695, supra note 87, at 16–17 (staying a judgment on specialty pending
a chancery determination whether a prior, unfulfilled oral agreement constituted a defense to
suit on specialty).
385
E.g., Wilson v. Gardner (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Nov. 21, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1768–1770, at 50–51 (Lydia Sparacio
Bontempo ed., 2001) [hereinafter FAIRFAX 1768–1770].
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“by the strict rules of the common law debarred of any satisfaction in the
premises.”386 A litigant could not seek relief in chancery, however, if he
or she had a remedy at common law,387 or if the issue to be tried in
chancery was identical to that already tried at law.388 The precise
location of the line specifying the availability of equitable relief was not,
however, clear. Thus, Virginia courts permitted a person who would
inherit an estate to seek injunctive relief against a current tenant
threatening to commit waste.389 However, they did not permit an
overseer who had managed an estate to sue in chancery to recover his
promised share of the crop he had grown;390 apparently his only remedy
was a common-law breach of contract suit. Of course, “Equity never
decree[d] against an Act of Parliament [or of the colonial assembly,]
which indeed would be transferring the legislative power.”391
Another area of expanding jurisdiction was the criminal law.392
Throughout the decades following Bacon’s Rebellion, Virginia’s courts
386
Haley v. Eyres (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra
note 127, at 57. Thus, chancery set aside a jury verdict on a bill “[i]gnorantly” given by a
widow under persuasion by a creditor for her deceased husband’s debt when she had never
possessed or administered any part of his estate; the defense had not been available to her at
the jury trial. Northington v. Poole (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–
1690, supra note 312, at 86. In another case, the plaintiff’s correspondent in London had shipped
goods to the plaintiff in Virginia, but the commander of the vessel, who had all the papers,
refused to deliver the goods; because the plaintiff had no “evidence to prove the same . . . by
the strict rules of law,” he was permitted to bring an action in chancery. Gwin v. Scott
(Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 26; see
Gwin v. Scott (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at 43
(presenting the defendant’s answer to the complaint); accord Allerton v. Withers (Stafford Cnty.
Ct., Sept. 10, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 119–120 (reporting an
action in chancery against an agent of the decedent who alone had knowledge of decedent’s
assets but could not testify to that knowledge in suit at common law).
387
See, e.g., Lutwidge v. French (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1735), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra
note 144, at B181–83 (agreeing with counsel’s argument on the matter); Gibson v. Maddocks
(Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 87 (quashing the
complaint because the plaintiff could pursue a common law remedy).
388
See, e.g., Jones v. Beere (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–
1689, supra note 145, at 42 (denying an injunction that had been tried at law).
389
E.g., Pigg v. Pigg (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1730/1731), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732,
supra note 383, at 11–12.
390
Rooker v. Tarpley (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1731), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1731–1732, at 24–25 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1731–1732].
391
Knight v. Triplett (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1740), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144,
at B111, B127–28. Here, the court declined to invalidate or otherwise ignore legislation
declaring an unrecorded deed void. Id. at B128–29; accord Jones v. Porters (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr.
1740), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B93, B95, B99 (showing counsel’s
argument requesting not to transfer the legislative power to the equity court).
392
For the most useful work on colonial Virginia criminal law, see generally CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 198.
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continued to prosecute all the standard offenses of English law. Major
felonies were sent to the General Court but only after a county court had
found probable cause to prosecute, whereas lesser felonies,
misdemeanors, and minor offenses were prosecuted at the county level.
Felonies sent to the General Court included assault resulting in
disfigurement,393 arson,394 infanticide,395 larceny,396 murder,397 rape,398
and treason.399 Also arrested was a defendant who “dr[a]nk a health to
King James and curse[d] his present majesty: King William.”400
Standard crimes tried at the county level were assault,401 attempted
rape,402 contempt of court,403 defamation,404 hog-stealing,405 larceny,406
See, e.g., Queen v. Quan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1708), in WESTMORELAND 1707–
1709, supra note 130, at 52 (reporting a man was arrested for allegedly biting off someone’s ear).
394
E.g., King v. Cheek (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 71–72.
395
See, e.g., King v. Jones (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 8–9 (reporting a case where a jury of matrons examined the alleged
mother to determine if she had recently given birth). Another case involved a prosecution for
concealing the birth of an illegitimate child; the testimony of the mother is reported in the court
records. King v. Lawson (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 14, 1690), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 14. It is noteworthy that the alleged father also was named
Lawson. Id.; see also Queen v. Marson (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 29, 1706/1707), in
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 69–70 (reporting another case giving the
testimony of a mother).
396
E.g., King v. Marsh (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 11–12; see also R v. Alworthy (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 3,
1715), in WESTMORELAND 1714–1716, supra note 138, at 51–53 (reporting an examination of
several witnesses and a defendant accused of larceny).
397
See, e.g., King v. Day (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1700), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at
29; see also Examination of Bush (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1704), in LANCASTER 1703–1706,
supra note 238, at 28–33 (recording detailed examinations of witnesses to the murder of a
servant). Compare Queen v. Several Indians (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1704), in RICHMOND
1702–1704, supra note 261, at 124–26 (reporting examinations of several Native Americans
suspected of murdering a white man), with Queen v. Several Indians (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct.
5, 1704), in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 130–31 (reporting the subsequent
prosecution of those Native Americans).
398
E.g., King v. Burk (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1715/1716), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–1716, at 62 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1714–1716].
399
E.g., King v. Jackman (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1686), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 106.
400
King v. Loveless (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692,
supra note 56, at 65.
401
See, e.g., King v. Poore (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra
note 184, at 19 (prosecuting a servant for an assault on his overseer).
402
E.g., Queen v. Melone (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1702/1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704,
supra note 203, at 16.
403
See, e.g., King v. Dinwiddie (King George Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1722), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 46 (prosecuting a county sheriff for sundry abuses and contempt); see
also King v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 11, 1697), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 43
393
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perjury,407 publishing “false scandallous [sic] . . . news,”408 riot,409 servant
conspiracy,410 and trespass.411
The important development in the late seventeenth century, as
shown above, was not the prosecution of standard offenses, but a revival
of prosecutions of morals and regulatory offenses, which had largely
disappeared from court dockets in the post-1660 era. Indeed, by the
early eighteenth century, grand juries had developed the habit of
presenting and having prosecuted as criminal virtually any conduct on
which they frowned. As just noted, the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century saw a revival of regulatory prosecutions. Some
regulatory offenses, such as contempt of court,412 disturbing the peace,413

(penalizing a man for speaking threatening words to the jury foreman); King v. Richins
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1677), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 68–69
(punishing a man with banishment for scandalous words to the court and threatening
language to the sheriff); Summons of Upshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1715), in 15
NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 171–73 (holding a man in contempt of court for
refusing to give his evidence on his oath). But see Russell v. Southall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
Oct. 5, 1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 70 (requiring the peace
bond of a “peaceable quiet” man who cursed justices after receiving an accidental blow to
head).
404
See, e.g., King v. Field (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 12, 1687), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra
note 186, at 10 (ordering thirty lashes for a man calling a woman a “whore” and claiming to
have committed fornication with her).
405
E.g., Carter v. Dunkan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1713), in WESTMORELAND 1712–
1714, supra note 128, at 41; see also King v. Sheppard (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1674), in
MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note 104, at 23–24 (ordering a penalty of two years servitude in
lieu of corporal punishment for hog-stealing).
406
E.g., King v. Simpson (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 4, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 104.
407
E.g., King v. Cooper (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1683/1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 4–5; cf. Goodridge v. Darnell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12,
1690/1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 9–10 (ordering the sherrif to arrest a
defendant found guilty in a civil suit of fraudulent packing of tobacco and to repair a pillory for
his use thereof).
408
King v. Townsend (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1687/1688), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690,
supra note 312, at 40.
409
E.g., King v. Braydon (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1686), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 86.
410
See, e.g., King v. Nickson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 14, 1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690,
supra note 312, at 2 (examining a servant charged with conspiracy with others to procure
weapons and run away).
411
See, e.g., King v. Locker (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 46 (ordering a penalty of 120 lashes after trial for trespass).
412
E.g., King v. Fleming (Goochland Cnty. Ct. Sept. 1731), in 3 GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra
note 90, at 2–3.
413
E.g., King v. Holladay (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 99.
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failing to appear as a juror414 or witness,415 failing to notify authorities of
tithables under a defendant’s control and thereby undermining the tax
system,416 failing to read laws in church,417 failing to assist or obstructing
a sheriff or constable,418 and jail break,419 were prosecuted in an effort to
strengthen the legal order and preserve the public peace.
E.g., King v. Keeling (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 41. But see Worsdell’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1, 1715/1716),
in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK R ICHMOND C OUNTY, VIRGINIA 1714–
1715, at 85–86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1714–1715]
(remitting a fine when the jury refused to conduct a survey of land boundaries over three days
in which no provisions were made available).
415
See, e.g., King v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 3, 1727), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART II), supra note 165, at 40–41. Courts protected witnesses from civil arrest while
attending or travelling to or from court. E.g., Motion of Mercer (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5,
1733), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734, supra note 160, at 61–62.
416
E.g., Barnes v. Nelmes (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 23, 1677), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1677–1679, supra note 133, at 4–5. Compare Vause v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 3,
1689/1690), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 95 (finding a sheriff guilty of receiving
tax money attributable to concealed tithables), with Willis v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar.
3, 1689/1690), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 96–97 (presenting the sheriff’s motion
to dismiss the action), and Willis v. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1690), in MIDDLESEX
1686–1690, supra note 312, at 102–03 (granting the sheriff’s motion to dismiss). An owner of a
servant could obtain an opinion from the court whether that servant was tithable or not. See,
e.g., In re. Ransom (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1673/1674), in MIDDLESEX 1673–1678, supra note
104, at 4–5 (finding the woman servant not tithable).
417
Compare King v. Churchwardens of King William Parish (Goochland Cnty. Ct., June 1731),
in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 359 (presenting the churchwardens for
failing to read the law in church), with King v. Churchwardens of King William Parish
(Goochland Cnty. Ct., June 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 393
(dismissing the presentment).
418
E.g., King v. Sturman (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–
1721, supra note 169, at 61–62; cf. King v. Evans (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1718), in VIRGINIA
COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1716–1723 (PART II), at 18 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1990) [hereinafter ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART II)] (fining a constable
for misexecuting a warrant); King v. Rapone (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1731), in 3
GOOCHLAND 1731–1735, supra note 90, at 41–42 (fining the defendant for assaulting a
constable in execution of office); R v. Robinson (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1729), in
LANCASTER 1729–1732, supra note 126, at 1–2 (fining the defendant for abusing a deputy sheriff
in execution of office). Civil liability also existed for persons who obstructed officials, even if
officials subsequently were able to perform their duty and no long-term obstruction occurred.
Compare Foster v. Parker (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 2, 1730), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART IV), supra note 186, at 59 (reporting jury finding that the defendant assaulted a sherrif
who came to the defendant’s home to serve an execution and that the sherrif was subsequently
able to serve the execution), with Foster v. Parker (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 5, 1730), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 71–72 (finding the defendant guilty
and fining him forty shillings).
419
E.g., Queen v. Cleve (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 17[0]7), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra
note 160, at 4–5; King v. Pigg (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART III), supra note 127, at 52–53; cf. King v. Robinson (Essex Cnty. Ct., July 16, 1728), in ESSEX
1727–1729, supra note 151, at 44 (fining the defendant for rescuing a prisoner).
414
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A second sort of regulatory prosecution was brought to promote
development of the economy. By the early eighteenth century county
courts had assumed vast powers over economic matters.
They
determined county tax rates,420 supported the poor,421 ordered men and
goods impressed into public service,422 probated wills,423 supervised the
administration of estates,424 apportioned dower,425 examined separately
E.g., Order to Pay Sheriff (King George Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–
1728, supra note 126, at 31–32.
421
See, e.g., In re. Paine (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12, 1683/1684), microformed on
00327495162125 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (granting 1000 lb. of tobacco to an “[a]ged,
[i]mpotent widow”); In re. Tilfaire (Northampton County Ct., Jan. 1, 1677/1678), in 10
NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678, supra note 125, at 226, 228 (remitting payment to the person caring
for a woman accidentally burned in a fire); see also In re. Baker (Charles City Cnty. Ct., 1665), in
3 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 10, at 36 (exempting from taxes a youth suffering from
“convulsion [fits]”).
422
E.g., Order for Forty-Nine Men (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1676), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra note 52, at 70–71; In re. Townsend (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June
27, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 28; cf. Assignment of Stith
(Charles City Cnty. Ct., Sept. 15, 1691), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 109
(noting the public condemnation of land for construction of a town); In re. Taylor (Charles City
Cnty. Ct., 1687/1688), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7, 10 (noting the public
condemnation of land for construction of a town); In re. Lindsey (King George Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5,
1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 80 (seeking reimbursement for a horse
pressed into public service); In re. Haynes (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1677), in LANCASTER
1674–1678, supra note 156, at 82–83 (seeking reimbursement for a gun impressed into service);
Impressment of Roome (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685,
supra note 159, at 16 (certifying that Roome had been impressed into service). But see Motion of
Vallicote (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1690), in MIDDLESEX 1690–1694, supra note 162, at 8
(exempting a school teacher from military service); Read v. Pope (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3,
1738), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK R ICHMOND C OUNTY, VIRGINIA
1737–1738, at 81–82 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1737–
1738] (finding a tort in the absence of proof of public need).
423
E.g., Nuncupative Will of Whitnall (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1686), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 39. In the absence of a will or an heir, an estate
would escheat to the crown. See Will of Norman (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5, 1665), in STAFFORD
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 9 (preventing an estate from escheating where an heir
was found and proved).
424
See, e.g., Meriwether v. Coleman (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 11, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra
note 247, at 88–89 (upholding the validity of a grant of administration by the county court); see
also In re. Burge (Charles City County Ct., Dec. 3, 1688), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note
105, at 34–35 (granting a lapsed legacy to the widow rather than the nieces of the decedent); In
re.Wharton (King George Cnty. Ct., May 8, 1725), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, supra note 226, at
83 (appointing surety of administrator as administrator when in danger of being held liable on
bond); Nusum v. Spencer (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 14, 1691/1692), in LANCASTER 1691–1695,
supra note 263, at 9–10 (holding that a husband, upon marriage, does not gain control of
property held by his wife as executrix of her father); Lewis v. Muttoone’s Children
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 21, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at
29 (ordering equal distribution of the estate among the children even though the decedent had
left the plaintiff daughter out of his will); Thomas v. Bloomfield (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept.
5, 1688), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 41 (holding an administrator who
420
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wives whose husbands were conveying land,426 and appointed and
policed the work of guardians.427 More directly related to the economy
was the judiciary’s jurisdiction to distribute liquor licenses;428 to direct
appropriate officials to care for the poor;429 to establish and maintain
roads,430 bridges,431 ferries,432 and facilities for processing tobacco;433 to

executes a note promising to pay debts of the estate is liable on the note even if no assets of the
estate are in his possession); In re. Burnard (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1690), in STAFFORD
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 92 (exercising “charitable consideration” and granting a
widow goods in addition to her paraphernalia).
425
E.g., In re. Metheny (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1691/1692), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra
note 184, at 75.
426
E.g., Acknowledgment of Keare (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 11, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–
1691, supra note 186, at 36.
427
See, e.g., In re. Ellison (King George Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723,
supra note 127, at 93 (requiring the guardian appear before the court for alleged
mismanagement of the estate); In re. Lund (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1690), in STAFFORD
1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 128 (ordering the guardian deliver property that
rightfully belongs to the minor); Order for Removal of Peirce (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 27,
1705/1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 8–9 (ordering the removal of a
minor from the guardian’s care because the guardian was also adjudged a minor).
428
E.g., In re. Mason (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note
184, at 51. They also set liquor prices. E.g., Order re Rates of Liquor (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr.
4, 1711), in MIDDLESEX 1710–1712, supra note 261, at 15. A license to sell liquor at one location
did not authorize its holder to sell at any different location. Compare King v. Searle (Essex Cnty.
Ct., Mar. 21, 1720/1721), in E SSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra note 269, at 72 (reporting jury
verdict finding the defendant sold alcohol in a place other than where he was permitted), with
King v. Searle (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 17, 1721), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra note
269, at 87–88 (fining the defendant 2000 lb. of tobacco for selling said alcohol).
429
See, e.g., In re. Stone (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra
note 184, at 35 (directing a doctor to treat a man’s sore leg); cf. Stapleton v. Reeves (Middlesex
Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 26–27 (finding a doctor’s
charges “unreasonable”).
430
E.g., Order for Clearing of Highways (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–
1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 32; see also King v. Harrison, (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1737), in 2
RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B60, B66 (conceding power in county courts to
license gates across highways); cf. Donally v. Mickleburrough (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1,
1718), in MIDDLESEX 1716–1719, supra note 184, at 59–60 (ordering the implementation of a
private road across neighboring plantations); In re. Newton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 12, 1693), in
STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 106–07 (allowing a private road across a neighboring
estate for getting tobacco to water without compensation).
431
E.g., King v. Snall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART
III), supra note 127, at 79.
432
E.g., In re. Ferry by Straham (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra
note 184, at 48.
433
E.g., Rolling House of Heaberd (King George Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1721), in KING GEORGE
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 5–6; cf. Inspection of Davis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1681), in
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 8 (reporting an inspectors’ finding that Davis’s tobacco
was fraudulently packed).
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appoint leather inspectors;434 to approve the amount of rent charged for
leases;435 and to direct the keeping of boundary records.436 One of the
judiciary’s most important powers, authorized by statute, was to grant to
owners on one side of a stream an acre of land on the opposite side,
thereby enabling construction of a mill dam. In the process, the court
would summon a jury to assess damages both to the individual whose
acre was seized as well as to others along the stream whose land might
be damaged by the mill.437
Courts also used the criminal law to discipline people who ignored
their regulatory commands, as they prosecuted, for example, subjects
who failed to maintain highways,438 farmers who planted tobacco after
June 30439 or failed to grow the minimum required amount of corn, 440
millers who failed to keep proper measures at a mill,441 and vagrants.442
Cases involving forfeiture of vessels for violating the Navigation Acts
E.g., Appointment of Darrell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 18, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693,
supra note 158, at 95.
435
E.g., Leases from Lee to Williams (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., May 15, 1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769,
supra note 385, at 82.
436
E.g., In re. Processioning of Lands (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 13, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–
1692, supra note 184, at 61; cf. In re. Jones (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 12 (certifying that Jones had imported a specified
number of immigrants and was entitled to fifty acres of land each); In re. Mitchell (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1747), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1746–1748, supra note 323, at 24 (recording a bill of
exchange).
437
E.g., In re. Jerdone (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1767), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
ORDER BOOK L OUISA C OUNTY, V IRGINIA 1767–1768, at 42 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 2000) [hereinafter LOUISA 1767–1768]; In re. Snell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1728), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 13. Rarely, courts denied petitions as
being too prejudicial to the owner whose land was sought. E.g., Branham v. Dozier (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 1, 1724), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 64. But see, e.g., Adams v.
Randolph’s Executors (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 1731), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra
note 183, at 406 (granting a petition to build a mill that was prejudicial to an existing mill since
the existing mill was out of repair). Also, legislation authorized the taking of land for mill
dams. 2 HENING, supra note 115, at 260–61.
438
E.g., Chandler v. South (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., May 28, 1707), in WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707, supra note 225, at 93.
439
E.g., King v. Traverse (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Sept. 13, 1692), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra
note 158, at 33; cf. R v. Feild (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1727), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730
(PART II), supra note 165, at 82 (finding the defendant guilty of tending tobacco seconds).
440
E.g., King v. Rawlls (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1692), in RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra
note 184, at 34.
441
E.g., King v. Brown (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART III), supra
note 269, at 110.
442
See, e.g., King v. Eager (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1767), microformed on 00303775162116
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); King v. Burgess (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1714), in RICHMOND
1714–1715, supra note 414, at 7; cf. Queen v. Mickenon (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1704), in
MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 58 (ordering a man to appear before the court for
“entertaining a sickly woman . . . likely to come upon the [p]arish”).
434
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were also tried in county courts,443 as were cases involving the
importation of slaves without payment of duty.444
It is noteworthy that courts prosecuted crime with little regard for
procedural niceties. In many cases, courts dispensed with niceties and
tried defendants summarily and administered punishment.445 A court,
for example, judged one servant, who claimed to have committed a theft
at the order of his master, “to be an [i]gnorant person” and thus gave
him twenty lashes.446 Another court, however, found a man who had
fraudulently taken and sold a horse to be “a man of [i]dle dissolute and
lewd behavior and . . . of a very evil and loose conversation” as well as
guilty of prior thefts and sentenced him to jail until further court

443
E.g., Spencer v. Finny (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1677/1678), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1677–1679, supra note 133, at 24–26. A subsidiary issue in this case was
whether the crew of the forfeited vessel could recover its wages and transportation expenses
back to its home port out of the proceeds of the vessel and its cargo. Id. at 26.
444
E.g., Lee v. Hall (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1712), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712,
supra note 206, at 97. Peace bonds were another device used for these purposes. Thus, courts
required individuals who threatened the community to give peace bonds upon some other
individual’s complaint, although they would discharge the bond as long as the person
thereunder proved that he had, in fact, kept the peace. See, e.g., In re. Mussen (Stafford Cnty.
Ct., Mar. 11, 1690/1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 6 (discharging Mussen
from his peace bond). The court also required comparable securities from two leaders of local
Native Americans. See Trial of the Indians (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1691/1692), in STAFFORD
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 95 (releasing six Native American prisoners after two of their
leaders gave security). Peace bonds could be required not only for threatened acts of violence
but even for moral offenses, as in the case of one Robert Hunter “notoriously known to have
unseemingly kept company with” another man's wife. Bond of Hunter (Northumberland
Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 28. Even when a
bond was violated, a court might treat an impoverished man who put up security “as an object
of charity” and remit the penalty. In re. Ripley (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1724), in ESSEX 1725–
1729 (PART I), supra note 250, at 85. A court might show mercy even toward an
“impoverish[ed]”defendant who, on the whole, had behaved well and recommend that the
governor remit the penalty of a bond. Davis’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5,
1718/1719), in RICHMOND 1718–1719, supra note 151, at 40.
445
See, e.g., King v. Arramore (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1725), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK E SSEX C OUNTY, VIRGINIA 1723–1725 (PART II) 67 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II)] (ordering thirty-nine lashes
at the public whipping post for threatening to break into a house and murder the inhabitants);
King v. Hughs (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1721), in KING GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note
127, at 9–10 (ordering twenty lashes for a husband and ten lashes for his wife at the public
whipping post for receiving rum from a Negro slave). Compare Golding v. Jackson
(Northampton County Ct., Aug. 17, 1715), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at
184–85 (ordering the defendant to present a certificate to show that the tithable was not
concealed), with Golding v. Jackson (Northampton County Ct., Nov. 15, 1715), in 15
NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note 225, at 189, 192 (dismissing the information because it
was unsigned).
446
King v. Lewis (King George Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1726), in KING GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note
126, at 26.
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order.447 Another court held a third man “of a bad character and by
pregnant circumstances . . . guilty” of a theft and ordered thirty-nine
lashes, even though “the evidence [would] not touch his life.”448
Similarly, a court refused to declare an indictment insufficient
because it lacked an addition to the defendant’s name stating his
occupation or status.449 More significantly, courts issued broad search
warrants, such as one to “search . . . every such suspected house[] and
place” in response to complaints of crime,450 and another to seize twentynine hogsheads of tobacco, allegedly about to be shipped unlawfully
from the colony.451
Especially in the late seventeenth century, lines between the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of courts were not always clear. One plaintiff, for
instance, brought a civil action for conversion of a horse, which a court in
1691 resolved by requiring the defendant to acknowledge his offense on
his knees and give a peace bond;452 another brought a suit against a man
who had stabbed him, which resulted both in damages and in the
defendant being jailed and required to give a peace bond.453 Yet another
plaintiff brought an ambiguous suit against a woman for “sinful &
unchristian-like carriages” toward him and others during Sunday
services.454 The attorney general brought suit against a fourth defendant
who married the half-sister of his first wife.455 When the jury returned a
447

Elkin v. Jones (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at

93.
Queen v. Evans (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 16, 1712/1713), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK MIDDLESEX C OUNTY, VIRGINIA 1712–1714, at 12 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLESEX 1712–1714].
449
King v. Monteith (King George Cnty. Ct., Sept. 5, 1724), in KING GEORGE 1723–1725, supra
note 226, at 44.
450
In re. Hamerton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 4, 1702/1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra
note 203, at 6–7.
451
See Information of Wharton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1681/1682), in MIDDLESEX 1680–
1686, supra note 184, at 25 (joining the information’s prayer to the governor to seize the
tobacco); see also Information of Wharton (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1681/1682), in
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 27 (condemning the tobacco seized in a subsequent
search by the governor).
452
Mason v. Jones (Stafford County. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note
184, at 56.
453
Smyth v. Lugg (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 20, 1679/1780), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1677–1679, supra note 133, at 101; cf. Richa v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in
STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 54–55 (reporting a suit that simultaneously sought
money damages, time in the pillory, cutting off the defendant’s ear, and imprisonment for
fraud).
454
Palmer v. Kendall (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 28, 1692), microformed on 00327495162125
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
455
See Attorney Gen. v. Bartholmew (Charles City County Ct. Aug. 3, 1694), in CHARLES CITY
1687–1695, supra note 105, at 180–81.
448
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verdict of not guilty, the attorney general appealed to the General Court,
contrary to the principle that no appeal is available to the prosecution
following an acquittal in a criminal case.456
Ambiguity also resulted when peace bonds were used in lieu of
criminal prosecutions. Courts, for instance, required individuals who
threatened the community to give peace bonds upon some other
individual’s complaint, although they would discharge the bond as long
as the person thereunder proved that he had, in fact, kept the peace.457
Peace bonds could be required not only for threatened acts of violence
but even for morals offenses, as in the case of one Robert Hunter
“notoriously known to have unseemingly kept company with” another
man’s wife.458
Six decades later, however, lines were clearly drawn. In one matter,
when a victim and an alleged criminal settled their civil disputes and
requested dismissal of a pending indictment, the king’s attorney
opposed the dismissal and the court ordered the criminal proceeding to
go forward.459 By the mid-eighteenth century it had become clear that
the same action simultaneously could be both a felony against the
commonwealth and a trespass against an individual.460
Another area of expanded jurisdiction at the turn of the century
covered criminal prosecutions against slaves. All slaves accused of crime
were tried at the county level, even for the most serious offenses,461 and
they were punished for offenses of which only they could be guilty, such
as verbal abuse of a white man, which a court found to be “intolerable

Id.
See supra note 444 and accompanying text (discussing discharge of peace bonds).
458
Bond of Hunter (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 20, 1681), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–
1683, supra note 162, at 28.
459
King v. Mannen (Orange Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1752), in ORANGE 1752–1753, supra note 322,
at 15.
460
Smith v. Brown (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1729), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at
R1–7; see King v. Pryor (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144,
at B34, B39 (refusing to dismiss the assault case because the defendant owed the king a fine).
461
Compare King v. Jack (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct. Apr. 4, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732,
supra note 383, at 82 (finding a slave guilty of conspiring to rebel and murder a man), with King
v. Jack (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 1, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 93
(imposing the death penalty on the slave); compare King v. Old Caesar (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
Nov. 4, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 33 (finding a slave
guilty of committing buggery on a four-year-old girl), with King v. Old Caesar
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 18, 1724), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184,
at 33–34 (sentencing the slave to fifteen minutes in the pillory, ears cut off, and twenty-one
lashes).
456
457
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and insufferable.”462 On the whole, trials of slaves nonetheless appear to
have been fair, even though slaves were tried without juries and no
grand jury presentments were required.463 However, many were
acquitted, even of serious charges,464 and even slaves who were found
guilty of felonies typically avoided the death penalty.465
Acquittal, however, did not always mean that no penalty was
imposed—courts nonetheless subjected many slaves who were not guilty
to serious whippings, often of thirty-nine lashes.466 One court even gave
a master permission to castrate a “notorious runaway and night walker”
who could not “be reclaimed by the ordinary methods of
punishment,”467 while another was permitted to cut off a runaway
slave’s “two great toes.”468 Another discrimination against blacks lay in
more severe penalties given to women who bore illegitimate mulatto

462
In re. Barbee (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 28, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at
69; accord Mills v. Wilke (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1682), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra
note 247, at 2.
463
See, e.g., Queen v. Dick (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1706), in WESTMORELAND 1705–
1707, supra note 225, at 52–54 (convicting five slaves without a jury and ordering they be
hanged).
464
See, e.g., King v. Prince (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 18, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra
note 247, at 88–89 (acquitting a slave charged with rape); see also King v. Dick (Louisa Cnty. Ct.,
Apr. 29, 1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK L OUISA C OUNTY, VIRGINIA
O RDERS 1744–1747, at 94–95 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA
1744–1747] (acquitting a slave of the murder of a white man).
465
See, e.g., Queen v. Dick (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 22, 1703), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704,
supra note 203, at 28 (sparing a slave guilty of theft by gubernatorial pardon). Of course, some
slaves were executed. See, e.g., Queen v. Rascow (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1707), in
MIDDLESEX 1707–1708, supra note 169, at 31–32 (convicting a slave of larceny and sentencing
him to death by hanging). For some crimes of which slaves were found guilty, such as hogstealing, their masters also were liable to pay monetary penalties to victims. See, e.g., Newton v.
Corbin (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 28, 1711), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206,
at 93 (sentencing the slave to thirty-nine lashes and requiring his owner pay 200 lb. of tobacco).
Slaves could not be executed unless at least four judges concurred. 8 W ILLIAM WALLER
H ENING, THE STATUTES AT L ARGE: B EING A C OLLECTION OF ALL THE L AWS OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE F IRST S ESSION OF THE L EGISLATURE IN THE Y EAR 1619, at 522–23 (Univ. Press of
Va. 1969) (1821).
466
E.g., King v. Prince (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 18, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note
247, at 88–89.
467
In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra note 169, at
82. Castration was subsequently prohibited by statute except in cases of attempted rape of a
white woman. 8 HENING, supra note 465, at 358.
468
King v. Sawney (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 1718), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721,
supra note 169, at 19–20. Sawney, it appears, was a “continual runaway.” Motion of Eskridge
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 67,
69. Practices such as these later received statutory confirmation. See 6 HENING, supra note 142,
at 111 (permitting dismemberment of runaway slaves).
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children—five years of additional servitude469—instead of the usual two
years for an illegitimate white child.470 However, the greatest failure of
the criminal justice system in connection with slavery lay in its failure to
protect slaves’ lives; whites charged with murdering slaves were
invariably found not guilty by juries.471
The county courts performed a number of other functions, which
individually were of less importance than most of those noted above but
which collectively conferred significant authority. Thus the courts
legislated general rules, such as one prohibiting the capture of wild
horses without prior court approval472 and another prohibiting fishing at
night.473 They also performed housekeeping tasks, such as scheduling a
celebration for the birth of James II’s son;474 selecting a site for building a
courthouse;475 setting the boundaries of the jail yard;476 purchasing
record books and law books,477 including copies of all the colony laws

469
E.g., Edmonds v. McCollins (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1705), in LANCASTER 1703–1706,
supra note 238, at 68. King v. Jones presented an unusual legal issue when Jones declared that an
East Indian slave fathered her illegitimate child. (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1736), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, supra note 142, at 23. The issue was whether Jones was guilty of
bearing a mulatto child; the court decided she was not since the statute “only relat[ed] to
Negroes & mulattoes & [was] silent as to Indians.” Id. Another unusual issue arose when a
mulatto woman—following intercourse with a white man—produced an illegitimate child; she
too was only required to undergo the penalty appropriate for bearing an illegitimate white
child.
See Westcomb v. Bryan (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 26, 1708/1709), in
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra note 130, at 66–67 (requiring the woman serve her master for
an additional year).
470
E.g., Ward v. Owen (Essex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at
25.
471
E.g., Inquisition into Death of Jack (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1698), in MIDDLESEX
1697–1700, supra note 314, at 46–47.
472
See Rule re Wild Horses (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 9, 1690), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 106 (fining a man 500 lb. of tobacco for capturing a wild horse); cf.
Complaint re Wolves (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Oct. 10, 1688), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note
186, at 45 (seeking the Governor’s permission to grant bounties for wolves’ heads).
473
By-Law Against Fishing (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1677/1678), in MIDDLESEX 1673–
1678, supra note 104, at 96–97.
474
Order re. Birth of Prince of Wales (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 2, 1688/1689), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1687–1689, supra note 145, at 67.
475
Compare Order for Courthouse (Essex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 18, 1726), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART
I), supra note 250, at 29 (directing a courthouse to be built on Thomas Plumer’s land), with
Order for Courthouse (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 16, 1727), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I), supra note
250, at 48 (directing the courthouse to be built “near [the] top of [the] [h]ill”).
476
Order re Prison Rules (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 27, 1711), in WESTMORELAND 1709–
1712, supra note 206, at 57−58.
477
E.g., Order re Law Books (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Dec. 21, 1685), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686, supra note 232, at 91–92; Order for Record Book (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1714), in RICHMOND 1714–1715, supra note 414, at 8. On one occasion when a
loose sheet of judgments was lost, the individuals against whom the court had issued

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

831

that were in force;478 providing food and lodging for the justices during
court term;479 adopting rules concerning scheduling of jury trials480 and
postponement of cases on account of attorney absences;481 prohibiting
foreigners from pleading in court;482 threatening anyone appearing
drunk in court with time in the stocks;483 and prohibiting smoking in
Finally, they received petitions, such as one
court.484
“unanimously . . . [and] earnestly desired” by the people requesting the
governor to call an Assembly into session.485
2.

The Structure of Political Power

The county courts, in theory, were creatures of the central colonial
government. Counties were created by statute, and judges were
formally appointees of the Governor. However, in practice, the county

judgments had to return to court so that new judgments could be entered. Summons of
Dangerfield (Essex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1701), in ESSEX 1699–1702, supra note 247, at 101–02.
478
See Appointment of Mercer (King George Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1721/1722), in KING GEORGE
1721–1723, supra note 127, at 36−37 (appointing John Mercer to write out all of the current laws
for the court); cf. Adjournment of Court (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1706), in MIDDLESEX 1705–
1707, supra note 314, at 65 (postponing session of court until a copy of new enacted laws arrived
from Williamsburg).
479
E.g., Order to Ordinary Keeper (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1726), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART II), supra note 165, at 24.
480
See, e.g., Rule About Actions (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1712), in WESTMORELAND
1712–1714, supra note 128, at 9 (requiring that jury trials be “entered and called the first of every
succeeding [docket]”).
481
See, e.g., Rule re Attorneys (King George Cnty. Ct., July 5, 1723), in KING GEORGE 1721–
1723, supra note 127, at 95 (ordering that no future cases be continued due to attorney absences
without a sufficient excuse); see also In re. Darrell (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1692), in STAFFORD
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 117 (reporting the complainant’s request for immediate trial of the
case so that servants summoned as witnesses could return to a frontier plantation to work and
protect it against Native Americans).
482
E.g., Order re Foreigners (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 30.
483
See, e.g., Rule About Drunks in Court (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1683), in LANCASTER
1682–1687, supra note 247, at 26 (ordering anyone coming before the court drunk be placed in
the stocks); Queen v. Callahan (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708,
supra note 160, at 3 (ordering an attendee who is drunk in court to be placed in the stocks); cf.
King v. Taylor (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Nov. 15, 1677), in LANCASTER 1674–1678, supra note 156, at
75–76 (fining a justice who was drunk in court 500 lb. of tobacco); In re. Belfield (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 40 (granting a justice’s
request to deny the rumor he is drunk on the bench).
484
E.g., Rule re “Rude and [U]ncivilized Custom of Sm[ok]ing in Court” (Rappahannock
Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1691), in in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692, supra note 56, at 61.
485
In re. the People (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note
184, at 21; see also Petition to House of Burgesses (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 9, 1700), in
MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 31–32 (protesting an increase in the minister’s salary
and other matters).
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courts were largely self-perpetuating bodies, in that their sitting judges
recommended whom the colony’s Governor should appoint to the
bench,486 and Governors generally followed their recommendations. On
June 5, 1723, for example, the judges of Richmond County recommended
to the Governor a list of men to appoint to the court, and on July 3, 1723,
the Governor appointed each and every man on the list and no others.487
Although Governors appointed many other local officials,488 here too
they typically acted on the advice of the county magistrates.489
Local oligarchies were strong, in part, because they typically acted
with unanimity; only in rare cases did minorities “publicly and openly”
express their “dissent,”490 whereas in the General Court publicly
recorded dissents were frequent.491 Governors accordingly had to
placate local oligarchies, and they did not always succeed. In 1691, for
instance, the presiding justice of the Stafford County Court refused to
continue sitting after Martin Scarlet, whom the presiding justice accused
of defaming him, had been sworn to serve on the bench.492 Also in 1691,
486
E.g., Recommendation of Corbin (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 4, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–
1700, supra note 314, at 32.
487
Compare Recommendation of Justices (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1723), in RICHMOND
1722−1724, supra note 159, at 18 (presenting a list of recommended judges to the governor), with
Swearing of Justices (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159,
at 19 (presenting a list of sworn justices identical to the prior list of recommended justices). A
similar judicial appointment occurred in Westmoreland County. Compare Recommendation of
Justices (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Feb. 22, 1709/1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note
206, at 11−12 (presenting a list of recommended judges to the President), with Swearing of
Justices (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., May 31, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206,
at 16 (reporting the oath taken by those recommended), and Swearing of Justices
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND 1709–1712, supra note 206, at 18
(listing those appointed as justices).
488
See, e.g., Appointment of Pope (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1710), in WESTMORELAND
1709–1712, supra note 206, at 20–21 (reporting the appointment of a prosecutor).
489
See, e.g., Recommendation of Barradall (King George Cnty. Ct., May 3, 1728), in KING
GEORGE 1725–1728, supra note 126, at 79 (recommending Barradall to serve as the King’s
Attorney General); Recommendation of Baker (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Jan. 3, 1699/1700), in
RICHMOND 1699–1701, supra note 285, at 3 (recommending Baker to serve as coroner). The
power of local courts to recommend appointees rested on legislation. See Recommendation of
Stoner (Goochland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1728/1729), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183,
at 83 (referring to an Act of Assembly that determined the method of appointing a sheriff).
490
In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 9, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184,
at 65. Compare West v. Rabyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1713), in 15 Northampton
1710–1717, supra note 225, at 96 (delaying the decision because of a 2-2 vote), with West v.
Rabyshaw (Northampton Cnty. Ct., June 16, 1713), in 15 NORTHAMPTON 1710–1717, supra note
225, at 97 (reaching a decision with a “fuller court” and with no dissent noted).
491
E.g., Blackwell v. Wilkinson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1768), in JEFFERSON, supra note 181, at 73,
85; Rogers v. Spalden (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at
B80–81.
492
Compare Swearing of Scarlet (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692,
supra note 184, at 21 (reporting Martin Scarlet’s sworn oath), with In re. Fitzhugh (Stafford Cnty.
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in the same county, William Buckner refused to take the oaths required
by Parliament to William III since he previously took oaths to James II
and did not “in his conscience think himself fairly discharged from the
said oaths in the life of King James,”493 while in the same year in
Rapphannock County, a man appointed as sheriff likewise refused to
take Parliament’s oaths.494 Loyalty to the monarchy established in the
Glorious Revolution was a treasonous matter in the reign of William III,
but Governors could do nothing about conduct bordering on treason
beyond excusing locally important men from public service and
weakening that service as a result.
Perhaps the greatest reason for the strength of county courts by midcentury was that the Governor, the Council, and the General Court
became overworked. As Virginia expanded westward into the Piedmont
and its population grew, the General Court had more work than it could
process in its few brief sessions over the course of any year. In addition,
distances between Williamsburg and outlying counties became too great
for many litigants to bother bringing cases to the General Court. They
turned instead to county courts and accepted what those courts
decided.495
3.

The Structure of Legal Knowledge.

The expanding common-law, equitable, criminal, and regulatory
jurisdiction of Virginia’s county courts nonetheless fails to capture fully
the power that those courts accumulated in the aftermath of Bacon’s
Rebellion. Their power depended to some significant degree on the
structure of legal knowledge in Virginia, which was quite different from
what it was in most other colonies.
In New York and Pennsylvania, for example, most men who were
learned in the law lived and were educated in the colonial capital and
practiced both before local courts and their colony’s Supreme Court.496
Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 21−23 (reporting the justice’s
refusal to take the bench until his name had been cleared).
493
Refusal of Buckner (Stafford Cnty Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note
184, at 28; cf. Refusal of Gregge (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra
note 184, at 28 (reporting Gregge’s refusal to take an oath required by Parliament to the
governor because he had given the governor “some reasons why he refused the same and
further alleged that his honour [sic] did not then seem to be very well satisfied with his
reasons”).
494
Comm’n of Travers (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 60.
495
See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 213.
496
See 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MIDDLE
COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660–1730, at 57–58, 106–07 (2013).
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These lawyers travelled out from the colonial metropolis and transmitted
knowledge back and forth between the capital and outlying counties.497
Virginia, in contrast, sent more of its sons to study law in the Inns of
Court than did any other North American colony—over sixty in all.498
However, most of these men did not return to Virginia to practice law;
instead, they came home to manage their estates and fortunes.499 As
wealthy men of their counties, they then served on county courts.500
Edmund Scarborough, a county judge in Northampton County who
had been trained at the Inns of Court, is an early example. What is
interesting is how Scarborough wrote several opinions in the early 1660s
reflecting rule-of-law and common-law values that he probably had
learned in England. In one case, for example, he directed litigants to
produce evidence that “may have such light as to guide us in the way of
justice, which to do is the care & duty of the court,”501 while in another
he sought to reassure multiple creditors having claims against an estate
that the court would “assure all effectual Justice” and would not be
“more indulgent to one than the other in respect of priority.”502
Scarborough’s views came together most clearly in a third case, Foxcroft
v. Gething.503 As always, Scarborough was “zealous to do justice”—this
time in connection with disposition of property under a will, for which
he sought “the best construction of the donor’s intent.”504 The task, he
recognized, was not easy. In words that would echo repeatedly in the
centuries to come, he declared that law required “great study & much
knowledge” and that he “could never read” or “determine [it] without
contradiction: Sometimes the questions of right & wrong call in for their
support statute law[,] precedents[,] equity[,] and when those lie not in a
direct line to serve the occasion analogy must come in.”505

Id.
See E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT, xii–xxx (1924) (listing
members of the Inns of Court and the states from which they came).
499
See, e.g., id. at 35, 41, 53, 96 (discussing the careers of William Byrd, Robert Carter, Gawen
Corbin, and Benjamin Harrison).
500
See, e.g., id. at 20, 42 (discussing the careers of Robert Beverley and Wilson Cary).
501
Boys v. Webb (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON
1657−1664, supra note 34, at 287–88. Judge Scarborough also wrote opinions in two other
relevant cases. See Allen v. Bucknor (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1662/1663), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 287; Alexander v. Estate of Bucknor (Northampton
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 286–87.
502
Alexander v. Estate of Bucknor (Northampton County Ct., Mar. 2, 1662/1663), in 8
NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note 34, at 286–87.
503
(Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 28, 1662/1663), in 8 NORTHAMPTON 1657–1664, supra note
34, at 276–80.
504
Id. at 279.
505
Id. at 277.
497
498
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“Reason . . . dictated this discourse,”506 although he also took the step “of
writing what I speak that this may stand for affidavit to posterity . . . for
whose sake I count myself chiefly obliged to vindicate truth & justice,
which must prevail or the walls perish.”507
As a judicial author, Edmund Scarborough was no Oliver Wendell
Holmes. Nonetheless, his opinion in Foxcroft conjoined all the central
elements of common-law thinking—justice, precedent, and analogy—
along with the importance of producing written opinions to guide judges
and litigants in the future. Foxcroft thereby shows how post-restoration
Virginia judges were committed to ascertaining, enunciating, and
governing under law, in general, and Virginia’s version of the common
law, in particular.
Career patterns such as Scarborough’s made the structure of legal
authority in Virginia very different from what it was elsewhere. In New
York and Pennsylvania, for example, trained lawyers aware of the work
product of their colony’s highest court brought their legal knowledge to
bear on local judges who were not trained in the law.508 In Virginia, on
the other hand, county benches might contain men learned in the law
who possessed independent knowledge of what the law required.509
Thus, in New York and Pennsylvania, it appears that lawyers taught law
to local courts, whereas in Virginia it appears that county courts had
sufficient confidence to determine the law by themselves.
The early Virginia bar, in short, was weak compared to local courts.
In a colony like Pennsylvania, the bar served as the glue holding the
legal system together, as most lawyers practiced both in local and
colony-wide courts and thereby kept judges informed of what their
colleagues in other courts were doing.510 In Virginia, in contrast, lawyers
who practiced in the General Court were not permitted to practice in
county courts and vice-versa,511 whereas county court lawyers tended to
practice only in their own county and immediately adjacent ones.512
County courts determined who could practice law before them, and
Id. at 279.
Id. at 276. For a later brief opinion by another judge construing an article of a will, see In
re. Tankard (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Oct. 31, 1671), in 9 NORTHAMPTON 1664−1674, supra note
7, at 307–08.
508
See 2 NELSON, supra note 496, at 57–58 (describing New York lawyers’ legal
sophistication).
509
See id. at 58 (describing the variances in Chesapeake area colonies’ laws versus those
in New York).
510
See id. at 107 (describing Pennsylvania’s bar system).
511
See 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 140, 143 (requiring General Court attorneys apply for
county licenses and vice-versa, while restricing attorneys to one license at a time).
512
See FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON: LAWYER 1 (1986) (noting that county lawyers
would generally practice on a circuit of several adjacent counties).
506
507
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efforts to give the Governor control even of initial admissions to local
bars appear to have failed, at least in the late seventeenth century.513
Moreover, especially in early eighteenth-century Virginia, many
attorneys were comparatively insignificant men—one man on whom
there is data, for example, kept an ordinary in addition to engaging in
some practice of law.514
County courts also admitted and disciplined lawyers and thereby
determined how they could practice.515 In one case, for example, a court
imprisoned a lawyer who refused to ask leave of the court whether the
questions he proposed to ask witnesses might be asked of them,
declaring “he would ask what questions he pleased.”516 Local courts also
determined issues such as the liability of lawyers for clerk’s fees in the
cases they filed,517 and whether, on the basis of the court’s view of the

See Barnes v. Conway (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19, 1684), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 42 (refusing to enforce Laws of 1680, Act VI, which required
attorneys to obtain a license from the governor); cf. In re. Taverner (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., June 8,
1687), in LANCASTER 1687–1691, supra note 186, at 1 (permitting a lawyer “to plead to such
business as [he] formerly entertained” despite his lack of license required by the governor’s
proclamation). But see Slaughter v. Waters (Rapphannnock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1686), in
RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra note 101, at 51 (entering an information against Waters for
pleading without a license from the governor).
514
See Order re Laton (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 22, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra
note 445, at 82 (granting Laton a license to keep an ordinary); Merit v. Mayfield (Essex Cnty.
Ct., Feb. 17, 1724/1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 40 (identifying Laton as
“Attorney” who confessed judgment on behalf of defendant); see also Fisher v. Brown (Essex
Cnty. Ct., Sept. 16, 1724), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 13 (outlining a case
in which Laton confessed judgment on behalf of defendant).
515
See License of Harris (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1684), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1683–1686, supra note 232, at 36 (granting an attorney’s license where licensure could not be
obtained without court approval); cf. Churchill v. Smith (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1702/03),
in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 17–18 (granting judgment for the defendant in a suit
against the county justice for appearing in violation of a statute as a lawyer in a case pending
before the court). Compare Carnegie v. Davies (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Apr. 30, 1708), in
WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra note 130, at 32–33 (recording a motion that Eskridge, a
member of the court, should not plead before the court as an attorney), with Excuse of Eskridge
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1716), in WESTMORELAND 1714−1716, supra note 138, at 64
(reporting refusal by the practitioner at bar to serve on the bench).
516
Imprisonment of Prosser (Goochland County Ct., Aug. 18, 1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND
1728–1731, supra note 183, at 258–59. While in jail, he also refused to turn over the declaration
that had been returned to him in the case he was litigating, apparently on the ground that
prisoners had no duty to provide material to courts. Id. at 259. Ultimately, Prosser made peace
with the court and was permitted to continue practicing. See In re. Prosser (Goochland Cnty.
Ct., 1730), in 1 & 2 GOOCHLAND 1728–1731, supra note 183, at 283.
517
See, e.g., Colston v. Davis (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1, 1699), in RICHMOND 1697–1699,
supra note 364, at 125–26 (holding lawyers liable for clerks’ fees).
513
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strength of the evidence, attorney’s fees should be awarded to plaintiffs
in assault cases.518
In the end, then, no one from outside the county judiciary controlled
the county courts. Early eighteenth-century Virginia was not governed
by a rule of law administered by professional lawyers.519 Governors and
appellate judges likewise were not in control. Power was exercised by
local elites, who often possessed some training in the law and who ruled
as they thought best. Their power, of course, was not absolute. They
always had to take other institutional players into account and often had
to seek their cooperation. However, the self-perpetuating oligarchy that
sat on the county bench very much remained at the center of colonial
Virginia’s legal and political system.520
Rhys Isaac has described the place of county courts in the Virginia
legal order of the first half of the eighteenth century. His description
bears quotation at length:
At the county level the commissioning of squire justices,
unsupervised by assizes of learned judges, encouraged
the “determining of every thing by the Standard of
Equity and good Conscience,” as Robert Beverley
described procedures. Beverley took pride in the way
Virginia courts spurned “the impertinences of Form and
Nicety.” Colonel Landon Carter thought that issues
should be decided rather by ‘Good reason and Justice’
than by “Precedents” and sneered at the “Mechanical
knowledge” of attorneys. In this the colonel . . . was
setting his face against the strict, literal application of
what was to be found in law books and asserting a
substantial role for the common sense of men of
affairs . . . .521
Another scholar of colonial Virginia law agrees. As Peter Hoffer has
observed, the county courts “did not fear or compete with a professional
judicial cadre” sitting on a central court.522 “The highest court in the
colony was not composed of professional judges, as in some of the other
See, e.g., Morris v. Taylor (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734,
supra note 326, at 52 (awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees).
519
See A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680−1810, at 53 (1981) (explaining how a possibly able bar in late
seventeenth-century Virginia did not survive into the eighteenth century).
520
PAGAN, supra note 5, at 58.
521
ISAAC, supra note 172, at 134.
522
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, supra note 198, at xix.
518
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colonies and . . . in England.”523 Instead, the General Court, like the
county courts, was composed of “experienced planter-lawyers rather
than full-time judges. The county bench did not function in the shadow
of more learned and respected central courts, but labored alongside them
in a two-track system,” 524 and judicial decisions “did not reflect hard
and fast rules,” but judicial efforts “to make practical, not fine,
distinctions.”525 Similarly, in Isaac’s view, “it was very much the
gentleman’s sense of right, rather than the technical interpretation of
texts, that prevailed” in localities.526
Both Isaac and Hoffer overstate somewhat the informality of county
courts, which were more observant of legal norms than either concedes.
Thus, there were instances of citation of General Court precedent both in
the General Court itself and in a county court.527 However, Isaac and
Hoffer are absolutely correct that county judges did not function in the
shadow of the General Court. Local magistrates knew as much law as
anyone in Virginia and accordingly felt free to depart from technical
rules when equity and practical good sense so required.
4.

The Independence of County Courts

As time went on, the county courts thus felt increasingly free to
ignore the law laid down by the General Court. The 1731 case of Waugh
v. Bagg528 and later county court cases on the same issue illustrate this
point. Waugh v. Bagg addressed an important issue: whether a county
court possessed power to set aside a jury verdict awarding excessive
damages and to grant a new trial.529 The General Court ruled that it did
not, reversed the county court judgment, and thereby reinstated the jury
verdict.530 Nonetheless, county courts continued to grant new trials
when juries returned verdicts awarding either excessive531 or insufficient

Id.
Id.
525
Id. at xxix.
526
ISAAC, supra note 172, at 134.
527
See, e.g., Reeves v. Waller (Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B34
(using its own precedent to interpret a statute); Stocker v. Bisse (Charles City Cnty. Ct. Feb. 3,
1689), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 73–74 (using a five-year-old General Court
case to determine the issue at present).
528
Waugh v. Bagg (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at
R61, R77–78.
529
Id.
530
Id. at R78.
531
E.g., Ashmore v. Scott (Prince William Cnty. Ct., July 7, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1761−1762, at 106–07 (Ruth
Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1761−1762].
523
524
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damages.532 Perhaps Waugh v. Bagg was distinguishable on its facts from
the subsequent lower court cases; perhaps the lower courts did not even
know that Waugh v. Bagg had been decided. Unfortunately, the
destruction of most General Court records and the scantiness and
imprecision of the records that have been preserved make it impossible
to be certain. However, it seems that county court judges regarded
General Court decisions merely as suggestions for how to think about
issues rather than as fixed rules they were bound to follow.
Reeves v. Waller533 and later lower court decisions provide another
example. Legislation enacted in 1715 had provided that suits for the
recovery of debts under £5 be commenced by petition and tried by the
court rather than commenced by writ and tried by jury. Thus, when
Reeves brought suit by writ and won a forty shilling verdict, a county
court set the verdict aside and ordered him to pay costs.534 Reeves then
brought a writ of error in the General Court, which, although inclined at
first to deny the writ, ultimately granted it.535 Nonetheless, subsequent
county courts, apparently seeking to clear their dockets by forcing
plaintiffs to bring small debt claims under the simpler petition
procedure, ignored the Reeves result.536
At times, county courts even ignored mandates of central authorities
in specific cases. In theory, county courts were under the control of the
General Court, consisting of the Governor and Council, in the sense that
county court decisions were subject to appeal. Appeals were, in fact,
frequently taken from county courts,537 and the county courts routinely
See, e.g., Brown v. Hackett (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773–1774,
supra note 331, at 55–56 (granting a new trial when damages were too small); Lenox & Scott v.
Davis (Culpeper Cnty. Ct. July 22, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK
CULPEPER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1763−1764, at 71 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998)
[hereinafter CULPEPER 1763–1764] (granting a new trial after the jury returned the same verdict
twice, which the court found contrary to the evidence); cf. Pulliam v. Turner (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., July 4, 1739), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 62 (finding “damage
should be entered double” and therefore doubling the jury’s verdict).
533
(Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B34.
534
Reeves v. Waller (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1733), in 2 RANDOLPH V. BARRADALL, supra note
144, at B34.
535
Id.
536
See infra notes 537–52 and accompanying text (demonstrating that county courts, although
an inferior court, did not always obey mandates and rules of the General Court).
537
E.g., North v. White (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Apr. 2, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 10−11; cf. Hughlett v. Howson (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Sept. 19,
1700), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra note 130, at 27, 29 (referring a case in which the
county court justices divided equally to the General Court). In some cases, courts denied
appeals prior to final judgment. See, e.g., In re. Hambleton (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1690), in
STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 137–38 (finding an interlocutory appeal to
the General Court did not lie); see also Nichol v. Harrison (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1731),
in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 74–75 (denying an appeal on the ground that the
532
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obeyed the mandates rendered on appeal.538 As a general rule, “an
inferior court [could] not hold plea or take cognizance of” a matter which
“the General Court ha[d] adjudged,”539 and, even if not totally bereft of
jurisdiction, a county court possessed only what limited jurisdiction the
General Court delegated to it.540
But the general rule was not always followed, and the General Court
did not successfully enforce every judgment. When one defendant, for
example, moved to arrest judgment on a plaintiff’s verdict on the ground
that the General Court had assumed jurisdiction over the case, which
“therefore [ought] not to be judged of by an Inferior Court,” a county
court denied the motion.541 In another case, a county court declined to
appoint an administrator for an estate as the Governor had directed it to
do.542 Similarly, the judges of another county refused to obey an order
from the Governor to cease building a new courthouse on the grounds
that they had already purchased materials and that their time in the old
courthouse was about to expire.543 On yet another occasion, a county
losing litigant had no “legal proof”); Bronaugh v. Field (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 1, 1730), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 6 (denying an appeal as untimely). A litigant who
failed to prosecute an appeal was liable for any damages suffered by the appellee. E.g., Brent v.
Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note 158, at 98.
538
See, e.g., Stevenson v. Ball (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Jan. 11, 1729/1730), in LANCASTER 1729–
1732, supra note 126, at 8 (enforcing reversal by the General Court); Spotswood v. Harrison
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 2, 1731), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1730–1732, supra note 383, at 74–75
(receiving an order of the General Court reversing the verdict of the county court and granting
a new trial); In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 16, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra
note 184, at 62 (obeying a mandate of the General Court to adjudicate the case); Gibson v.
Younge (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra note 184, at 57
(reporting a finding by the General Court that the defendant had “very litigiously made his
appeal” with “little reason” and direction to the county court to give “a definitive judgment of
all matters depending without further benefit of appeal”); cf. Dwight v. Wormeley (Middlesex
Cnty. Ct., Oct. 7, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra note 312, at 82 (obeying an order of the
Governor that no counselor may be sued except by summons under hand of the Governor);
Geldinge v. Dixon (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 29, 1675), microformed on 00327495162125
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (submitting a statement of facts, on orders of the House of
Burgesses, for legal decision by the legislature).
539
Morris v. Carter (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1695/96), in LANCASTER 1695–1699, supra
note 144, at 5–6.
540
See, e.g., Smoot’s Petition (Richmond Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1702), in RICHMOND 1702–1704,
supra note 261, at 5 (obeying an order to find facts on the claim that a sheriff had assaulted the
petitioner’s wife).
541
Grymes v. Beverley (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1706/1707), in MIDDLESEX 1705–1707,
supra note 314, at 83.
542
Letter of Gooch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART
III), supra note 127, at 45.
543
Opinion re Courthouse (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Nov. 6, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704,
supra note 203, at 83–84. Apparently, there previously had been doubt whether the court was
complying with earlier rulings when it proceeded with the construction. Order re Courthouse
(Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1704), in MIDDLESEX 1702–1704, supra note 203, at 75–76.
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court declined to determine, as a letter from the Governor had directed,
whether a Native American was properly held as a servant and sent the
case back to the General Court,544 while, in a fifth case, a lower court
reissued a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, even though the defendant
had appealed to the General Court and the case apparently was pending
there on appeal.545
Some county courts relied on technicalities to avoid enforcing
General Court orders. Thus, one court declined to obey an order
reversing a county court chancery decree on the ground that the
appellant had failed to prosecute the order of the appellate court in a
In another case in which the General Court had
timely fashion.546
directed a defendant to submit an answer and the defendant refused,
claiming the order of the General Court was “out of date,” the county
court agreed that the defendant need not answer.547
The spirit of independence displayed by county courts emerged with
special clarity in Colsworthy v. Smith,548 in which the General Court had
enjoined Colsworthy and his agents and attorneys from proceeding on
any suit at common law against Smith in the Essex County Court. The
county court’s response was that the order to Colsworthy was “no
prohibition to them to hear the said cause” if Colsworthy brought it
forward to trial, which he did.549 Ultimately, however, the parties agreed
to submit the case to referees.550 Later, when issues emerged in regard to
the referees and the defendant sought to stop proceedings by relying on
his injunction, the county court continued to persist in its view that it
need “not take notice of the [i]njunction.”551
In short, when county courts presented a united front to outsiders, as
they usually did, they possessed considerable freedom to render
whatever judgments they wished. They did not need to follow legal

Letter of Governor (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1683–1685, supra note 159, at 72.
545
Maddocks v. Gibson (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Apr. 6, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note
158, at 86.
546
Belfield v. Port (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 6, 1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note
257, at 72–73. The earlier litigation was Port v. Belfield. (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 3,
1708/1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note 257, at 38–39; (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2,
1708/1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra note 257, at 37–38.
547
Gwyn v. Thomas (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1696), in ESSEX 1695–1699, supra note 267, at 7.
548
(Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 71;
(Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 59.
549
Colsworthy v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II),
supra note 445, at 59.
550
Id.
551
Colsworthy v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II),
supra note 445, at 71.
544
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doctrines elaborated and enforced by appellate courts.
Despite
Virginia’s outward reception of common-law forms, law in the county
courts ultimately rested on the common sense of local judges as well as
on formal rules imposed from above. Everything effectively reinforced
the power of local gentry. As Rhys Isaac has concluded, “[a]ll the
different forms of gentry domination were subtly concentrated and
institutionalized in the system of local government,” where “county
courts and parish vestries” worked together to ensure “the rightful rule
of those whom . . . property, family, and learning set above the common
folk.”552
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW
The concentration of power in the local gentry determined, in turn,
the substance of mid-eighteenth-century Virginia law. Central political
authorities did not, because they could not, determine the law.
Whatever power they possessed, as we shall see, resulted from their
employment of carrots rather than their use of sticks—from bargains
they made rather than obedience they coerced. Local gentlemen, as well,
were not completely free to control the law; foundational market forces
limited what they could do.
The foundation for everything in colonial Virginia was tobacco. As I
have urged elsewhere, people migrated to Virginia in the early
seventeenth century to get rich, and cultivating tobacco proved to be the
way for some of them to do so.553 Growing tobacco, in turn, required
three factors—capital, land, and labor—and law became the means by
which those who got rich kept the three factors under control.554
First, this section discusses the basic monetary and debt system of
colonial Virginia.555 Second, it discusses real property law in colonial
Virginia.556 Third, it details Virginia’s slavery laws.557 Finally, the
section discusses how slavery fit into the colony’s general social order.558

ISAAC, supra note 172, at 133.
See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660, at 7 (2008) (explaining that historians agree that “Virginia was
founded primarily for economic profit”).
554
See id. at 23–24 (discussing the history of tobacco cultivation in Virginia).
555
See infra Part IV.A (discussing Virginia’s capital and debt laws).
556
See infra Part IV.B (discussing Virginian laws concerning land).
557
See infra Part IV.C (discussing Virginian law regarding slavery).
558
See infra Part IV.D (examining the role of slavery law within Virginia’s social order).
552
553
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A. Capital and Debt
It had become clear by the 1660s that Virginia’s prosperity and place
of preeminence among Britain’s North American colonies depended
upon the production and marketing of tobacco, which produced
substantial tax revenue for the crown and huge profits for British
merchants.559 In good years, when the amount of tobacco produced
equaled the market’s demand at a price at which planters could earn a
profit and were also able to obtain capital to expand their production
and buy luxury goods with which to celebrate their success.560 As a
result, by the close of the seventeenth century Virginia was tied tightly
into a complex, North Atlantic commercial economy.
All sorts of commercial disputes arose in this economy. Suits by
mariners for wages were frequent,561 as were suits on construction
contracts562 and suretyship agreements.563 Other common cases raised
the issue of who bore the risk of loss. In one case, for example, the king’s
searchers seized a servant, who was being transported to Virginia at a
Virginian’s request, in England as his vessel was about to leave.564 The
court ordered the ship captain to return to the Virginian the fare he had
paid for the servant’s transportation.565 In another case, in which a
doctor leased a plantation with a dwelling house that burned down
during the course of the lease, the issue was whether a covenant in the
lease requiring the doctor to return the house in “good & tenantable”
Other cases presented
condition required him to rebuild.566
miscellaneous issues, such as one in which a court ruled that a buyer
need not pay for tobacco delivered to him by contract until the seller
delivered the entire contract amount,567 and another in which a
Gary M. Pecquet, British Mercantilism and Crop Controls in the Tobacco Colonies: A Study
of Rent-Seeking Costs, 22 CATO J. 467, 469–70 (2003).
560
See id. at 470–72 (explaining the nature of the colonial tobacco market).
561
E.g., Parker v. Foxall (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Mar. 4, 1685/1686), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1685–1687, supra note 101, at 33.
562
E.g., Rice v. Pavey (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 7, 1684), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685,
supra note 159, at 53.
563
See, e.g., Batty v. Bradley (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1694), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695,
supra note 105, at 193, 195 (ordering the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff for a payment on
which defendant was surety).
564
Chilton v. Wilson (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 12, 1678/1679), in LANCASTER 1678–1681,
supra note 144, at 19.
565
Id.
566
Barber v. Clarke (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687,
supra note 101, at 90. The court held that the covenant did not require him to rebuild. Id.
567
Compare Hawkins v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 19, 1718/1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723
(PART II), supra note 418, at 51 (reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff refused to deliver
the tobacco contracted for until the defendant had paid for the entire amount), with Hawkins v.
559
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consignee of goods who failed to receive orders from the owners sought
permission to dispose of them.568
However, in addition to the good years that produced significant
litigation, there also were bad years, and those years ultimately led to
even more lawsuits. In some bad years, conditions such as drought
destroyed the crops of some planters, who had little choice but to borrow
money and fall into debt.569 Other years saw overproduction of tobacco
and consequent low prices at which almost no planter could break
even.570 Almost everyone then had to borrow money, and nearly
everyone fell into debt.571 Because everyone understood that no one
could borrow unless creditors could be reasonably confident they would
be repaid, facilitating the collection of debts soon became a staple of the
Virginia legal system.572 It remained such throughout the colonial
period.
Although precise statistical analysis remains impossible due to the
incompleteness and sloppiness of surviving court records, perusal of the
extant records quickly shows that collection of debts remained
numerically the most important category of judicial jurisdiction in the
aftermath of the Restoration.573 In the early years, debt collection could
be a remarkably informal process, as in one case in which the court
authorized the creditor to retain the debtor’s steer, already in the
creditor’s possession, in full satisfaction of the debt.574 In a second case,
the court held the amount of corn that a debtor had consumed could not
be “certainly proved or known” and gave judgment on the basis of a
calculated guess.575 In a third situation, a debtor entered a plea that the
giving of a mortgage constituted full satisfaction in payment of a bond

Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 16, 1719), in ESSEX 1716–1723 (PART II), supra note 418, at 72
(granting judgment for the defendant).
568
In re. Corbin (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1694), in MIDDLESEX 1694–1697, supra note 193,
at 3.
569
See Pecquet, supra note 559, at 470.
570
See id. at 470–71 (reporting a situation in 1681 where planters overstocked the tobacco
market).
571
BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTER’S REPUBLIC:
THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC
INDEPENDENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 23 (1996) (noting Virginia’s large amount of
debt compared to other colonies).
572
See 1 NELSON, supra note 553, at 44–47 (providing a summary of the development of debt
collection in Virginia).
573
Id. at 45.
574
Donding v. Porter (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Sept. 7, 1664), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690,
supra note 127, at 3.
575
Jackson v. Wright (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687,
supra note 101, at 13–14.
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for a large sum of money, although the court rejected the plea.576 In a
fourth case, a debtor petitioned successfully that all executions against
his estate be suspended on the ground that he had no assets to pay
them.577
However, there never was a serious doubt that those who delivered
goods were entitled to payment, even in the absence of an express
promise to pay,578 and with increased caseloads, courts developed
routinized and detailed procedures and processes, often favorable to
creditors, which enabled them to collect. In one case, for example,
“where [a] debtor remain[ed] in prison,” a court ruled that “his estate
may be taken;”579 while in another case an “attachment . . . according to
law [was] granted” when an arrest warrant was returned “non est
inventus.”580 A third creditor received an attachment against the estate
of a debtor who had left the county,581 while other cases allowed
recovery against individuals who helped debtors escape to or secret their
property in another county beyond the jurisdiction of the court.582 Cases

576
Compare Beverley v. Prescott (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1684), in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686,
supra note 184, at 69–70 (holding the mortgage did not constitute full satisfaction for the bond),
with Beverley v. Prescott (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1687/1688), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690,
supra note 312, at 45–46 (ordering the defendant to pay the bond amount).
577
In re. Michaell (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1676), in 10 NORTHAMPTON 1674–1678,
supra note 125, at 134.
578
Compare Gibson v. Hughes (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 6, 1749), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 5–6 (reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s account
book did not contain any debts owed by the defendant), with Gibson v. Hughes (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., July 5, 1749), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 16 (holding that
the defendant, who received goods from a merchant, was liable to the third party plaintiff who
paid for them, even in the absence of a promise to reimburse the third party); compare Smith v.
Russell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Nov. 5, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note
186, at 20 (reporting the jury’s finding that defendant failed to return a horse lent to him by the
plaintiff), with Smith v. Russell (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 29 (holding that the defendant was obligated to return the
horse even in the absence of an express promise to return it).
579
Declaration of Sept. 21, 1668 (Va. Gen. Ct.), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at
510–11.
580
Suit Against Estate of Phillip Lymby (Charles City County Ct., Feb. 1672/1673), 13 VA.
COLONIAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 93, at 78.
581
Derrick v. Jones (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Feb. 14 & 15, 1665/1666), in STAFFORD 1664–1668,
1689–1690, supra note 127, at 20; cf. Gibson v. Smith (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., July 10, 1706), in
LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra note 238, at 101–02 (holding that attachment lies against property
of a nonresident debtor located within the county). But see In re. Willsheir (Charles City Cnty.
Ct., Jan. 24, 1687), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7–8 (releasing from attachment
the property of a destitute widow whose husband under suit had absconded from the county).
582
E.g., Curtis v. Conner (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1735), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1734–1735, at 84 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 2000) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1734–1735]; Peake v. Merriott (Stafford Cnty. Ct.,
Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–1690, supra note 127, at 59.
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dealing with different issues of attachment also established rules of
priority among creditors seeking payment out of the same assets.583
Perhaps the most important pro-creditor rule, which remained in
place from the past, was that, once a sheriff had served process on a
debtor by arrest, the sheriff became liable for any judgment against the
debtor, if—as occurred with some frequency—the debtor or his or her
bail failed to appear in court.584 Similarly, if a sheriff attached personal
property of a debtor, whoever possessed that property became liable for
any judgment.585 Another important pro-creditor rule allowed debtors
to appoint attorneys to represent them and come into court and confess
judgment;586 this occurred in one seventeenth-century case for 400,000 lb.

583
See Green v. Buckner (Stafford Cnty. Ct., July 12, 1693), in STAFFORD 1692–1693, supra note
158, at 105 (dismissing the action where the debt had been paid several years earlier); Cooper v.
Redman’s Adm’r (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1717), in WESTMORELAND 1716–1718, supra
note 212, at 65–66 (holding the plaintiff’s action in debt took priority over a third party’s
claims). Compare Fardo v. Eyles (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1692), in RICHMOND 1692–1694,
supra note 184, at 36 (granting judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant’s estate where
the defendant left the county), with Harwood v. Eyles (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 3, 1692), in
RICHMOND 1692–1694, supra note 184, at 36 (holding that the plaintiff’s debts took priority over
all other debts owed by the defendant’s estate).
584
E.g., Bowzer v. Price (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1674/1675), in LANCASTER 1674–1678,
supra note 156, at 21; Johnson v. Farmer (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1733/1734), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 1–2. If a deputy sheriff failed to properly insure a
debtor’s appearance, the deputy was not liable. Compare Nance v. Hill (Richmond Cnty. Ct.,
Aug. 6, 1729), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1729–1731, at 5–6 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter RICHMOND 1729–1731]
(reporting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s debtor escaped while under the deputy
supervisor’s supervision), with Nance v. Hill (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Mar. 5, 1729/1730), in
RICHMOND 1729–1731, supra, at 23–24 (dismissing the suit against the deputy sheriff).
However, the sheriff was liable in such situations. E.g., Johnson v. Davis (Spotsylvania Cnty.
Ct., Mar. 5, 1733/1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 11–12. The sheriff could,
in turn, sue the deputy and recover on the deputy's bond. E.g., Johnson v. Davis (Spotsylvania
Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 94. But see Everitt v.
Pabell (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Feb. 1687), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 7, 13
(holding the sheriff was not liable for an escape from a jail that was constructed as the law
directs); Shapleigh v. Mathew (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Jan. 16, 1683/1684), in
NORTHUMBERLAND 1683–1686, supra note 232, at 22–23 (holding the sheriff was not liable when
process was never served on a debtor because the debtor was outside the jurisdiction). Compare
Bridges v. Chew (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar. 26, 1748), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER
BOOK ORGANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1747–1748, at 82–83 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds.,
1997) [hereinafter ORANGE 1747–1748] (reporting jury finding that the sheriff produced the
debtor in court but later released the debtor for nonpayment of jailor’s fees), with Bridges v.
Chew (Orange Cnty. Ct., June 23, 1748), in ORANGE 1748–1749, supra note 261, at 3 (holding the
sheriff was not liable).
585
E.g., Blackburne v. Symons (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1685–1687, supra note 101, at 15–16.
586
E.g., Loxham v. Derrick (Stafford Cnty. Ct., June 10, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–1692, supra
note 184, at 26.
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of tobacco.587 Then there was the 1704 act of Parliament reversing the old
rule that promissory notes assigned without the knowledge and consent
of their maker could not be enforced at law by the assignee.588 There
were also important rulings that land was subject to seizure to pay
simple contract debts as long as a debtor’s personal estate was exhausted
first.589 Courts would also enter judgment against an executor or
administrator for an estate’s debts even if no estate property remained in
his hands because courts recognized that the debtor might come upon
such property in the future and ought to be liable to pay the debt.590
Rules of evidence, such as the rule allowing merchants to recover debts
simply by presenting and swearing to their ledgers, also tilted in favor of
creditors,591 as did an act of Parliament permitting creditors residing in
England to prove debts by affidavits sworn before the Lord Mayor of
London.592
There also were some pro-debtor rules. The most important rule
allowed debtors to pay in tobacco, “the customary pay of the country,”
rather than in cash.593 Another allowed the release of any defendant
imprisoned more than twenty days for a debt of less than 2000 lb. of
tobacco,594 while a third outlawed usury.595 A fourth, grounded in

587
Stone v. Jones (Rapphannock Cnty. Ct., Feb. 4, 1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685,
supra note 159, at 60.
588
See Thomas v. Joanes (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1686/1687), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690,
supra note 312, at 17 (dismissing an action where the defendant did not have knowledge of or
consent to the assignment to the plaintiff). But cf. Whetstone v. Laight (Middlesex Cnty. Ct.,
July 1, 1678), in Middlesex 1677–1680, supra note 134, at 25 (upholding assignment of a note by
the maker and assumption of the obligation by the assignee in the presence of the payee). The
statute was the Promissory Note Act, 3, 4 Anne ch. 8 (1704).
589
E.g., Farish v. Stevens (Caroline Cnty. Ct., June 12, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773, at 74 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1773].
590
See, e.g., Self v. Floury (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 24, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra
note 257, at 55–56 (holding the debtor was liable to pay a creditor with money the debtor
received by inheritance).
591
4 WILLIAM WALTER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL OF
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 327–
28 (Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1820); 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 53–55.
592
See, e.g., Rogers v. Spalden (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1739), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra
note 144, at B81. In Rogers, the General Court refused to admit into evidence an affidavit sworn
without notice to the debtor, but the plaintiff appealed that decision to the Privy Council. Id.
The Privy Council reversed the judgment of the General Court and granted a new trial without,
however, ruling clearly on the admissibility of the affidavit. JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 382–83 (1965).
593
Willis v. Chowning (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 6, 1686), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690, supra
note 312, at 11.
594
E.g., In re. Jarman (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1733), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734,
supra note 160, at 47–48; cf. In re. Wall (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 4, 1731, in SPOTSYLVANIA
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eighteenth-century legislation common to the North American colonies,
released insolvent debtors from jail if they turned over all their assets to
be sold for the benefit of creditors.596 In fact, courts did release a large
number of such debtors.597 However, these few concessions to debtors
did nothing to change the reality that, to the extent debtors possessed
assets, courts would do what they could to enable creditors to reach
those assets for repayment of debts.
B. Land Law
The law of property was another subject on which Virginia adopted
common-law rules, as modified by Virginia legislation—rules that
persisted throughout the colonial era. At the most basic level, courts
protected property rights by ordering the sheriff to remove from land
trespassers who had no claim of right to be there.598 They also enforced
the “usual way of alienations of lands and estates in this country,” which
was by deed and “by acknowledging . . . assignment or alienation in
court and recording the same.”599 Finally, they made important legal
1730–1732, supra note 383, at 31 (refusing to release the debtor from prison because his debt
exceeded 2000 lb. of tobacco).
595
See 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 294–95 (setting the interest rate at 6%); 6 HENING, supra
note 142, at 101–02 (setting the interest rate at 5%).
596
3 HENING, supra note 130, at 385–87; 4 HENING, supra note 591, at 151–52; 7 HENING, supra
note 205, at 549; 8 HENING, supra note 465, at 326.
597
E.g., In re. Mayfield (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 9, 1743), in CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA
ORDER BOOK 1740–1746 PART TWO 1742/3–1744, at 35 (John Frederick Dorman ed., 1973)
[hereinafter CAROLINE 1742/3–1744]; Carlyle & Dalton v. Burnett (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Mar. 22,
1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at 67; Chancey v. Childress (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Oct.
27, 1747), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1747/48 AND 1766–1772, at 10–11 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter
LOUISA 1747/48 & 1766–1772]; In re. Boyd (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Sept. 10, 1754), microformed
on 00327545162130 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
598
E.g., Williams v. Harper (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 12, 1689), in STAFFORD 1664–1668, 1689–
1690, supra note 127, at 55; see also Thorpe v. Jones (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 11, 1700), in ESSEX
1699–1702, supra note 247, at 52 (finding the defendant not guilty of trespass if he entered land
to obtain personal property belonging to him); In re. Potter (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 5, 1681),
in MIDDLESEX 1680–1686, supra note 184, at 24 (authorizing Potter to enter another’s land to
retrieve personal property); cf. Rider v. Hull (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 22, 1682/1683),
in NORTHUMBERLAND 1680–1683, supra note 162, at 98–99 (placing tenant of a conditional fee in
possession of the land with proviso that he not commit waste by cutting down more than an
appropriate number of trees).
599
Neale v. Shapleigh (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., May 29, 1675), in NORTHUMBERLAND
1674−1677, supra note 52, at 28–29. If a deed consisted of an indenture with multiple parts, a
litigant relying on the deed had to present all parts thereof. See King v. Fleming (Richmond
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1703), in RICHMOND 1702–1704, supra note 261, at 98–99 (dismissing a suit
where the plaintiff refused to present all parts of the indenture). Someone who conveyed land
to which he or she lacked good title was, of course, liable in damages on any warranties of title.
See Rice v. Pavey (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 8, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1689−1692,

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

849

policy judgments, such as one barring Lord Fairfax as proprietor of the
Northern Neck from using the remedy of distress to collect arrearages of
rent;600 a second implying warranties of title in deeds transferring
land;601 a third barring judicial inquiries into the consideration received
for a deed;602 a fourth holding that a tenant by curtesy forfeited his estate
if he tried to convey it in fee simple;603 a fifth authorizing the taking and
recording of depositions of elderly people “acquainted with the ancient
bounds of . . . lands;”604 and a sixth ruling that crops growing on land
were part of a decedent’s real rather than personal estate.605 Of course,
courts also adjudicated boundary claims606 and resolved disputes over
title to other sorts of property, such as slaves,607 servants,608 and other
forms of wealth.
The rules of property applied most frequently in court were those
dealing with succession to land and other assets. In the absence of a will,
land descended under the common-law rule of primogeniture.609 That

supra note 56, at 46–47 (ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff 1600 lb. of tobacco for
conveying land in which he lacked good title).
600
Newton v. Brokenburrow (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1696), in RICHMOND 1694–1697,
supra note 151, at 115.
601
Prosser v. Smith (Essex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 10, 1712), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS
LAND TRIALS BOOK ESSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1711–1741, at 1–2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1992) [hereinafter ESSEX 1711–1741].
602
See Brown v. Woffendall (Richmond Cnty. Ct, June 2, 1697), in RICHMOND 1697–1699,
supra note 364, at 2–3 (overruling the defendant’s plea that the plaintiff’s consideration was
insufficient).
603
Hammit v. Washington (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 7, 1708), in RICHMOND 1707–1708,
supra note 160, at 75–76; cf. Rust v. Brent (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1705/1706), in
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 15–17 (refusing to allow a life tenant to convey a
fee simple).
604
In re. Carter (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1713), in WESTMORELAND 1712–1714, supra
note 128, at 64–65.
605
In re. Travers’s Estate (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–
1685, supra note 159, at 97. Title to crops was the issue of a case later argued by Thomas
Jefferson and George Wythe in the General Court. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ ET AL., TH.
JEFFERSON AND BOLLING V. BOLLING: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA (1997) (providing a detailed analysis of the Bolling case).
606
See, e.g., Smith v. Briscoe (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 3, 1698), in MIDDLESEX 1697–1700,
supra note 314, at 52 (ordering a surveyor to investigate the boundary line at issue in a trespass
action).
607
E.g., Taliaferro v. Taliaferro (Essex Cnty. Ct. Aug. 18, 1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II),
supra note 445, at 70.
608
E.g., Smith v. Boughan (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Feb. 5, 1690/1691), in RAPPAHANNOCK
1689−1692, supra note 56, at 54.
609
But see Estate of Moss (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Mar. 14, 1769), in LOUISA 1768–1769, supra note
332, at 84 (ordering division of the decedant’s estate “equally among his children agreeable to
the Act of Distribution notwithstanding any will”).
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rule sometimes raised interesting issues, as in Salisbury v. Dennis,610 in
which Grandpa John died seized of some 300 acres of land that his eldest
son Richard inherited upon Grandpa’s death. His second son Paskall
died next, and then Richard died.611 Paskall’s only child, Mary,
thereupon sued Grandpa’s third son, John, Jr., for the land and won.612
In practice, however, most property owners did not observe the rule
of primogeniture. An owner of land or other property “might lawfully
devise his estate to whom he thought expedient,” and the courts would
Many testators used wills to avoid
enforce such devises.613
primogeniture, and innumerable disputes arose over the meaning and
validity of wills, in regard to both title to land,614 and title to other assets,
especially slaves.615 In one case, for example, one of three devisees had
been “unheard of and in remote parts for many years” and failed to
appear to take his third of a devise.616 The court responded by dividing
the land equally between the other two, subject to a bond that they give
the missing devisee his third should he appear.617 He never did appear,
but when his wife established upon his presumed death that she was his

(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 15, 1675/1676), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1674−1677, supra
note 52, at 61.
611
Id.
612
Id.
613
Webb v. Smith (Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 17, 1699), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1699–
1700, supra note 190, at 53. Compare Curtis v. Ayres (Essex Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1725), in ESSEX
1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 62 (reporting jury finding that the plaintiff inherited
a “Negro girl” through her grandmother’s will), with Curtis v. Ayres (Essex Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19,
1725), in ESSEX 1723–1725 (PART II), supra note 445, at 74–75 (ordering the defendant to
return the slave to the plaintiff). A devise would be enforced even if it excluded a child from
his or her equal share. See In re. James (King George Cnty. Ct., Feb. 2, 1721/1722), in KING
GEORGE 1721–1723, supra note 127, at 30–31 (ruling it “lawful” for a father to exclude his son
from a share under his will). But see Smith v. Smith (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1725), in
RICHMOND 1724–1725, supra note 184, at 63–64 (exercising chancery jurisdiction to give two
granddaughters “a child’s part” of their grandmother’s estate).
614
See, e.g., Elliot v. Robinson (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 2, 1689), in MIDDLESEX 1686–1690,
supra note 312, at 89 (determining a dispute over a child’s share of her father’s estate).
615
See, e.g., Ball v. Fox (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1704), in LANCASTER 1703–1706, supra
note 238, at 36 (examining a dispute over the disposition of two slaves by will). The statement
in the text remained true throughout the colonial period, as over one-third of the cases included
in Jefferson’s Reports of Cases Determined in the General Court of Virginia from 1730, to 1740; and
from 1768, to 1772 dealt with issues of inheritance and construction of wills. See generally
JEFFERSON, supra note 181.
616
Will of Berry (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687, supra
note 101, at 13.
617
Id.
610
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“apparent heir,” she received his third of the land.618 Disputes also
occurred about whether land and other assets had been fairly divided.619
By far the most important practices in connection with land,
however, were those by which virgin land was distributed by the crown.
As shown above, a cause underlying Bacon’s Rebellion was that a small
group of planters owned so much vacant land that indentured servants,
upon completing their term of servitude, were unable to obtain land.
After suppression of the rebellion, English authorities routinely
instructed Governors to distribute land more equitably and to prevent
the accumulation of large landholdings by a small number of wealthy
planters. As a result, land distribution policies became a subject of
continuing political conflict between Governors and the Council, the
entity of Virginia’s government most under the control of the great
planters. By 1710, however, when the Board of Trade omitted provisions
about land reform from the Governor’s instructions, the great planters
had won. The old system in which land patents were given mainly to
existing landholders was fully restored; grants often were made
thereafter for tens of thousands of acres, and some even exceeded
100,000 acres.620 A minor dispute about whether a tax could be levied for
sealing patents also was resolved in favor of Virginians, when the Privy
Council agreed that no official could charge a fee for attaching the
provincial seal to patents.621
C. The Law of Slavery
As the previous discussion displays, Virginia’s labor force was
transformed around the outset of the eighteenth century from one
dependent on white indentured servants to one consisting mainly of
black African slaves. Economic and demographic forces predominated
in the transformation, but law was not irrelevant in connection with
slavery.

Will of Berry (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Jan. 6, 1686/1687), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–1687,
supra note 101, at 69–70.
619
E.g., Marshall v. James (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct., Sept. 4, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1685–
1687, supra note 101, at 14–15. A common problem occurred when a testator gave away more
than he or she possessed; at that point, the court would appoint referees to distribute to every
legatee his or her proportionate share. E.g., Randolph v. Fetherston (Charles City Cnty., Apr. 3,
1690), in CHARLES CITY 1687–1695, supra note 105, at 76, 78.
620
See BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 147, 153, 160–61, 171–72, 194–95, 209–11 (providing
examples and explanations concerning the Privy Council’s role in land distribution). These
preceeding factual assertions can be located within this source.
621
Glenn Curtis Smith, The Affair of the Pistole Fee, Virginia, 1752–55, 48 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 209, 213 (1940).
618
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Statutes had created the category of slavery in the first place, and
thereafter judges had to determine many legal issues involving slaves,
such as whether a master was liable for the criminal act of his “Negro
[w]oman.”622 Of interest here is that judges even turned to law to give
blacks protection from the worst excesses of cruel masters. For instance,
they protected slaves whose masters beat them excessively.623 Also,
courts required masters wishing to punish slaves even more severely by
placing them in irons or by amputating body parts first to obtain judicial
approval.624
Perhaps the most telling difference, however, between early slavery
law and what the law of slavery would later become was in regard to
burdens of proof. Unlike later law, early law did not presume that a
person was a slave simply because he or she possessed an African
ancestor.625 The person claiming the alleged slave had to prove the fact
of slavery, and neither African ancestry nor possession of the alleged
slave since the time of his or her birth sufficed as proof.626 As a result, a
number of cases found persons of African descent to be free.627 By
622
Barret v. Gibson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1731), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at
R61, R70. The master was held not liable. Id. at R72.
623
E.g., Abuse of Lucy (Essex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 16, 1725/26), in ESSEX 1725–1729 (PART I), supra
note 250, at 1.
624
See, e.g., In re. Kemp (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Oct. 5, 1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra
note 169, at 82 (granting the master leave to castrate a runaway slave); King v. Sawney
(Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Aug. 27, 17198), in WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 19–
20 (granting the master leave to cut off Sawney’s “two great toes”). Sawney, it appears, was a
continual runaway.
In re. Eskridge (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Nov. 25, 1719), in
WESTMORELAND 1718–1721, supra note 169, at 67, 69.
625
See 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 365–66 (requiring proof that a person was a slave before
returning that person to the owner).
626
E.g., Loyd v. Thacker (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 4, 1697), in RICHMOND 1697–1699, supra
note 364, at 10–11; see also 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 365–66 (stating that an owner claiming
a runaway slave in the public realm must be able to prove his ownership of the property).
627
E.g., In re. Jack (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Nov. 13, 1665), in 13 VA. COLONIAL ABSTRACTS,
supra note 93, at 53, 56; In re. Gardner (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1771), in LOUISA 1770–1772,
supra note 151, at 33; Irvin v. Arnold (Orange Cnty. Ct., Mar. 27, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756,
supra note 245, at 9; Roger v. Metcalfe (Richmond Cnty. Ct., May 6, 1734), RICHMOND 1734–
1735, supra note 582, at 4–5; Lewis v. Harris (Stafford Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1691), in STAFFORD
1691–1692, supra note 184, at 20; see also Gwinn v. Bugg (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1769), in JEFFERSON,
supra note 181, at 87–89 (considering whether a child born to a “white woman” and “Negro
man” was a free person); In re. Mingo (Charles City Cnty. Ct., Aug. 3, 1692), in CHARLES CITY
1687–1695, supra note 105, at 130–31 (refusing to give effect to manumission granted by will by
“taking note of the law barring [N]egroes their freedom”); In re. Parker (Loudoun Cnty. Ct.,
May 10, 1758), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK
1757–1758, at 69–70 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1757–
1758] (revoking the sale of a mulatto child and granting custody to a couple who agreed to
raise her). But see Munro v. Shropshire (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1706), in
WESTMORELAND 1705–1707, supra note 225, at 43–44 (ordering the plaintiff to deliver the
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statute, anyone who attempted to sell as a slave someone who was not a
slave was subject to a penalty.628
That masters and judges usually did not treat slaves cruelly and
sometimes governed them by the rule of law did not mean, however,
that Virginia slavery was just and humane. It was not. However, it is
necessary to think more precisely than many previous scholars have
done to appreciate what made it unjust and inhumane. The concept of
slavery has been deployed to encompass many different sorts of masterservant relationships, and we need to focus on Virginia’s unique form of
slavery if we are to understand fully its injustice and inhumanity.
Slavery, of course, is grounded upon inequality—a condition that
would induce many nineteenth-century and later philosophers to
condemn it. However, inequality was a routine element of seventeenthand eighteenth-century life. Slavery may have been worse in degree
than most other unequal relationships of its time, but the inequality
associated with it was not different in kind. No society has ever in
practice condemned every form of hierarchy. Thus, we need to examine
various factors beyond mere inequality to understand the peculiar
injustice and inhumanity of Virginia slavery.
Heightened cruelty is a possible factor, but there is no evidence that
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Virginia masters were especially
cruel; Simon Legree was not among them. Difficult working conditions
could have the same impact; slaves on Caribbean sugar plantations, for
example, were effectively sentenced to early death by the conditions
under which they labored.629 Slaves in Virginia, in contrast, worked
under the same conditions endured by white indentured servants and
white owners of small plantations.630

“mulatto” child to the defendant and that the child be bound to the defendant); cf. Obligation of
Griggs (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1682), in LANCASTER 1682–1687, supra note 247, at 1
(reporting an agreement to free “a Negro boy” after he completes twenty-one years of service);
In re. Bowler (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Mar. 9, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS LOUISA
COUNTY, VIRGINIA ORDER BOOK ABSTRACT 1766–1774, at 29 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio
eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA 1766–1774] (allowing slaves to bring suit for freedom in forma
pauperis); In re. Maguire (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 2, 1709), in RICHMOND 1708–1709, supra
note 257, at 56–57 (appointing counsel to represent an indigent servant in suit for freedom);
William v. Neale (Westmoreland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 31, 1708), in WESTMORELAND 1707–1709, supra
note 130, at 27–28 (finding that an East Indian fraudulently trapped in a native country and
wrongfully sold as a slave was free).
628
8 HENING, supra note 465, at 123–25.
629
See SIDNEY W. MINTZ, THREE ANCIENT COLONIES: CARIBBEAN THEMES AND VARIATIONS
13–14 (2010) (noting that the number of living slaves in Jamaica and Saint Domingue
indicated that slavery conditions were deadly).
630
See supra text accompanying notes 125–66 (describing the treatment of white
indentured servants compared to black slaves).
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What made Virginia slavery particularly unjust and inhumane was
the structure of Virginia’s economy and of the law undergirding that
economy. To understand why, we must return to basic facts about the
law and economy and to analyze how the law of slavery intersected with
them.
Consider first the intersection of the law of slavery with the law of
debtor and creditor. Suppose a kindly master wanted to reward a
faithful slave by keeping that slave’s family intact. Could the master do
that? Could slaves enter into secure human relationships with each
other and with those who owned them? As outlined above, indentured
servants could make and enforce contracts to serve their masters well
and obtain early release as a reward.631 Could slaves enforce contracts
for rewards in return for faithful service? Were masters free to perform
such contracts if they wished? In general, the answer to these questions
is no. The law stood directly in the path of anyone treating slaves as
human; they were merely assets that, in addition to performing labor,
served as collateral for the payment of debts.
The case of Hughlett v. Schreever,632 a suit by an administratrix c.t.a.
against a defendant claiming under a decedent’s will, illustrates the
inhumanity that the law of slavery made inevitable in Virginia. The
decedent had owned four slaves; his will gave these slaves to his
subsequently deceased daughter, through whom the defendant
Schreever, in turn, claimed.633 Perhaps the goal of the bequest was to
keep the slaves together within the daughter’s family and thereby
preserve ongoing human relationships. In any event, when the daughter
died, Schreever took possession of the slaves and kept them together.634
The court, however, was concerned, as it had to be if Virginians were to
continue borrowing money, about the “just rights and dues” of creditors
and “that the debts” of the decedent “ought to be satisfied before any
legacies.”635 Accordingly, it ordered that the administratrix be given
possession of “the whole personal estate” of the decedent “as well
Negroes as other his said estate of what nature or condition soever.”636
The administratrix could then convert the slaves and other property of
the decedent into cash or other fungible assets that creditors could accept

See cases cited supra note 142 (providing an example of such an agreement).
(Northumberland Cnty. Ct., Mar. 20, 1700/1701), in NORTHUMBERLAND 1700–1702, supra
note 130, at 54, 56–60.
633
Id. at 56–67.
634
Id. at 57.
635
Id. at 57, 59.
636
Id. at 59.
631
632
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to satisfy debts. If she failed to do so, the slaves could be attached and
sold by the sheriff to pay off the debts.637
The same preference for the rights and dues of creditors and the
satisfaction of debts applied even while debtors were alive. Masters
might try to treat slaves decently and kindly, but it was more important
that they earned enough money to repay whatever debts they had
accumulated and to keep from borrowing more. If meeting their
obligations meant that they had to work slaves harder, they had little
choice. If it meant selling a few slaves and breaking up slave families
and communities, they had little choice. Perhaps a slave owner who had
a good relationship with his or her provider of capital could make
promises for the future and thereby postpone the day of reckoning. But
ultimately, if planters failed to use their slave property to satisfy the
claims of creditors, their slaves could be attached by the sheriff and sold
at auction to pay off debts even while the original borrower remained
alive.638
The Virginia legislature vacillated between treating slaves as
chattels, which would have rendered it easy for creditors to seize them
for unpaid debts, and real estate, which made their seizure more
difficult. At first, in 1705, the legislature declared slaves to be real
estate.639 However, when owners began to grant and bequeath slaves
with less than fee simple titles and subject to remainders, which
effectively exempted them from seizure by creditors, the legislature in
1727 changed its mind. It declared slaves to be chattels unless their
owner took specified steps to annex them to a particular tract of land, in
which event they would pass with the land subject to any limitations
attached to the land.640 At the same time, the statute also sought to
balance the policy of keeping slaves together on a plantation against the
rights of creditors. After providing that executors and administrators, in
general, could not sell slaves, the statute declared that “to bind the
property of slaves, so that they may not be liable to the payment of debts,
must lessen, and in process of time, may destroy the credit of the
country” and therefore gave executors and administrators authority to
sell slaves to pay debts, although for no other purposes, even when

E.g., Taylor v. Estate of McCoy (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1742–1744, at 27 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter LOUISA 1742–1744].
638
E.g., James v. Estate of Tyler (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., May 7, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–
1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 86; Robinson v. Churchill (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Feb. 28, 1765), in
FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 21.
639
3 HENING, supra note 130, at 333–35.
640
4 HENING, supra note 591, at 222–23, 225.
637

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

856

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

slaves had been annexed to land.641 Five years later, Parliament, in full
agreement with the latter principle, made slaves, whatever the nature of
property in them, liable throughout the empire to seizure for debt,642 at
which point the Virginia legislature declared them to be chattels.643 The
Privy Council, however, disallowed this act,644 and the 1727 law, as
modified by Parliament’s 1732 act, thus remained in force throughout
the colonial period.645
It is difficult to see how the crown, British merchants, and Virginia
planters could have prospered if the law had not made slaves subject to
sale to pay debts. As long as tobacco remained the main source of the
colony's wealth, it was inevitable that planters would accumulate
indebtedness during bad times. It was equally inevitable that the law
would adopt pro-creditor rules as a means of encouraging lenders to
lend against the hope that better times would follow. Once slaves, who
had no bargaining power, became “the greatest part of the visible
estates” of most planters,646 it is difficult to see how anyone could have
avoided making them, in effect, collateral for loans. The minute one
understands what it means for human beings to be the collateral on
which a system of credit and finance rests, one understands the
perversity and ultimate inhumanity of Virginia slavery.
Consider next the intersection of the law of property with the law of
slavery. Although primogeniture was the default rule for succession to
real property, most property owners made wills that divided property,
both real and personal, among all their children, often equally. Even in
the absence of significant debt, the law would force whoever
administered an estate under such a will, in the absence of a specific,
contrary direction from the testator or a court,647 to divide slaves among
devisees on the basis of value rather than by reference to family or other
Id. at 225–26.
See 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE FIR[S]T YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE
SECOND 583 (London 1786) [hereinafter 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE] (setting forth An Act for the
More Ea[s]y Recovery of Debts in His Majesty’s Plantations and Colonies in America enacted
in 1732). For a thorough analysis of the act and its effects on American debt and property law,
see Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American
History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 408, 408–39 (2006).
643
5 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 432–36
(Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1819).
644
Id. at 432.
645
See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 66–71 (1996)
(discussing the history and operation of the law in colonial Virginia).
646
4 HENING, supra note 591, at 226.
647
See, e.g., In re. Battaile (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Nov. 11, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra
note 331, at 39–40 (ordering that slaves “be worked together” until the children who were to
receive them under the testator’s will all reached their majority).
641
642
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ties.648 Failure to do so to the satisfaction of the devisees would lead to
complex litigation and subsequent judicial division of slaves.649
Note how the law of succession, by placing this burden on executors
and administrators, functioned much as the law of debtor and creditor
did. It treated slaves not as human beings but as fungible property
capable of being translated into money.
Even in the eighteenth-century world of inequality, it was possible
for people in different socio-legal categories to enter into human
relationships with each other. Women surely were not the economic or
legal equals of men, but eighteenth-century men and women nonetheless
had loving relationships with each other. Thus, we know that John
Adams loved Abigail, and vice versa.650 Similarly, it seems clear that
Thomas Jefferson had a decades-long, intimate relationship with a slave,
Sally Hemings, from which Hemings derived considerable power,
sustenance, and possibly even love.651
Under profound conditions of inequality, Eugene Genovese tells us,
slaves made their own world, built relationships with their masters and
other whites, established families, and created communities.652 By
allowing slaves to engage in such activities, their masters recognized
them as human beings and formed human relationships with them.
Relationships between masters and slaves were unequal, and for that
reason one might be critical of them. However, they were not different
in kind from the many sorts of unequal, but nonetheless fulfilling
E.g., In re. Catlett v. Catlett (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Mar. 11, 1742/3), in CAROLINE 1742/3–
1744, supra note 597, at 3; In re. Retterford (Essex Cnty. Ct., Sept. 17, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729,
supra note 151, at 66–67; Moor v. Elliot (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Apr. 9, 1751), microformed on
00327535162129 (Lib. of Va.); Div. of Slaves of Poythress (Prince George Cnty. Ct., July 1775), in
PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY VIRGINIA MISCELLANY 1711–1814, at 12 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III ed.,
1986) [hereinafter PRINCE GEORGE 1711–1814].
649
E.g., Smith v. Griffin (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1772), in JEFFERSON, supra note 181, at 132; Marston
v. Parrish (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1730), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308, at R35–36.
Compare Wilson v. Belfield (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra
note 159, at 31–33 (reporting jury finding that slaves devised by will to the plaintiff’s wife were
taken to satisfy a debt to the defendant), with Wilson v. Belfield (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Oct. 2,
1723), in RICHMOND 1722−1724, supra note 159, at 40–41 (granting judgment for the defendant).
For a case addressing a complex legal issue, whether slaves could be entailed without being
annexed to land, see Blackwell v. Wilkinson (Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1768) in JEFFERSON, supra note
181, at 73–86.
650
See generally MY DEAREST FRIEND: LETTERS OF ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS (Margaret A.
Hogan & C. James Taylor eds., 2007) [hereinafter MY DEAREST FRIEND] (exploring the
relationship between John and Abigail Adams).
651
See generally ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS: AN
AMERICAN CONTROVERSEY (1997) (detailing the relationship between Thomas Jefferson and
Sally Hemings).
652
See generally EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
(1974) (discussing the relationships that slaves created in their communities).
648
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relationships that always have existed and continue to exist in the world.
Slaves also formed invaluable, and sometimes equal, relationships with
each other.
However, the law—the law of property, the law of debt, and the
patterns of indebtedness underlying it—rendered all slave relationships
precarious. Whatever masters may have done, the law and the
underlying economy did not treat slaves as humans but as fungible
property convertible into cash.653 The law said they were property—
“considered no otherwise than horses or cattle”—and the British
merchants who lent money to Virginia planters thought of slaves as cash
equivalents for securing their debt.654 Slaves were mere numbers that
merchants used in an impersonal marketplace established to satisfy
Europe’s demand for tobacco. They were never considered as people
capable of developing relationships either with each other or with
whites—relationships that, however unequal, were still human.
Whereas indentured servants could complete their terms of
servitude and then live out human—if impoverished—lives, slaves could
not. Slaves’ complete lack of security—their constant vulnerability to an
impersonal marketplace structured and supported by law that could
deprive them at any moment of anything they created—meant that
slaves could not hope to feel any of the emotions or enjoy any of the
satisfactions that lie at the core of human existence. The law and the
economic conditions that governed it, by depriving slaves of the fruits of
creativity, deprived them of humanity, and white Virginians were as
powerless as blacks to modify that deprivation.
In short, Virginia’s law of property and debt, together with the
economic realities underlying it, were continually replicating the original
sin of slavery. The original sin lay in snatching people from their homes,
their families, their communities, and all they had created, and
depositing them in a strange world from which they could never return.
Of course, indentured servants and other immigrants to America also
experienced separation from home, family, and community. But they
had voluntarily made the decision to separate in order to build better
lives for themselves, and, once in the new world, they could focus on
building such lives. Slaves could not. If they tried, the law of slavery,
grounded in the ownership rights of masters and creditors, sooner or
later would destroy whatever they built. The law, like the original slave
trader, would snatch slaves from their homes, their families, their
653
See supra text accompanying notes 639–45 (discussing the treatment of slaves as real
property and chattel).
654
Tucker v. Sweney (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1730), in 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 308,
at R35, R39.
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communities, and the lives they had made and deposit them in yet
another strange world from which they could not return. Slaves thus
had to live in constant fear that they would be separated from everything
they valued, and, as a result, at least some must have given up trying to
generate anything of value.
D. Slavery and Social Order
Based as it was on underpinnings of slavery, the legal order of
Virginia functioned effectively into the mid-eighteenth century. The
eighteenth-century litigation process consisted of a series of inputs from
the General Court, the county benches, and jurors in imprecise, varying
amounts.655 Although each institution possessed a capacity to obstruct
the others—county courts sometimes ignored General Court mandates,
and judges and juries did not always agree—the system worked well
when all three institutions cooperated. It was this capacity for
obstruction together with the need for cooperation that set the
parameters within which the Governor and his councilors, the county
justices, and juries had to perform their duties and exert their power.
The Governor and other central authorities in Jamestown and
Williamsburg needed the cooperation of the county elites that sat on the
county courts to govern the localities effectively. At the same time, the
county elites needed the support of central authorities and, in particular,
of the Governor to maintain their dominant position at home.
The accommodation that center and periphery reached was for
county oligarchies to support the crown’s mercantilist policies, which
were highly profitable to British merchants and generated substantial
revenues for the king. In return, the Governor provided leading planters
with what they most needed—land. Tobacco quickly depletes the soil,
and as land in the older, settled parts of Virginia became exhausted, the
planters who lived there in great munificence became increasingly
dependent on newly opened frontier lands for their income. For some
seventy-five years after Bacon’s Rebellion, authorities in Jamestown and
Williamsburg accommodated the great planters more than ever, and
655
See supra Part II.D (discussing the roles of judges and jurors); supra Part II.E.1 (explaining
the dichotomy of power divided between the county and General Court). The destruction of
the records of the General Court for the colonial period vastly complicates the task of
determining the power of different institutions. On the surface, for example, it appears that
Virginia law was a good deal less uniform than the law of most colonies as counties disagreed
with each other about the appropriate rule to follow on numerous issues. However, that lack
of uniformity may be a mirage: the fact that two local courts disagree with each other may
reflect disagreement, but it may also reflect an appellate court's intervening reversal of the first
court’s judgment. In the absence of the appellate court’s records or of citations thereto, a
historian has no certain way of knowing.
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nearly all new land patented east of the Blue Ridge found its way into
wealthy planters’ hands.656 The planters, in turn, used their economic
power in localities to keep underclasses in control.657
V. TOWARD REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE:
VIRGINIA LAW AFTER THE MID-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The Virginia legal system’s efficiency probably peaked around 1750.
Thereafter, it entered into slow decline and finally in the mid-1770s came
apart.
A. The Decay of Judicial Power
By the mid-eighteenth century, Virginia’s law had assumed the
essential forms it would possess for the remainder of the colonial period.
Of course, many features of that law would change in minor ways, but
one trend was especially noteworthy. Over the course of a quarter
century, the power of the General Court over county courts and the
power of judges over juries decreased marginally, while in two years—
1763 and 1774—the bargain over land on which the accommodation
between county oligarchies and authorities in Williamsburg had rested
broke down. The result was that Virginia, which had been one of the
most placid, well ordered, and reliably loyal of Britain’s North American
colonies, became one of the most uniformly rebellious.
The common-law forms of action remained the foundation for
Virginia’s legal system,658 and over time that system became increasingly
formalistic.659 Despite whatever flexibility may have existed earlier,660 it
656
See ISAAC, supra note 172, at 117–18 (discussing the expansion of “[g]reat houses” that
were “monuments of family pride” in this area); accord, L. SCOTT PHILYAW, VIRGINIA’S WESTERN
VISION: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL EXPANSION ON AN EARLY AMERICAN FRONTIER 30–36 (2004)
(discussing the preferential land policy that rewarded wealthy members of society with land).
657
But see ISAAC, supra note 172, at 137 (noting that the mid-eighteenth-century role of
Glasgow merchant houses in tobacco marketing undermined the economic power of Virginia
elites). The most recent analysis of the role of Scottish merchants is consistent with that of
Isaac. See TILLSON, supra note 173, at 154–55, 166–67 (explaining why Virginia’s wealthy
planters lost power to the Scottish tobacco producers).
658
See, e.g., Buckner v. Robinson (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 12, 1771), in CAROLINE 1771–1772,
supra note 209, at 40 (recording a dower action); Taylor v. Boggess (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., June 20,
1769), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at 98 (recording a replevin action); Dempsey v.
Shepherd (Orange Cnty. Ct., Apr. 28, 1758), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK
ORANGE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1757–1759, at 25 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1998)
[hereinafter ORANGE 1757–1759] (recording a detinue action).
659
Courts, however, still refused to dismiss cases for purely formalistic pleading errors.
Compare Ramey v. Fletcher (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 24, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra
note 257, at 55 (reporting the defendant’s plea that the plaintiff husband erroneously pleaded
damage to himself and his wife rather than to himself alone), with Ramey v. Fletcher (Fauquier
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became clear after mid-century, for example, that in suits where the
amount in controversy was under £5, plaintiffs were required to proceed
by petition rather than by writ,661 while cases under the value of 200 lb.
of tobacco were within the exclusive jurisdiction of individual justices of
the peace.662 Pleading also developed in an increasingly formalized
fashion, as defendants continued to use proper pleas of the general issue
in response to different writs, such as did not assume to a writ of
assumpsit,663 not guilty to a writ of case,664 and owes nothing to a writ of
debt.665 Parties also continued to file special pleas, such as performance,
either total666 or partial,667 self-defense,668 the statute of limitations,669 full
Cnty. Ct., Aug. 30, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note 257, at 69–70 (holding the
defendant’s plea was not sufficient to prevent judgment for the plaintiffs).
660
See Warren M. Billings, Pleading, Procedure, and Practice: The Meaning of Due Process of Law
in Seventeenth-Century Virgina, 47 J. S. HIST. 569, 582−83 (1981) (discussing the use and flexibility
of “bill procedure” in colonial Virginia).
661
See, e.g., Jones v. Pickett (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1762), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra
note 144, at 106−07 (dismissing the action where the plaintiff did not proceed by petition). For a
judgment dismissing a suit when the jury returned a verdict under £5 because the court
surmised the plaintiff had been evading “the Petition Law,” see Burford v. Phillips (Louisa
Cnty. Ct., May 10, 1768), in LOUISA 1768–1769, supra note 332, at 7–8; accord Laird v. Smith
(Botetourt Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1773), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of
Utah) (dismissing a suit where the plaintiff utilized a writ to claim “more than is due him” to
evade the petition requirement).
662
See, e.g., Kelly v. Sims (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in LOUISA 1742–1744, supra note
637, at 27 (dismissing a suit where the amount in controversy valued 83.5 lb. of tobacco);
Broughton v. Duett (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra
note 209, at 45 (dismissing a suit where the balance due was “not cognizable before the court”).
Cases in which a plaintiff claimed £10 or more in damages could be commenced in the General
Court even if the plaintiff ultimately recovered less than £10. See, e.g., Tute v. Freeman (Va.
Gen. Ct., Oct. 1736), in 2 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 144, at B52 (denying the
defendant’s motion to overrule a judgment for £9 where the plaintiff claimed £25 in damages).
663
E.g., Lewis v. Rootes (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., Mar. 18, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra
note 532, at 7–8.
664
E.g., Pinkard v. Petty (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra
note 532, at 43.
665
E.g., Williams v. Dobbs (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1735/1736), in MIDDLESEX 1735–
1737, supra note 169, at 69.
666
E.g., Dillard v. Sanders (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra
note 532, at 76.
667
E.g., Davis v. Slaughter (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., May 19, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra
note 532, at 41.
668
E.g., Roach v. McKey (Louisa Cnty. Ct., June 13, 1743), in LOUISA 1742–1744, supra note
637, at 24.
669
E.g., Ashby v. Williams (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 26, 1763), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762–1763, at 89 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1762–1763]. Parties also sued to confirm title to land
by adverse possession. E.g., Buckner v. Lodowick (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1767), in
VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1765–1767, at 64–
65 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1989) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1765–1767]; see also
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administration,670 lack of consideration,671 and usury.672 By mid-century,
special pleading had fully developed in Virginia’s county courts.673
At the same time, chancery practice also became formalized with the
use, for example, of demurrers,674 depositions,675 and service of process
by publication.676 One court, for example, dismissed a case dealing with
distribution of an estate on demurrer when the complainant sued in his
own name rather than in the name of his three daughters, the alleged
heirs of the estate.677
Harrison v. Blair (Va. Gen. Ct., Apr. 1731), in 1 BARRADALL & RANDOLPH, supra note 308, at
R54–55 (granting judgment based on the limitation period in force at the time of judgment
rather than at the time of filing the plea).
670
E.g., Nelson v. Edmondson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 25, 1750), microformed on
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
671
Compare Broadwater v. Connell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Dec. 14, 1757), in LOUDOUN 1757–
1758, supra note 627, at 42 (reporting the defense of lack of consideration), with Broadwater v.
Connell (Loudon Cnty. Ct., Apr. 12, 1758), in LOUDOUN 1757–1758, supra note 627, at 63
(sustaining the defense on a post-verdict motion). In the mid-eighteenth century, lack of
consideration also appears to have constituted a good defense to a writ of debt. E.g., Moffet v.
Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 20, 1746), microformed on 00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y
of Utah).
672
See, e.g., Sligh v. Broadik (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Aug. 12, 1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1762, at 90–91 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1762] (recognizing a claim of compound interest as a
successful defense in a post-verdict motion).
673
See, e.g., Bowler v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Sept. 14, 1771), in CAROLINE 1771–1772, supra
note 209, at 60 (granting the defendant leave to wave a former plea and file a new special plea);
Pettitt v. Burton (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Dec. 10, 1745), microformed on 00327525162128
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (allowing the plaintiff to submit a special plea before the next
court date).
674
E.g., Coleman v. Kirtley (Culpeper Cnty. Ct., Aug. 19, 1763), in CULPEPER 1763–1764, supra
note 532, at 102; Spotswood v. Davis (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Dec. 3, 1729), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART IV), supra note 186, at 29.
675
E.g., Russell v. Estate of Borden (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 23, 1754), microformed on
00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Turner v. Nelson (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 23,
1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra note 247, at 74–75. Of course, depositions also were used
at common law and could be taken in colonies outside Virginia. E.g., Deposition of Stocton
(Albemarle Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1773), in ALBEMARLE COUNTY VIRGINIA COURT PAPERS 1744–
1783, at 54 (Benjamin B. Weisiger III. ed., 1995) [hereinafter ALBEMARLE 1744–1783]. Courts
preferred, however, to hear testimony viva voce. E.g., Palmer v. Word (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
July 5, 1738), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 14–15. Thus, the court would not
grant postponements for taking depositions when a litigant had had sufficient time to obtain a
deposition in the past. E.g., Scarburgh v. Holden (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Aug. 9, 1748),
microformed on 00327525162128 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
676
E.g., Bullitt v. Strother (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 23, 1773), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1772–1773, at 43 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1772–1773].
677
Heale v. Fox’s Adm’rs (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., Feb. 10, 1730/1731), in LANCASTER 1729–1732,
supra note 126, at 41–43. Chancery also had developed the capacity to refer an issue of fact to a
jury for trial at common law. Compare Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., June 11, 1768), in
CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note 153, at 77 (referring the issue to a jury of whether the
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A positive consequence of increased formalism was that attorneys
became able to use either printed or pre-written forms with blanks to be
filled rather than having to draft individualized pleadings on a case-bycase basis.678 However, the main consequence of formalism’s growth
was to decrease judicial discretion and hence the degree of judicial
control over the processing of litigation.
This weakening of judges is clearest when the role of formalism is
examined in the mid-eighteenth-century Virginia criminal process,
where conformity with legal niceties increasingly came to matter. One
court dismissed a presentment for profane swearing, for example,
because the defendant had “never had the . . . law delivered to him by
the churchwardens . . . & was entirely ignorant thereof.”679 Other courts
threw out presentments because of uncertainty of the presentment680 or
“irregularity of the Proceedings.”681 For example, the case of a defendant
charged in a county where his offense had not occurred was transferred
to the proper county,682 and another court dismissed a presentment for
swearing because of the crown’s failure to insert “the particular oaths”
therein.683 Other courts dismissed presentments for not including the

complainant was a slave or free person), with Mann v. Sutton (Caroline Cnty. Ct., July 15, 1768),
in CAROLINE 1767–1768, supra note 153, at, 81 (granting judgment for the plaintiff upon jury
finding that she was a free person). The inevitable result was that the jurisdiction of equity and
common law became somewhat overlapping. See In re. Thompson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 21,
1767), microformed on 00303775162116 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (authorizing a debtor, who
sought injunctive relief against a judgment on a note he had allegedly paid before the
promissee had assigned it to the party who brought suit, to file the bill in chancery although
noting that he “might have had his relief in the suit at law”).
678
See Garner v. Covington (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 27, 1760), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra
note 257, at 49–50 (granting the defendant’s motion to have the plaintiff fill in the blanks in the
declaration); Chattin v. Buxton (Lancaster Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1738), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LANCASTER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1736–1739, at 61–62 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANCASTER 1736–1739] (abating the suit because blanks in
the declaration were not filled up); Horsnail v. Glover (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Aug. 7, 1728), in
SPOTSYLVANIA 1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 27–28 (granting the plaintiff “leave to fill
up the blanks in his declaration”).
679
King v. Marye (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1736), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1735–1738, supra
note 142, at 26.
680
E.g., King v. Winter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Nov. 4, 1735), in RICHMOND 1735–1736, supra
note 322, at 6.
681
Dismissal of Presentments (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1724/1725), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART I), supra note 184, at 36.
682
See King v. Hollis (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 28, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1767–1769, at 105–06 (Ruth Sparacio &
Sam Sparacio eds., 1995) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1767–1769] (transferring the case to Loudoun
County).
683
King v. Cannon (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1768), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note 385, at
11.
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names of the persons on whose information they were rendered.684
Likewise, when another defendant following conviction moved in arrest
of judgment because the information against him had not stated the date
of the offense or the penalty provided by the legislature and had not
prayed for the issuance of process against him, the prosecution dropped
the proceeding.685 One defendant even moved in arrest of judgment on
the ground that he should have been indicted at common law rather than
under a statute.686 Similar sorts of formalistic claims also were advanced
and at times sustained in civil cases.687 Another, somewhat analogous
case, however, rejected a lawyer’s claim of error in failing to grant him a
continuance so he could prepare his legal argument.688
In criminal cases, particular attention was paid to juries, who
apparently had the power of nullification. When one defendant, for
example, was accused of living openly with a woman without benefit of
marriage and the Queen’s attorneys objected “that the fact aforesaid in
the presentment aforesaid was a sufficient conviction thereof,” the court
overruled the crown’s objection and impanelled a jury; the jury acquitted
Another defendant obtained dismissal of a
the defendant.689
presentment because one member of the grand jury was not a

E.g., King v. Ansley (Fairfax Cnty. Ct., Aug. 16, 1768), in FAIRFAX 1768–1769, supra note
385, at 11–12. But see King v. Morrow (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 25, 1749), microformed on
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (denying a motion to quash because one grand
juror was not a freeholder).
685
Compare King v. Ramey (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., July 23, 1762), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra
note 144, at 84 (recording the defendant’s reasons supporting his motion), with King v. Ramey
(Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 24, 1764), in VIRGINIA COUTNY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1763–1764, at 86 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1995)
[hereinafter FAUQUIER 1763–1764] (recording the prosecutor’s discontinuance).
686
King v. Walmsley (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., May 12, 1763), in LOUDOUN 1762–1763, supra note
144, at 66–67.
687
See, e.g., Chilton v. Lasswell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Feb. 14, 1759), in VIRGINIA COUNTY
COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1758–1759, at 25–26 (Ruth Sparacio
& Sam Sparacio eds., 1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1758–1759] (recording the plaintiff’s postverdict motion in a slander case that the defendant had failed to specify what goods the
plaintiff had allegedly stolen), with Chilton v. Lasswell (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., June 14, 1759), in
LOUDOUN 1758–1759, supra, at 73 (granting the defendant’s post-verdict motion).
688
Downs v. Denton (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Sept. 1, 1750), microformed on 00303745162113
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
689
Queen v. Champ (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 2, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra note
160, at 28. The woman with whom Champ was accused of living had the judgment against her
set aside because she “was not summoned to answer the suit nor had any notice of the trial.”
Compare Queen v. Carter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., July 3, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra
note 160, at 30 (fining the defendant for failing to appear and answer the presentment against
her), with Queen v. Carter (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Sept. 3, 1707), in RICHMOND 1707–1708, supra
note 160, at 40–41 (finding the presentment insufficient for uncertainty).
684
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freeholder,690 and a third moved to set aside a verdict because some of
the petit jurors who convicted him had served on the grand jury that had
presented him.691 Except for trials before the General Court in
Williamsburg, juries were drawn from the vicinage where the crime had
been committed; even for trials before the General Court six jurors were
drawn from the county of the alleged crime.692 This reliance on jurors
who often knew something about the defendant and the case, together
with technical rules that limited prosecutorial freedom, inevitably
reduced the freedom of judges, at least in some cases, to convict
defendants whom they believed guilty.
The judiciary’s declining power also emerged in prosecutions
affecting law enforcement.
In a number of cases, for example,
defendants were charged with interfering with judges and other officers
in the execution of their duties.693 Another case grew out of a
prosecution of a constable for refusing to serve a warrant—when a
prosecution witness failed to appear, the court in formalist fashion
declined to grant a postponement, thereby enforcing an agreement to try
the case at the present term.694 The crown thereupon dropped the
prosecution, the constable went free, and the warrant was never
served.695
Other changes in the mid-eighteenth century similarly altered the
dynamic between the bench and the bar, strengthening lawyers and
weakening lay judges, however slightly. The most important change
occurred when men seeking to practice as attorneys were required to
pass an examination administered by a “person or persons, learned in
the law,”696 although local courts retained power to grant leave to

King v. Kelly (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1734), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra
note 209, at 40–41.
691
King v. Scot (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Mar. 2, 1750/51), microformed on 00303745162113
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
692
Billings, supra note 660, at 579; see, e,g., Queen v. Peacock (Richmond Cnty. Ct. Apr. 11,
1706), in RICHMOND 1705–1706, supra note 237, at 32–33 (ordering the case be continued in
Williamsburg).
693
E.g., Smith v. Matterson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 20, 1767, microformed on 00303775162116
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
694
King v. Colhoun (Augusta Cnty. Ct., May 24, 1755), microformed on 00303755162114
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
695
Id.
696
4 HENING, supra note 591, at 360–61; e.g., License of Lewis (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3,
1733), in MIDDLESEX 1735–1737, supra note 169, at 3. The 1732 act, which gave the Governor and
Council authority to appoint bar examiners, was repealed in 1742. 5 HENING, supra note 643, at
171. The act was replaced by a law authorizing the General Court to appoint examiners from
among the attorneys practicing before it. 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 140; see also License of
Buchanan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., May 26, 1766), in FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 96
690
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practice in individual cases697 and to recommend for examination men of
“good demeanor.”698 The legislature also had succeeded in regulating
attorneys’ fees.699 These changes weakened local courts marginally.
Another change was the increasing presence of law books in the colony,
which made it easier for attorneys to cite precedent rather than relying
on a common-sense conception of justice.700
Judges of the General Court lost even more power than county
courts lost. The county courts, it will be recalled, were largely selfperpetuating bodies that recommended to the Governor whom he
should appoint.701 A telling event occurred in Spotsylvania County in
1744, when the Governor appointed three justices whom the court had
not recommended; as a result, eight other justices refused to take their
oaths or to serve,702 as did two of the three named by the Governor
without court recommendation.703 Only one of the three, William Lynd,
described by one of the eight as a man who “ha[d] begged himself into
the Commission,” thereby “slighting the court,”704 took the oath.705
(administering an attorney’s license); License of Pemberton (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Feb. 8, 1773), in
LOUISA 1766–1774, supra note 627, at 17–18 (administering an attorney’s license).
697
Compare Kennan v. Bailey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 6, 1738/1739), in RICHMOND 1738–
1740, supra note 151, at 13 (reporting a suit against an attorney for practicing outside the county
in which he was licensed), with Kennan v. Bailey (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Apr. 3, 1739), in
RICHMOND 1738–1740, supra note 151, at 22–23 (granting judgment for the defendant attorney).
698
6 HENING, supra note 142, at 141; see, e.g., Certification of Turner (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct.,
Nov. 8, 1732), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1732–1734, supra note 160, at 33 (ordering the clerk to certify
that Turner “h[a]s the [c]haracter of an [h]onest man”).
699
See 5 HENING, supra note 643, at 181–82; 6 HENING, supra note 142, at 371–72 (placing
limitations on attorney fees); see also Oath of Waller (Louisa Cnty. Ct., Dec. 13, 1742), in LOUISA
1742–1744, supra note 637, at 2 (reporting several attorneys’ oaths not to exact or receive
“exhorbitant fees”); Oath of Power (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., Dec. 7, 1742), in MIDDLESEX 1740–1745,
supra note 261, at 60–61 (reporting several attorneys’ oaths not to exact or receive “exhorbitant
fees”).
700
See Wills v. Estate of Prescoat (Essex Cnty. Ct., June 20, 1728), in ESSEX 1727–1729, supra
note 151, at 41 (ordering the defendant to deliver several law books to the plaintiff to satisfy a
debt).
701
See, e.g., Recommendation of Madison (Orange Cnty. Ct., July 25, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–
1756, supra note 245, at 67–68 (recommending James Madison’s father to be a justice).
702
Refusals of Johnston, Robinson, Thornton, Chew, Tutt, Carr, Waller & Turner
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct. June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 72–73.
703
Refusals of Strother & Hunter (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1742–1744, supra note 160, at 73; accord Refusal of Peyton (Prince William Cnty. Ct., Nov. 1,
1762), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA
1762–1763, at 2 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1999) [hereinafter PRINCE WILLIAM 1762–
1763] (reporting a justice’s refusal to serve because “the Commission of the Peace [was]
not . . . made out according to the late nomination” by the sitting justices).
704
Refusal of Thornton (Spotsylvania County Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744,
supra note 160, at 73.
705
Oath of Lynd (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 5, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra
note 160, at 73.
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Apparently the matter was solved by compromise, when the Governor
issued a new commission of the peace containing one of the three men he
wanted, but not Lynd.706
Similarly, two decades later in Fauquier County, Wharton Ransdell
refused to serve as a justice of the peace; John Churchill refused to serve
while John Crump remained on the court; and George Lamkin indicated
he did not want to be included in any future commission of the peace.707
Similarly, the Northampton County Court withdrew a recommendation
that it had made for the appointment of several justices of the peace
when one of them declined to serve,708 while James Nisbett was willing
to serve in Prince William County if he was placed third in the
commission but not otherwise.709 Also, in 1762, Richard Coke presented
the Northampton County Court with a commission to be crown
prosecutor, after the court had recommended James Henry for the
post.710 The court acted on an assumption, which was probably false,
that its recommendation had not been properly communicated to
authorities in Williamsburg and therefore ordered that Coke “be not
admitted to take the oaths to qualify him” until the further pleasure of
the Governor and Attorney General be known.711
Appeals from county courts to the General Court remained the
norm. But at times, county courts denied appeals,712 while at other times
appellate courts refused to consider appeals from general verdicts when
evidence had not been taken down in writing and submitted on appeal
under proper seal.713 This led one litigant to argue, somewhat vaguely
and over broadly that “‘no such general verdict from Virginia . . . ever
was opened or look[ed] into, or can be, by the laws of the land; which

See Comm’n of the Peace (Spotsylvania County Ct., July 3, 1744), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–
1744, supra note 160, at 73–74 (issuing commission for Waller and Robinson).
707
Refusals of Lamkin, Ransdell, & Churchill (Fauquier County Ct., July 23, 1761), in
FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra note 144, at 7.
708
Recommendation for Comm’n of the Peace (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Jan. 12, 1768),
microformed on 00327485162124 (Library of Va.).
709
Reasons of Nisbett (Prince William Cnty. Ct., May 5, 1762), in PRINCE WILLIAM 1761−1762,
supra note 531, at 76.
710
Order re Coke (Northampton Cnty. Ct., July 16, 1762), microformed on 00327485162124
(Library of Va.).
711
Id.
712
See, e.g., Moffet v. Graham (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1746), microformed on
00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (stating “no appeal should be granted on a
general verdict without errors . . . first filed”).
713
See SMITH, supra note 592, at 356 (providing Perry v. Churchill as an example). But cf. id. at
357–58 (discussing Lidderdale v. Chiswell where the council directed the court below to receive
and authenticate the appellant’s bill of exceptions and thereupon considered appeal).
706
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would be to find without evidence, for the plaintiffs, where twelve men,
upon their oaths, have, upon evidence, found for the defendant.’”714
County courts also refused at times to obey orders from the
Governor and the General Court. One case of direct disobedience
occurred when a county court declined to obey a mandamus from the
General Court requiring the county to build a specified bridge, which the
county court declared would require a “needless tax” and be “altogether
useless.”715 The court also took note of topographical conditions that
would make construction difficult and challenged the bona fides of the
man who had obtained the mandamus, when it accused him of offering
not to enforce the mandamus if tithables under his control were relieved
of other work on the roads.716
As a result of disobedience such as this, the General Court
developed a practice of issuing its orders, not to county courts, but to
litigants, who were more amenable. In Lewis v. Golston,717 for example, in
which the General Court had prohibited the plaintiff from suing the
defendant in county court, the county court, when presented with the
prohibition, agreed only to “take the same into consideration.” In the
end, however, it did not need to do so, because the plaintiff, “rather than
run the risk of being adjudged guilty of contempt,” withdrew his suit,
“saving,” however, his “good right by law to commence his action
& . . . to prosecute the same” in the county court.718 In a case such as
Golston, the county court not only declared its independence from the
General Court, but the General Court recognized that independence and
did nothing direct about it.
County courts, in turn, lost authority vis-a-vis juries impanelled in
the cases they heard. Of course, they continued to police procedures
followed by juries during their deliberations,719 to enjoin enforcement of
Id. at 358 n.33.
Slaughter v. Justices (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra
note 247, at 90–91; see Letter of Gooch (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Oct. 1, 1728), in SPOTSYLVANIA
1724–1730 (PART III), supra note 127, at 45 (declining to appoint an administrator as directed by
the governor). But see In re. Hathaway (Stafford Cnty. Ct., Dec. 16, 1691), in STAFFORD 1691–
1692, supra note 184, at 62–65 (obeying the mandate of the General Court to adjudicate the case).
716
Slaughter v. Justices (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 28, 1767), in FAUQUIER 1766–1767, supra
note 247, at 91.
717
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 3, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra note 209, at 99; see
also Lewis v. Golston (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., June 4, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra
note 209, at 103 (granting the plaintiff’s motion for additional time to familiarize himself with
the General Court’s order).
718
Lewis v. Golston (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1, 1735), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1734–1735, supra
note 209, at 108.
719
See Shields v. Wilson (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 1, 1751), microformed on 00303745162113
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (setting aside a verdict because two jurors departed the jury room
during deliberations).
714
715
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common-law judgments,720 to rule on the admissibility of evidence,721 to
preserve objections to their rulings by way of bills of exceptions,722 and
to set aside verdicts and grant new trials when juries returned verdicts
contrary to the evidence.723 In another case, a court held a verdict “idle
and void” because jurors had “misbehaved themselves.”724
Judges also continued on occasion to penetrate beyond the rubric of
contrary to evidence, which implicitly meant that a jury had disobeyed
the law, and explicitly set aside verdicts contrary to law. In one such
case, a jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict for money owed, but the court,
finding that the obligation arose out of “gaming contrary to act of
Assembly,” set the verdict aside.725 In another case, a jury returned a
E.g., Crabb v. Martin (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Apr. 14, 1772), microformed on 00307225162119
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); see also Ledderdale v. Harrison (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 20, 1756),
microformed on 00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (ruling in chancery that the
petitioner in chancery owed only £6, 3 shillings, and 9 pence and that payment of that sum
would discharge the larger verdict that Harrison had obtained at common law).
721
See, e.g., McCollom v. Hunter (Augusta Cnty. Ct., June 18, 1757), microformed on
00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (allowing the defendant to prove a written
instrument given in consideration for land that was never conveyed); Beard v. Moore (Augusta
Cnty. Ct., Mar. 19, 1756), microformed on 00303755162114 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah)
(permitting a witness with a record of criminal conviction to give an unsworn statement to the
jury, but not to testify under oath).
722
E.g., Hamilton v. Ellzey (Loudoun Cnty. Ct., Aug. 15, 1764), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK LOUDON COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1764, at 54–55 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds.,1997) [hereinafter LOUDOUN 1764]; Rogers v. Marshall (Northampton Cnty. Ct.,
May 8, 1750), microformed on 00327535162129 (Library of Va.).
723
E.g., Doah v. Sayers (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 22, 1747), microformed on 00303745162113
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah); Darnall v. Morgan (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 26, 1764), in
FAUQUIER 1764–1766, supra note 160, at 6; Stubblefield v. Moore (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., July 1,
1740), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1738–1740, supra note 122, at 104. But compare Garner v. Darnall
(Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note 257, at 93 (reporting the
defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury rendered a verdict for the wrong
party), with Garner v. Darnall (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Aug. 29, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1761–1762, supra
note 144, at 19 (denying the defendant’s motion for new trial). Even when a jury found
contrary to evidence, a court had discretion to accept its verdict. See, e.g., Henslee v. Tutt
(Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Mar. 1, 1742/1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 3–4
(considering whether to grant a new trial where the jury found contrary to the evidence).
Although, in the case just cited, the court ultimately did, in fact, grant a new trial. Henslee v.
Tutt (Spotsylvania Cnty. Ct., Apr. 5 1743), in SPOTSYLVANIA 1742–1744, supra note 160, at 7–8.
724
Galloway v. Mann (Augusta Cnty. Ct., Aug. 23, 1764), microformed on 00303765162115
(Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
725
Beverley v. Barksdale (Caroline Cnty. Ct., Aug. 15, 1772), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT
RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1772–1773, at 49–50 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam
Sparacio eds., 1993) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1772–1773]; see also Hackett v. Goodall (Caroline
Cnty. Ct., May 13, 1773), in CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589, at 20–21 (admitting evidence that
money was won playing dice in a suit for a statutory penalty for unlawful gambling); Thornton
v. Evans (Richmond Cnty. Ct., Feb. 7, 1694/1695), in RICHMOND 1694–1697, supra note 151, at
22–23 (reporting jury verdict upholding the defendant’s plea that recovery of winnings at a
game of cards was outlawed by statute). But see Russell v. Morton (Richmond Cnty. Ct., June 5,
720
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general verdict for the defendant, and the court directed it to consider its
verdict further.726 When it returned later with the same verdict, the court
granted the plaintiff a new trial.727 In a third case, in which a defendant
requested a special verdict and informed the jury of legal questions that
would arise thereon, the court denied the request and instructed the jury
“to do as pleased,”728 although when the jury returned a general verdict
for the plaintiff, the court granted a new trial.729 On at least one occasion,
a court dispensed with a jury entirely and concluded that particular
evidence constituted a bar to a plaintiff’s suit, and accordingly, it
rendered the equivalent of summary judgment for the defendant.730
Nonetheless, despite the vast power of judges to reject jury verdicts,
at least some lawyers were prepared to argue that general verdicts were
immune from judicial review.731 For whatever reason, courts at times
stayed their hand and did not exert their full power over juries. A 1769
case, Doe v. Anderson,732 which grew out of a title dispute to three
plantations and 600 acres of land, probably typifies how cases were
routinely tried. At issue was the admissibility of a deposition taken
some sixteen years earlier and a copy of an alleged original survey,
which was certified as a true copy by the proprietor’s alleged agent.733
Plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of oral testimony needed to

1733), in RICHMOND 1732–1734, supra note 326, at 43–44 (allowing the plaintiff to recover
winnings at a card game). Compare Swan v. Parkes (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct. Mar. 5,
1684/1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 71 (reporting a suit brought to
recover money owed on a wager on a horse), with Swan v. Parkes (Rappahannock Cnty. Ct.,
May 6, 1685), in RAPPAHANNOCK 1683–1685, supra note 159, at 80 (allowing plaintiff’s suit to
proceed).
726
Seekright v. Goar (Middlesex Cnty. Ct., June 7, 1743), in MIDDLESEX 1740–1745, supra note
261, at 73.
727
Id.
728
Barbour v. Sandys (Orange Cnty. Ct., Apr. 24, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, supra note
245, at 23.
729
Compare id. (reporting the jury’s general verdict for the plaintiff), with Barbour v. Sandys
(Orange Cnty. Ct., May 22, 1755), in ORANGE 1755–1756, supra note 245, at 34 (granting a new
trial). See also Thompson v. Boylston (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Nov. 12, 1772), microformed on
00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for special
verdict).
730
Mercer v. Crump (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Mar. 28, 1761), in FAUQUIER 1759–1761, supra note
257, at 98.
731
See SMITH, supra note 592, at 357–58 & n.33 (providing the respondent’s argument in
Lidderdale v. Chiswell as an example); see also supra text accompanying note 714 (setting forth the
text of the argument).
732
(Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Sept. 26, 1769), in VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1769–1771, at 12–13 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996)
[hereinafter FAUQUIER 1769–1771].
733
Id. at 12.
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authenticate the documents and also to their quality as hearsay.734
However, “[t]he court admitted them generally without giving any
charge to the jury;”735 the court, that is, simply let the jury determine
without guidance the weight to be given to disputed evidence and thus
the entire outcome of the case. Similarly, a court in a 1752 case, Patton v.
Shann,736 refused a defendant’s request to direct the jury that special
damages had not been proved and instead sent the jury out without
direction.
Judges, in short, possessed a limited willingness to police juries, as
Riddle v. Stodghill,737 a 1751 action of trespass for an assault, illustrates.
Initially, the jury in Riddle returned a verdict for the defendant, but the
court, finding that verdict contrary to the evidence, directed it to
reconsider.738 The jury did reconsider and returned a plaintiff’s verdict
for one penny damages—technically, but not in practical impact, vastly
different from the initial verdict rejected by the bench.739 Nonetheless,
the court, for reasons the record fails to illuminate, accepted the new
verdict and entered judgment thereon.740 Perhaps the court was satisfied
with an apparent compromise. Perhaps it appreciated that its real power
to police juries was limited. Perhaps there were underlying facts that the
record fails to reveal.
Several years later, a new issue of constitutional dimension came to
the fore and led a jury to behave exactly as the jury in Riddle v. Stodghill
had behaved. Again the court stayed its hand.
Legislation in 1696, which over the years had been slightly amended,
set the annual salary of clergymen at 16,000 lb. of tobacco, which at the
then price of 10 shillings per hundred lb. gave a salary of approximately
£80 per year. In 1755, the House of Burgesses, fearing that a drought
would lead to a tobacco shortage and a spike in its price, gave local
bodies the option of paying all salaries in cash rather than tobacco, at a
rate of two pennies per lb. of tobacco. When approved by the Council
and the Governor, this act, which remained in force only for ten months,
gave clergymen an annual salary of approximately £130. Anticipating
that tobacco prices might rise above two pennies per lb., some clergymen

Id. at 13.
Id.
736
(Augusta Cnty. Ct., Nov. 17, 1752), microformed on 00303745162113 (Genealogical Soc’y of
Utah).
737
(Orange Cnty. Ct., Aug. 23, 1751), in ORANGE 1749–1752, supra note 247, at 73.
738
Id.
739
Id.
740
Id.
734
735
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were unhappy, but when prices topped out at the two penny rate they
did nothing.741
A second drought, with the accompanying concern about rising
prices, led to the adoption of a second Two Penny Act in 1758, this time
with a duration of one year. When prices in fact rose to six pennies per
lb., which would have worked out to annual salaries of £400, the clergy
memorialized the Privy Council to disallow the legislation. The council,
in fact, disapproved the legislation in the summer of 1759, but official
word thereof did not reach Virginia until over a year after passage of the
1758 act, the effect of which had already expired.742
Nonetheless, several ministers brought separate suits to recover back
pay in the form of the difference during the year the act was in effect
between the two pennies per lb. of tobacco they received and the six
pennies market price.743 The legal issue in the cases was whether the
Privy Council’s disallowance became effective only on the date when
official notice was received in Virginia, in which case the ministers lost,
or whether the Two Penny Act was void ab initio, in which case the clergy
was entitled to its back pay.744 In the first two suits, one minister won
and one lost.745
A third suit, known to historians as the Parsons’ Cause was filed in
Hanover County, in which the court ruled as a matter of law that the
Two Penny Act was void ab initio and summoned a jury of enquiry to
calculate the damages to which the plaintiff minister was entitled.746 The
defendant vestry thereupon retained Patrick Henry, the son of the
county court’s presiding justice, to represent it.747 In addressing the jury,
Henry, whom opposing counsel accused of “‘treason,’” ignored the issue
of damages and addressed directly the merits of his father’s ruling of
See 2 LYON GARDINER TYLER, HISTORY OF VIRGINIA: THE FEDERAL PERIOD 1763–1861, at 61–
62 (1924) (discussing this controversial legislation). The preceding factual scenario comes from
this source.
742
See id. at 63–66 (discussing the subsequent legislation regard clergymen’s salary). The
preceding factual scenario comes from this source. See also SMITH, supra note 592, at 607–626
(discussing this appeal and others surrounding the Parson’s Cause with great doctrinal
precision); CRAIG YIRUSH, SETTLERS, LIBERTY, AND EMPIRE: THE ROOTS OF EARLY AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORY, 1675–1775, at 169–79 (2011) (providing the most recent discussion of the
Parson’s Cause itself and those surrounding it); infra text accompanying notes 746–51 (briefly
discussing the Parson’s Cause).
743
See TYLER, supra note 741, at 70–76 (discussing the several suits initiated in regards to
the act).
744
See id. at 70 (explaining that a plaintiff would receive damages only if a jury found the
law to be invalid).
745
ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, PATRICK HENRY: PATRIOT IN THE MAKING 123–24 (1957).
746
TYLER, supra note 741, at 70.
747
RICHARD R. BEEMAN, PATRICK HENRY: A BIOGRAPHY 19–20 (1974) (discussing Henry’s
arguments before the jury).
741
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law.748 Henry called the Two Penny Act “‘a good law . . . of general
utility’” that “‘could not, consistently with the original compact between
King and people, . . . be annulled.’”749 In Henry’s view, “‘a King, by
disallowing Acts of this salutary nature, from being the father of his
people, degenerate[d] into a Tyrant, and forfeit[ed] all right to his
subjects’ obedience.’”750 The jury, like the one in Riddle v. Stodghill,
agreed and effectively nullified the court’s ruling of law by returning a
verdict of one penny damages, and when the plaintiff moved to set aside
the verdict as contrary to the evidence, the court overruled the motion.751
Some present in the courtroom may have wondered why Henry
adopted so extreme a position, and it is possible that he was merely
seeking popularity.752 However, there also may have been a legal
reason. Writing some fifteen years later in his Notes on the State of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson observed that, although juries typically
decided only the facts and took their law from the court, “this division of
the subject lies within their discretion only. And if the question relate[s]
to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the judges
may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and
fact.”753 Henry, that is, may have needed to argue his case as a
constitutional one in order to deny law-finding power to the court and
confer such power instead on the jury.
Knox v. Daniel,754 a case from 1768, is consistent with this
interpretation of Jefferson’s understanding. There the jury returned a
verdict for £75 damages upon finding that the defendant “maliciously
and unjustly to vex, injure, and oppress” the plaintiff “without any just
or reasonable cause” had him bound over to an examining court on
suspicion of felony.755 The defendant moved in arrest of judgment on
Id. at 19.
Id.
750
Id.
751
Id. at 19–20; see also MEADE, supra note 745, at 124–34 (providing a detailed account of the
Parson’s Cause). Ultimately, the General Court, and later the Privy Council, rejected the position
of the Hanover County Court and ruled that the disallowance of the Two Penny Act took effect
only upon its official communication to authorities in Virginia. See SMITH, supra note 592, at
623–24 (discussing rejection by the Privy Council); TYLER, supra note 741, at 74 (discussing
rejection by the General Court).
752
See BEEMAN, supra note 747, at 20 (providing Henry’s supposed declaration to Maury that
Henry took such position “to render himself popular”).
753
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140 (William Peden ed., 1955).
754
Compare Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty Ct., Oct. 25, 1768), in FAUQUIER 1767–1769, supra
note 682, at 62 (reporting the jury verdict and defendant’s motion to arrest the judgment), with
Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1770), in FAUQUIER 1769–1771, supra note 732, at 54
(reporting the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion).
755
Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., Oct. 25, 1768), in FAUQUIER 1767–1769, supra note 682,
at 62.
748
749

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

874

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

four grounds: (1) that suit had been brought in a county other than
where the alleged tort had occurred; (2) the plaintiff had not given notice
of his intent to sue; (3) the quite large £75 damage verdict was excessive;
and (4) the jurors improperly had separated and taken meals at their
own expense between the time they began receiving evidence and the
time they returned their verdict in open court.756 Indeed, the defendant
implied that the jurors changed their verdict after separating. Normally
the defendant’s fourth allegation would have led to rejection of a jury
verdict, but in Knox it did not.757 Perhaps the court deferred to the jury
because it did not credit the defendant’s factual claims. However, the
case also may have been one where the jury had ignored standard blackletter law to protect a subject’s liberty and the court, recognizing the
jury's superior authority, tolerated its doing so.
Oldum v. Allerton,758 a 1739 case of which Jefferson was almost
certainly aware, also fits with what he wrote in Notes on the State of
Virginia. Although Oldum involved a different issue—the immunity of
judges to suit—the argument of counsel reported in the case made the
same distinction presented in Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia
between ordinary litigation, where judges should enjoy immunity, and
matters involving judicial bias or threats to the liberty of the subject.759
Counsel made the standard argument that it would be “dangerous” to
place “Power . . . in the hands of a single person subject to no control”
because “Human nature is too depraved to depend altogether upon the
virtue & integrity of the judge[.] Power is apt to intoxicate & spoil the
best tempers . . . . Fences against arbitrary power should be kept up.”760
At the same time the argument of counsel recognized the “hardship”
that would be imposed on judges by subjecting them to suit on account
of their judgments.761 However, counsel continued:
Besides the Justices in these cases are always very
tenderly dealt with by the jury in their damages if it
appears to be a mere mistake in judgment. On the
contrary where there are any marks of violence or
oppression o[r] partiality or passion[,] they [the jurors]

Id.
See Knox v. Daniel (Fauquier Cnty. Ct., June 26, 1770), in FAUQUIER 1769–1771, supra
note 732, at 54 (denying the defendant’s motion).
758
(Va. Gen. Ct., Oct. 1739), in 2 BARRADALL & RANDOLPH, supra note 144, at B320, B331–43.
759
See id. at B332–34 (providing the issue presented in the case and the court’s distinction
between liability and nonliability of the judiciary).
760
Id. at B341.
761
Id. at B342.
756
757
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make them [the judges] smart for it in damages as
indeed they ought.762
We can best make sense out of Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia
and the cases that have just been discussed if we start with the
proposition that early eighteenth-century judicial practices of good
conscience, good reason, and justice were being transformed in the 1760s
and 1770s by lawyers like Jefferson into a more formal and mechanical
body of legal knowledge and legal rules. Gentlemen justices such as
Patrick Henry’s father maintained control of their localities by avoiding
appearances of oppression or partiality; they understood that, if they
behaved badly, their underlings in one way or another might make them
smart. As Virginia’s legal profession moved to the fore in the second
half of the century, however, lawyers like Jefferson were no longer
satisfied that judges would practice good conscience and maintain
appearances lest the people somehow sanction them. The lawyers strove
to articulate rules with which they could bind the judges.
Accordingly, Notes on the State of Virginia spelled out as a rule—that
judges had no power to set aside a jury verdict in a case of constitutional
magnitude—what previously had only been a tendency to respect jury
freedom in cases of public significance. Inevitably, as the power of
lawyers and their rules increased, that of lay justices in particular and
courts in general became more and more constrained.
B. The Collapse of the Land Bargain
As noted above, land distribution policy was a highly contested
political issue in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century
Virginia.763 By 1710, however, the great planters had won the contest,
and the crown had acquiesced in the practice of granting virgin lands
almost entirely to leading planters. The planters then developed
extensive land speculation schemes, on which they became quite
dependent as they strove to maintain the economic status quo.764
Indeed, land speculation became so important to maintaining the
status quo that leading Virginians became unduly sensitive to any threats
to it. Thus, when in 1752 Governor Robert Dinwiddie, in pursuit of his
instructions, demanded the payment of a fee for sealing patents granting

Id.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing land distribution policies in colonial Virginia in depth).
764
See HOLTON, supra note 168, at xiii–xvii, 3–38 (discussing the efforts of Virginia’s elite
gentlemen in maintaining wealth and power).
762
763
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land his demand raised a storm.765 Although such fees were common in
other colonies, they had not been paid in Virginia for several decades.766
The fee demanded by Dinwiddie was not a trivial one—roughly the
purchase price of a cow.767 Such a fee would have had its greatest impact
on people seeking small grants and on speculators seeking a large
number of grants—speculators who often were members either of the
However,
Governor’s Council or of the House of Burgesses.768
opponents of the fee did not protest against it on economic grounds.
Instead, they turned to a young lawyer for legal and constitutional
argument when the House of Burgesses appointed Peyton Randolph,
who had been educated at the Inns of Court and was only in his early
thirties, to travel to England for a substantial fee of £2500 and argue their
cause before the Privy Council.769 Dinwiddie promptly removed
Randolph from his post as Attorney General and appointed George
Wythe in his stead.770
In essence, the Burgesses’ argument before the Privy Council made
two points: (1) that by agreeing earlier to issue land patents without
charging any fee the crown had established a precedent from which it
could not now depart; and (2) the fee amounted to a tax and that no tax
could be levied in Virginia without the consent of the House of
Burgesses.771 In 1754 the Council rejected both arguments and upheld
Dinwiddie’s right to collect the fee.772 However, it made some
concessions to the Burgesses: it exempted from the fee patents that had
been filed before Dinwiddie’s announcement of the fee, grants of fewer
than 100 acres, and grants of land west of the Alleghany Mountains, with
the result that few grants remained that were covered by the fee.773
Virginians accordingly celebrated what they counted as a victory; they
also were pleased when the Privy Council directed Dinwiddie to restore
BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 256–57.
See id. (providing brief general discussions of the conflict over Governor Dinwiddie’s
proposed fees); see also TYLER, supra note 741, at 58–60 (discussing briefly petitions and appeals
brought in regards to the tax).
767
BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 256.
768
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 621, at 220–21 (discussing the role of the pistle fee dispute in
the revolution).
769
See Jack P. Greene, The Case of the Pistole Fee: The Report of a Hearing on the Pistole Fee
Dispute Before the Privy Council, June 18, 1754, 66 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 399, 399, 402
(1958) (providing brief background information on the dispute and discussing Randolph’s
appointment by the House of Burgesses); see also JONES, supra note 498, at 179 (providing
biographical information on Randolph as a member of the Inns of Court).
770
Greene, supra note 769, at 402.
771
Id. at 401. For a transcript of arguments presented on behalf of the Assembly, see id. at
412–19.
772
Id. at 405.
773
BILLINGS ET AL., supra note 112, at 257; Greene, supra note 769, at 404.
765
766
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Randolph to the office of Attorney General, and Dinwiddie consented to
the payment of Randolph’s £2500 fee.774
The importance of the dispute over Dinwiddie’s demand for a fee
upon issuing land grants lay less in the substance of the dispute than in
the habits of mind it created. The three-year-long conflict between
Dinwiddie and the Burgesses established important patterns of thought
that channeled future Virginia resistance to British demands.
At its root, the dispute was about an economic matter of central
importance to Virginia’s great planters—their access to new land on
cheap, favorable terms. They could not tolerate the possibility that
crown officials might alter the land bargain worked out at the beginning
of the century, a bargain on which their economic security depended.
The planters argued, however, not on economic but on legal and
constitutional grounds. Their belief that they had triumphed on those
grounds acculturated them to turn to lawyers and constitutional
argument when, within a decade, new conflicts with Great Britain arose.
The role that law and the constitution played in obstructing
Dinwiddie’s demands also made the interests of the bar congruent with
the interests of planters. The two groups had not necessarily shared
interests when debt collection had been the main task of Virginia law
and lawyers; then, lawyers and planters had sometimes been at odds.
However, once the great planters conceived of lawyers as protectors of
the constitutional, and thus economic, structure of Virginia society their
alliance became firm. Lawyers became important figures in the inner
circle that dominated Virginia culture.
The next conflict over land policy—and a more important one than
Governor Dinwiddie’s demand for a fee for issuing land patents—
emerged in the aftermath of the Seven Years War. Virginians had
expected Britain’s victory in the war to open the Ohio Valley to
settlement and accordingly were sorely disappointed by the
Proclamation of 1763, which barred all settlement west of the
Appalachians.775 Nothing better demonstrates how badly the great
planters needed the western land in which they were speculating than
the continual efforts they made and the hope they maintained for the
crown to rescind the proclamation.776 Their ultimate disappointment
Greene, supra note 769, at 405.
See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NORTH AMERICA 92 (2006) (explaining the effect of the Proclamation of 1763).
776
See id. at 60–62, 92–94, 98–99 (2006) (providing a brief history of the proclamation and
discussing attempts to sell and acquire land in this region); PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
LEVIATHAN: EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 50, 55–61, 85–94, 134–36 (2007)
(discussing attempts to acquire land despite the proclamation and the resulting consequences);
HOLTON, supra note 168, at 3–13, 28–32, 35 (discussing tensions between land speculators,
774
775
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came in 1774, when the British ministry, in a conscious effort to
discourage western speculation and settlement, drafted the Quebec Act
so as to incorporate into the Roman Catholic province of Quebec much of
the land Virginians had hoped to exploit.777
London’s policy of discouraging western speculation and settlement
did not lead Virginians directly to revolution,778 but it tended in that
direction. The policy made it more difficult for Virginia planters to pay
debts to British creditors and to abide by long-accepted arrangements,
such as those sanctioned by the Navigation Acts requiring that all
Virginia tobacco to be marketed through Great Britain.779 This led
notable Virginians, such as Arthur Lee and George Washington, to
suppose that the ministry was “antiamerican” [sic] and had a
“‘malignant disposition to American[s].’”780 They and the group of legal
thinkers associated with them then did what litigants and lawyers
typically do in the context of an interest-group conflict—they developed
theoretical arguments in support of their economic positions. In the
process, they translated, and thereby escalated, their economic
materialist battle over land, tobacco marketing, and debt into a
constitutional controversy that called into question longstanding, settled
assumptions about the relationship of Virginia to Great Britain.781
When, before the middle of the century, Virginia’s great planters
understood that they had cut a deal with the crown that gave them land
in return for their acceptance of mercantalist policies, they could both
cope with the economic consequences of the deal and see themselves as
equal participants in a consensual, fair process of governance. It did not
matter that they were not represented in Parliament as long as they
Native Americans, and the Privy Council over land out west); PHILYAW, supra note 656, at 46–
64 (discussing the attempts of Virginia’s “land barons” to acquire “Land of the Western
Waters” in the midst of the proclamation). Perhaps the most extreme example of these efforts
was a large-scale military adventure by Virginians against Ohio Valley Native Americans that
has come to be known as Lord Dunmore’s War. Patrick Griffin tends to treat the adventure as
largely orchestrated by Dunmore for his own political purposes. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 97–123.
Woody Holton, on the other hand, sees Virginia speculators rather than Governor Dunmore as
the driving force. See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 33–35.
777
GRIFFIN, supra note 776, at 102; HOLTON, supra note 168, at 33; see PHILYAW, supra note 656,
at 62–64 (discussing efforts to speculate land out west despite legislative hindrances in the
1760s and 1770s).
778
See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 36 (arguing that the abolition of western land speculation
was not a “paramount concern” in the revolution).
779
See id. at 3–4, 46–66 (discussing Jefferson’s and Washington’s difficulties in maintaining
their land agreements as well as tensions arising due to the Navigation Acts).
780
Id. at 9, 32. For statements of Edmund Pendleton and Thomas Jefferson, see id. at 35–36 &
36 n.54.
781
See, e.g., YIRUSH, supra note 742, at 158–79 (discussing the pistole fee dispute and the
Parson’s Cause as disputes that tested constitutional principles).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/9

Nelson: Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia

2014]

Law and the Structure of Power

879

participated in other ways as free men in the lawmaking process and
could live with the material output of that process. However, when
crown and Parliament claimed supreme power and by proclamation and
legislation changed fundamental ground rules that had been in place for
decades Virginians feared both for their economic well-being and for the
Thus, their economic and
loss of their freedom and power.782
constitutional interests were congruent.
The first impact of this congruence was to transform what might
have been a trivial political conflict in Virginia—the conflict over the
Stamp Act—into a supreme constitutional controversy. Patrick Henry
was again at the center of the controversy in Virginia with his
introduction in the House of Burgesses of five resolutions against the
Stamp Act, the last of which declared that the act “ha[d] a manifest
tendency to destroy British as well as American freedom.”783 This last
resolution passed by only one vote, and that vote was reversed on the
following day.784 However, the debate among the Burgesses gave play to
radical ideas and when the stamp distributor for Virginia arrived in the
colony he was met by a mob and forced to resign his office.785
As a result, no stamps were available for sale, and business could not
proceed as usual. Lawyers had to decide what to do. Thus, the
legislature, following the Stamp Act’s repeal, extended the period for
recording deeds and other documents that had not been recorded in the
absence of stamps.786 Similarly, the courts had to decide how to proceed
in the absence of the stamps required on judicial documents. Some
closed down and declined to transact any business requiring stamps,
while others continued to do business on the ground that no stamps
were available and that it was essential they remain open. Most
interesting was Northampton County Court, which responded as
follows to an inquiry from its nonjudicial officers whether they would
incur any penalties for keeping the court open without using stamped
paper:
[T]he said court unanimously declared it to be their
[o]pinion that the said [a]ct did not bind, affect, or
concern the inhabitants of this [c]olony, inasmuch as
they conceive the same to be unconstitutional, and that
See T. H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE: THE MENTALITY OF THE GREAT TIDEWATER PLANTERS
EVE OF REVOLUTION 124–59, 196–203 (2001) (discussing these fears as relating to the
increasing debts owed by Tidewater tobacco planters).
783
BEEMAN, supra note 747, at 36.
784
Id. at 38–39.
785
Id. at 43.
786
8 HENING, supra note 465, at 199–200.
782
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the said several officers may proceed in the execution of
their respective [o]ffices, without incurring any [p]enalty
by means thereof.787
With this somewhat-modern, judicial declaration of unconstitutionality,
which was entered formally into the record apparently for the purpose
of protecting officials from liability, at least some Virginia legal actors
began to move along with actors in other colonies in directions that
ultimately would result in a new distinctively American common law of
constitutionalism.
The movement occurred in fits and starts, however, and for over a
decade the direction of movement was often unclear. In 1769, for
example, many Virginians joined other colonists in a boycott of imported
British goods that aimed to pressure British merchants to urge
Parliament to repeal the Townsend duties, but they refused to put
further pressure on the merchants by withholding exports of tobacco,
which was then commanding high prices.788 In this instance, the
ideological interests of those advancing constitutional arguments and the
material interests of the great planters were not congruent, and the
limited boycott had only a limited effect.789
As the price of tobacco fell during the next five years, the economic
interest of planters became more congruent with the presentation of
strong constitutional arguments. Thus, when Parliament in 1774 passed
the Quebec Act and the other Intolerable Acts, Virginia joined a boycott
that included a ban on tobacco exports, which was then commanding an
extremely low price.790 Non-exportation, however, created a problem.
Without income from the sale of their tobacco, Virginia planters had no
money with which to pay debts to British creditors. Thus, nonexportation required the enactment of legislation to stop debt collection,
which in turn would further pressure Parliament to repeal the
Intolerable Acts.791 Such legislation, though, appeared certain to be met
with a gubernatorial veto and thus seemed incapable of being passed.
However Lord Dunmore, the royal Governor, came to the rescue.
Under Virginia law, various fees paid to court officers were set by
787
In re. Clerk and Other Officers (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Feb. 11, 1766), microformed on
00327485162124 (Library of Va.); accord TYLER, supra note 741, at 85–86.
788
HOLTON, supra note 168, at 85, 92–94.
789
See id. at 85–95 (discussing the colonists’ efforts to boycott importation and exportation of
goods).
790
See id. at 100–11 (discussing the boycott of 1774).
791
See DEWEY, supra note 512, at 99 (discussing legislative pressure to stop debt collection); see
also HOLTON, supra note 168, at 110–18 (discussing the consequences of the boycott on tobacoo
exportation).
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statute, and the statute setting those fees had expired in April 1774.
Renewal of the fee bill thus was on the legislature’s agenda at its May
1774 session, but before the legislature acted Governor Dunmore
dissolved the House of Burgesses when it approved a resolution
condemning Parliament’s closure of the Port of Boston.792 Historians
dispute whether the Burgesses intentionally postponed consideration of
the fee bill in the expectation that they would be dissolved or whether
failure to enact the bill before dissolution was a mere accident.793
Whatever the intention of the legislature, the law, lawyers, and
courts, in alliance with the economic interests of the planters, now
entered the picture. At a rump session of the Burgesses in Raleigh
Tavern the day after dissolution, the issue arose how the courts should
deal with the failure to enact the fee bill.794 Some thought they should
stay open and establish fees by themselves, while others thought that in
the absence of statutory fees, the courts were required to close.795 An
intermediate position was that courts should remain open for criminal
prosecutions, administration of estates, and recording of documents, but
should not hear debt cases or civil suits more generally.796
Demonstrating their independence of the General Court now that
the land bargain had completely collapsed, the county justices did what
most of the former Burgesses wanted: in most counties, they remained
open but ceased to hear all but occasional debt and civil cases.797 Thus,
in two counties for which records are printed—Caroline in the tidewater
and Fauquier in the piedmont798—judicial business declined markedly.
Caroline County records in the year from June 1773 to May 1774 are 183
pages in length and contain over 1600 entries,799 while Fauquier records
HOLTON, supra note 168, at 117–18.
Compare HOLTON, supra note 168, at 117–18 (asserting that the Burgesses knew that the
Governor was going to dissolve the General Assembly and thus postponed consideration of the
fee bill), with DEWEY, supra note 512, at 100–01 (contending that the Burgesses thought they had
another month of business when the Governor unexpectedly dissolved the Assembly).
794
DEWEY, supra note 512, at 101.
795
Id. at 101–02.
796
Id. at 102.
797
Id. at 97 tbl.6, 102.
798
The Antient Press published printed records of Caroline County in 1994 and of Fauquier
County in 1996. See, e.g., CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589; CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra note 331;
FAUQUIER 1772–1773, supra note 676; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1773–1775 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter
FAUQUIER 1773–1775]; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS MINUTE BOOK FAUQUIER COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 1775–1779 (Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAUQUIER 1775–
1779]; VIRGINIA COUNTY COURT RECORDS ORDER BOOK CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1774–1778
(Ruth Sparacio & Sam Sparacio eds., 1994) [hereinafter CAROLINE 1774–1778].
799
See CAROLINE 1773, supra note 589, at 45–99 (reporting cases from June 1773 until July
1773); CAROLINE 1773–1774, supra note 331, at 1–100 (reporting cases from August 1773
792
793
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from June 1773 to April 1774 are 116 pages long with over 900 entries.800
From June 1774 to May 1775, in contrast, Caroline records are only
twenty-three pages in length with fewer than 300 entries,801 while
Fauquier records are some twenty-seven pages, also with fewer than 300
entries.802 The disappearance of debt and other civil litigation, in short,
reduced county court business to somewhere between thirteen percent
and thirty-three percent of what it had been.
The local judiciary, through legal interpretation rather than a
legislative act, thereby put maximum pressure on Parliament to repeal
the Intolerable Acts. There was nothing that the Governor and the
General Court could do in response, although the General Court itself,
over which the Governor presided, sought to remain open. However, it
too was forced to suspend its sessions when the small group of attorneys
who practiced before it organized a boycott, which litigants and
witnesses later joined.803
The turn of Virginians to lawyers in the summer of 1774, following
habits of mind that had grown up over the previous quarter century,
thus effectively demonstrated their independence of royal authority and
of the colony’s central government. Local courts, with their selfperpetuating membership, went about business as usual, except that
they declined to hear the one category of cases—those involving debt
collection—that central authorities most wanted them to hear. However,
although they acted independently, most Virginians were by no means
yet ready to declare that independence formally even as tensions
continued to mount through the autumn and winter of 1774–1775.804
Then, in April 1775, Governor Dunmore took two steps that pushed
Virginians closer to open rebellion. On April 21, apparently out of fear
that he and other senior officials were threatened with bodily harm,
Dunmore ordered the colony’s supply of gunpowder removed from the
Williamsburg Powder Magazine and placed on board a royal naval

until March 1774); CAROLINE 1774–1778, supra note 798, at 1–29 (reporting cases from
March 1774 until May 1774).
800
See FAUQUIER 1772–1773, supra note 676, at 75–102 (reporting cases from June 1773 until
August 1773); FAUQUIER 1773–1775, supra note 798, at 1–89 (reporting cases from August
1773 until April 1774).
801
See CAROLINE 1774–1778, supra note 798, at 29–52 (reporting cases from June 1774 until
May 1775).
802
See FAUQUIER 1773–1775, supra note 798, at 89–107 (reporting cases from June 1774
until January 1775); FAUQUIER 1775–1779, supra note 798, at 1–9 (reporting cases from February
1775 until May 1775.
803
DEWEY, supra note 512, at 5.
804
See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 136 (“It was a long way from the boycott of 1774 to the
Revolution of 1776.”).
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vessel.805 The next day he quietly warned the speaker of the House of
Burgesses that if any senior British official was harmed, he would
proclaim freedom for slaves.806 Several weeks later, Dunmore himself
fled Williamsburg and began raising an army to defend Britain's
interests.807 At first, he welcomed slaves who joined his forces by
promising them freedom, and later in November 1775 he proclaimed
publicly that he would free any slaves that joined.808
The threat of a slave revolt pushed Virginians nearly unanimously in
the direction of independence.809 Beginning in the spring of 1776, courts
began to appoint officials such as sheriffs “pursuant to an ordinance of
convention” rather than on a commission from the royal governor.810
Over the next several months, it became increasingly clear that a formal
declaration of independence, together with the formal establishment of a
new government, were necessary to maintain internal order and obtain
foreign support essential to defeat Great Britain.811 Accordingly, on May
15, 1776, the Virginia convention directed its delegates in Congress to
propose independence, and on May 16, the Union Jack was hauled down
from the Williamsburg capitol and replaced with a continental flag.812
On June 29, a new constitution was proclaimed, and Patrick Henry was
elected Governor.813 The royal colony of Virginia thereby came to an
end, and the new Commonwealth of Virginia came into place.814

Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144–45.
807
Id. at 133.
808
Id. at 148–49.
809
See id. 149, 158–61 (discussing colonists’ reactions to Dunmore’s actions).
810
Appointment of Dally (Northampton Cnty. Ct., Mar. 12, 1776), microformed on
00327485162124 (Library of Va.); accord Appointment of Fleming (Botetourt Cnty. Ct., Apr.
16, 1776), microformed on 00307225162119 (Genealogical Soc’y of Utah).
811
See HOLTON, supra note 168, at 171–75, 183–205 (providing a detailed discussion on efforts
to end the war).
812
Id. at 204.
813
Id.
814
See id. (discussing the establishment of the Commonwealth of Virginia).
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